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ABSTRACT

When we strive to better ourselves morally, what
aspects of our humanity do we bring into play?

In my

dissertation, I consider Kant's answer to this question.
The fact that Kant held moral obligation to be reason-based,
moral action to be rational and voluntary, and feelings to
be largely irrational and beyond our control does not entail
that he denied feelings a role in the moral life.

Against

common misconceptions of Kant as a philosopher who neglects
the emotional aspects of moral life, I show that he actually
considers our emotional dispositions to be valuable tools
for perfecting ourselves morally, i.e., for fulfilling all
our duties and striving to do so from respect for the moral
law.

Feelings such as love, respect, and pride can help us

increase our moral perfection because they make us less
prone to act in morally unacceptable ways and more prepared
to carry out our various duties.

Because such feelings help

us carry out our duties, it is our duty to cultivate them.
I show not only that it is incumbent on us to cultivate
morally beneficial emotions, but also how we can do it.
Building on Kant's vague hints about what the process
involves, I argue that cultivating a given feeling requires,
above all, sharpening one's judgment about it, one's
sensitivity to its nature and to the shape it takes in one's
own character.

This enables one to make responsible

decisions about whether to act on the feeling and, when one
ii

does choose to act on it, to express it in a way which is
dignified and which harmonizes with one's sense of moral
integrity.

Cultivating morally beneficial feelings also

involves refining the feelings themselves through
participating in society and in culture--shaping emotional
bonds through friendship and engaging in art, sports, and
the like as creator as well as consumer.
I begin with an argument showing that on Kant's mature
moral theory, it is our duty to cultivate feelings which
help us form a virtuous disposition.

I then discuss

particular feelings which are especially important in this
regard.

I begin with the feeling of respect for the moral

law and show that it constitutes the motive of duty.

Kant's

"pure” moral motive— the motive of duty— is thus actually a
feeling which is grounded in a rational grasp of the moral
law.

I then consider feelings associated with our duties

toward ourselves (e.g., pride and courage) and with our
duties toward others (e.g., love and respect) and raise the
question of how cultivated feelings figure in the virtuous
character and also in relation to good willing and to
morally worthy action.

I show that certain "moral" feelings

(feelings with a rational basis, e.g., "proper" pride and
love of man) can become part of the motive of duty itself
and so can serve as motives to morally worthy action.
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INTRODUCTION

When we strive to better ourselves morally, what are we
doing?

What aspects of our humanity do we bring into play?

I will here consider Kant's answer to these questions.
At first glance,

Kant's picture of morally-engaged

humanity looks bleak and o v e r - l n t e l l e c t u a l i z e d .

He seems to

admit only our purely rational side into the arena of moral
assessment and activity:

moral willing and acting are based

on our rational grasp of the moral law and its requirements.
The emotions seem barred from playing a n y motivating role in
moral life--even from being proper objects of moral
assessment--because, as Kant so often says,
only irrational
but also,

they are not

(unable to judge the rightness of actions)

to a great extent,

beyond our cont r o l . x

Since

xIn this work, I use the terms "feeling" and
"emotion" (as
well as
their
plurals) interchangeably
to
refer not
only
to
episodic feelings but also
to our dispositions to feel
them and
to
the attitudes
and
habits of
thought
which underlie
those
dispositions, all
of
which are
part of
a person's
character.
These
terms, together
with the
apt but
unfortunately outdated
term, "sentiment," cover the broad range of feelings I take to be
covered
by Kant's
use
of
"G e f u h l ."
That
I use
the
terms
interchangeably might
strike some
readers as
misleading given
their
sometimes
disparate
meanings.
The
reader
might,
for
instance,
think I'm going to
show that strong
emotions such as
rage and lust play a key part
in moral life, for Kant, and might
then
be disappointed
to
find that
a substantial part
of
my
discussion focuses
on a comparatively pallid class
of "reasonbased" feelings
(the "moral"
feelings) which might
even strike
some
as mere arid caricatures of natural emotions.
To forestall
disappointment, I assure the reader that I will show that all our
feelings--including
those which are
nature-based (some of which
might even underlie
our vices)--can
be brought to
bear on
our
moral
improvement,
but
that
only
the
"moral"
feelings
can
motivate us in morally worthy action because they alone stem from
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moral praise and blame attach only to voluntary actions, and
since moral actions must spring from the good will which
acts from the reason-based motive of duty,

the emotions

appear to be neither morally valuable nor morally relevant,
on Kant's view.
I hope to show that such an intellectualistic rendering
of the Kantian virtuous character,

while containing a kernel

of truth,

is incomplete and crude in its conception of

feeling.

The kernel of truth is that morality JLa. reason-

based rather than nature-based,

for Kant.

Natural feelings,

such as the sympathy which might move me to help somebody
who has fallen on the street, are neither lasting enough nor
evenly enough distributed to provide a universally
accessible foundation for morality.
accessible to every human being and

In order to be
safe from the

misfortunes of circumstance and the inequity of natural
endowments,

the moral motive must be grounded

in something

so essential to humanity that everbody can be expected to
have

it.

That common element

By locating the moral
gives morality--and

is reason.

lav in common human reason, Kant

in particular, moral motivation--the

stable foundation it needs.

Since the moral motive

for the moral lav, or the motive ofduty in its most
form)

is always available for us to

(respect
basic

act on in virtue of our

an awareness of
the moral
lav or of
its specific
obligations.
This
sense of duty, however,
can join with
natural feelings in
several ways, illustrated in Chapters 3-5.
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reason,
of luck.

Kant makes morality a matter of choice rather than
Only by acting

from the motive of duty do we show

a direct concern for the rightness and/or moral
permissibility of our actions.

Because

concern for

awareness of) the rightness

(and, when engaged,

of our actions,

it embodies a direct

respect for the moral law--unlike feelings

such as s y m p a t h y - - c a n 't "misfire" by sometimes leading us to
wrong action.*

And in the absence of a fully worked-out

moral theory which is feeling-based— say, a theory showing
how love can, without the assistance of reason,

not only

give rise to obligations but also be intrinsically
principle-guided and hence not blind--we have to take Kant's
word on the

inadequacies and real dangers of feeling-based

ethical theories.
The kernel of trut h — that morality is based on pure
reason,

for Kant--has led philosophers to criticize him for

having an alienated and skeletal conception of the morally
engaged self.

The common core of the criticism is that he

fails to give sufficient moral credit to the sensible,
nature-based aspects of humanity.

If to be morally good is

to know what duty demands and to act from that sense of
duty, and to have a sense of duty is just to be aware of the
moral law, then morality,

for Kant, reduces to being

*Barbara
Herman
gives the
example of
being led
by one's
sympathy to help some art thieves load their getaway car (Herman,
"On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty," The Practice of
Moral J u d g m e n t , p p . 4-5).
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responsive to principle.
not all there
right emotions

But responsiveness to principle

is to being a virtuous person.

is

Feeling the

in the right sorts of circumstances

is an

aspect of good moral character that Kant seems to ignore.
Schiller began the critical trend, arguing that respect
for the moral
because

lav is not in fact the highest moral

ideal

it can only arise from a sense of mastery over,

rather than cooperation with,
the dutiful soul,

the inclinations.

Schiller suggests,

should be our moral

Instead of

the beautiful soul

ideal--the soul which "feels able to

trust to the impulse of desire without running the risk of
offending m o r a l i t y . " 3
Bernard Williams
trend of late,

is a prominent thinker to join the

launching a multi-fronted attack against

Kant's apparent devaluation of the emotions.

Williams

argues that far from playing an y minor role

in the moral

life, the emotions are actually what give sense to moral
practices:

it is only by seeing a person's actions as

expressive of an underlying emotion,

e.g., compassion,

we can make sense of her actions at all.*

that

On Williams'

view, the emotions are central aspects of an individual's
moral char a c t e r — a position that Kant with his principlebased ethics cannot possibly seem to share.

3Schiller,
*91KS, p . 4 73.

"On Loveliness and Dignity," S c h i l l e r 's Completed

“•"Morality and the Emotions," Problems of The S e l f . p. 222.
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But the fact that Kantian morality is reason-based does
not entail that the emotions have no place in it.

Only if

we think of emotions as natural events which take place in
us entirely independently of our choices do we need to
exclude them from the realm of morality,
voluntary.

the realm of the

I wish to suggest that Kant did not think of all

feelings as nature-based.

On Kant's view, there

is a

privileged class of feelings which is reason-based.
class includes feelings such as respect,
conscience,

proper pride,

This

the workings of

and the love of mankind.

These

feelings are not mere impulses: they follow upon rational
judgments--in particular,

upon a proper grasp of the moral

law and the realization that we ourselves are the authors of
its duties.

Since wfi. control our reflection on the moral

law and our attentiveness to the ways in which its
requirements are specific to our finite nature and manifest
themselves

in particular circumstances,

the cultivation of

feelings based on such reflection also lies within our
power.
admitted

This special class of emotions can therefore be
into the moral arena from the very outset.

What I wish in particular to consider with regard to
these "moral" feelings is what their relation is to the
broader range of natural feelings and what they can do to
bring the latter in line with the requirements of reason.
I will give a catalogue of the three main types of moral
feeling in Kant's theory,

showing,
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for each one, what its

role

is in morality and how it can be cultivated.

I will

also discuss the cultivation of feelings which are not
strictly "moral"

in that they are not preceded by

consciousness of the moral law, but which are still
instrumental to morality in ways yet to be specified.
The project is thus to show the importance of the
emotions

in Kant's conception of the moral life.

that respect,
theory because
dignity.

in particular,

I argue

has a certain primacy in Kant's

it makes us heed others'

(as well as our own)

It also tempers feelings such as love, which when

left unchecked can become morally harmful.
In Chapter 1, I give the argument that there is room
for the emotions

in Kant's mature,

reason-based system.

I

begin by considering Kant's seemingly inconsistent remarks
about the relation between anthropology (the empirical study
of human beings) and a metaphysics of morals
body of moral principles).
knowledge

(an a priori

I argue that anthropological

is the material to which Kant applies the moral

law in order to yield the specific duties confronting us.
then turn to the question of how moral worth,
value

in Kant's system of ethics,

motivated actions.

I

the highest

can attach to emotionally

Morally worthy actions, according to

Kant, are those which are motivated by respect for the moral
lav.

I argue that feelings which have been cultivated with

an eye to moral ends contain within themselves a kernel of
respect for the moral lav, and so, can serve as morally

worthy motives.

I conclude with a catalogue of the three

main types of morally beneficial
dignity-feelings,
greater detail

and helping feelings— which I discuss

in

in subsequent chapters.

In Chapter
moral

feelings--duty-feelings/

3, I focus on the feeling of respect for the

law and explain why it constitutes the only morally

worthy motive,
commentators,
of the moral

in Kant's eyes.

Against "formalist"

who see respect as a purely intellectual grasp
law,

I argue that respect is a reason-based

feeling, differing from other emotions
proper reflection on the law.

in that it follows a

I also argue that the moral

lav must be grasped in the right sort of w a y — as embodying
the concept of d u t y — in order for us to feel respect for it.
In order to grasp the lav in this way, we must consider
from an appropriate standpoint,
are finite rational beings,

it

namely, an awareness that we

not pure intellects.

Only then

can we feel the humility which constitutes the "negative"
side of respect.

The importance of a proper self-conception

in our reflection on the moral lav is often neglected in
discussions of Kant's conception of respect.

I seek to

remedy that situation and at the same time to show why
reflection on our finite rational

identity does not threaten

the autonomy of morality by introducing incentives
"extraneous" to the moral law itself.
In Chapter

3, I consider the feelings which stem from a

recognition of our unconditional worth.
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These "dignity-

feelings"--pride,

courage,

love of honor, and the workings

of conscience— serve primarily,

though not exclusively,

help us carry out our duties toward ourselves.

to

Heeding our

sense of dignity and cultivating related emotions,

I argue,

is a main avenue toward shaping a distinctive c h a r a c t e r .
where "character"

is to be understood not only in the moral

sense of the good character who lives up to the principles
of morality,

but also in a more

individualized sense, as the

character who has a sense of her own individuality and is
able to trust and enjoy her emotions because she has unified
them in accordance with the idea of her dignity.

By

considering specific character types with different
strengths and weaknesses--that

is, different needs for moral

improvement--I show that cultivating character in both of
these senses

is morally incumbent on us, for Kant.

I also consider the moral feelings associated with good
or bad conscience:

self-respect and guilt,

respectively.

There is a danger,

in Kant's duty-oriented theory,

of

acquiring what he calls a "tyrannical" conscience which
blames one for having failed to do one's duty even where one
has done everything one could rationally be expected to do.
Even though supererogation is not a problem for Kant in the
way it is for utilitarians,

the ever-present possibility of

being tempted to violate our duties can lead to a tyrannical
conscience.

Although Kant himself proposes no solution for

how to avoid such a conscience,
8

I give my own solution by

shoving how to weaken morally harmful

inclinations without

compromising one's own individuality.
In Chapter 4, I consider feelings which help us carry
out our duties toward others--notably sympathy,
respect for others.

love and

Like the "dignity-feelings" discussed

in Chapter 3, these feelings must be cultivated

in

accordance with moral principles and ends in order to
receive proper expression.
feelings

But they differ

from dignity-

in that they are essentially sociable

directed)

(not sel f 

in character.

The central feeling here is the love of mankind.

While

Kant says that it cannot be a du t y to have this feeling,
since love cannot be felt out of the constraint inherent in
the thought of duty,

it is still a duty to cultivate it by

practicing beneficence

(DV:401-2).

is that by doing good to others,
(DV:402,
to make

457).

Kant's assumption here

we will come to love them

Although this is a tenuous assumption,

I try

it more plausible by considering concrete situations

in which we do help other people.

I argue that the social

graces are an especially fruitful ground for cultivating our
love of man.
I also show, however,

that love of man,

interpreted as

a direct concern for the well-being of others, must be
understood pas part and parcel of the motive of duty itself
as it manifests

itself in the morally mature agent.

9

In Chapter 5, I focus on the type of love manifested
interpersonal relations such as friendship,
the more broadly directed
related).
Kant

love of mankind

in

rather than on

(though these are

Against critics such as Williams,

who argues that

is wrong to make duty rather than affection the proper

motive even in such intimate relations such as that between
man and wife,
should,
this.
Love,

I argue that

interpersonal relations do, and

involve obligations, and that Kant rightly sees
This does not preclude them from manifesting l o v e .

for Kant,

respect.

is conditioned by principles and tempered by

Only by respecting the loved one can the lover

heed the loved one's wants rather than imposing her own
conception of happiness on him.

Respect towards others

is

thus needed for us to be able to fulfil our duties of love,
a prominent one being our duty to promote others'
I hope,

in the end,

to suggest that morality and

happiness are actually closer
us to think.

happiness.

in Kant's system than he leads

Morality requires unifying one's emotions

accordance with moral principles.
precisely what happiness consists

But a unified self

in

is

in, according to Kant.

suggest that the moral emotions provide a "middle realm"
between reason and inclination, which the inclinations can
see as an "ally" and which reason approves of morally.
Through the cultivation of moral feeling,
are at least partly satisfied
manner.

the inclinations

in a morally acceptable

The cultivation of moral

10

feeling is therefore one

I

of the ways of realizing highest good in the world:
happiness

in proportion to virtue.

11

Cftaptec L l

Kant

Mfl-iaL Relevance aJ. Emotion

is commonly taken to hold an inadequate

if not

downright crude view of the emotions and their place in the
moral

life.1

This assumption

is made not only by his

critics but also by some of his commentators.
glance,

the assumption seems well-founded.

At first

Even

if one

recognizes that Kant does give certain feelings a role in
the moral

life,

one can legitimately complain that his

catalogue is incomplete:
love and respect

(the latter of which many hold not even to

be a genuine feeling,
fear,

his discussion focuses primarily on

for Kant),

but surely feelings such as

pride and envy have morally important functions which

warrant discussion.
There are three central

ideas in Kant's moral system

which seem to support the conclusion that Kant did not take
the emotions seriously.

The first is that since feelings

cannot serve as a basis for moral obligation,

the moral law

is rooted in pure reason and not in natural feelings
(DV:376-8)*

The second claim is that our actions are

morally worthy only when we are motivated by the thought of
duty,

ie., the self-constraint we experience when we reflect

1I henceforth use
"emotion" and "feeling"
interchangeably,
except when one of them is
more appropriate to the context.
See
footnote 1 of the
Introduction for
a discussion
of my use of
these
terms
and their
relation
to the
more
outdated (though
popular in the 18th Century) term, "sentiment."
*1 discuss this claim in greater detail
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in Chapter 2.

on the moral

law (DV:379-80).

as constraining because
principles or maxims
G:422n)

We experience the moral

law

it sets a limiting condition on the

(subjective principles of reason;

on which we propose to act:

it tells us to act only

on those maxims which could at the same time serve as
universal laws
beings,

(MM:214).

Since we are finite rational

we will always have

prone to develop)

(or will at least always be

inclinations which tempt us to adopt non-

universalizable or immoral maxims.

Even if our inclinations

are such that they by and large harmonize with moral
requirements,

we will always experience some constraint

the thought of duty,

in

given that inclinations are changeable

and we cannot count on them always harmonizing with the
moral law.*
Before considering the third claim,

it may be helpful

to understand why it is only actions motivated by duty (the
feeling of obligation which stems from our awareness of the
moral law) which have moral worth.

When we allow ourselves

to be so motivated, we are acting out of a direct concern
for the morality of the action.*

Kant maintains that when

*Because
we
are finite,
we
are
also
vulnerable to
the
fluctuations of circumstance.
We are never fully in control of
our emotions; and
given a
time of weakness
and a sufficiently
hateful individual, even the most virtuous individual may one day
find herself tempted to murder.
*In interpreting the motive of duty this way, I am following
Barbara
Herman in
"On Acting from
the
Motive of
Duty,"
The
Practice
Moral J u dgment, Chapter 1.
Herman interprets Kant as
claiming that only action from obligatory maxims can
have moral
worth.
This
certainly harmonizes with Kant's account at MM:222-

13

we act in this way/ our will embodies the valuable state of
autonomy,

or "inner freedom."

That autonomy is a state of freedom is easy to see if
we compare

it to its opposite,

heteronomy.

Heteronomy is

the state of will in which we allow ourselves to be
motivated by idiosyncratic desires, and so, share no common
vantage point with others.

Autonomy,

by contrast,

is a

condition in which we know that our reasons for acting are
universally acceptable,
the moral law.®

since we have tested them against

Since, as practically rational beings, j££.

are the authors of the law and of the duties

it imposes on

3.
However, Kant
sometimes
also
suggests
that action
from
permissible
maxims
can also
have moral
worth.
He
says, for
instance, that all
that we need to do to
have a good will--that
is, for our actions to have moral worth--is
to be concerned with
the
morality
of our
actions, and
we
express this
concern by
testing
our maxim
against the
categorical imperative
(G:403).
Since
permissible maxims
also satisfy
the requirements
of the
categorical imperative, this suggests
that they, like obligatory
maxims, can be acted on from the motive of duty.
I believe this
commits
Kant to
the possibility
of permissible
actions having
moral
worth, even
though it
is hard to see exactly what the
motivational
structure would be in such cases.
The thought of
duty (in the form
of "I am not
violating duty") would
probably
cooperate with the inclination which originally gave rise to
the
permissible maxim.
*Jay Wallace claims that the value of autonomy lies in this
freedom from countervailing reasons.
When
we act autonomously,
that is, when our principle of action is the moral law, we ensure
that
we are acting on a maxim
to which anv other rational agent
could in principle consent.
We are thus acting in a way which is
independent of
personal differences in desires
or inclinations.
Since no reasons can be offered against autonomous actions,
they
have a freedom which heteronomous actions lack--namely, a freedom
from
countervailing
reasons ("Kant
on Moral
Worth and
Moral
Luck,"
unpublished manuscript,
p p . 10-11, 20).
I believe that
this is part
of Kant's thought,
but that the ultimate
value of
autonomy
lies in the fact that it embodies a universal yet selfimposed obligation.

14

us

(CPrR:31,

87; MM:227;

G:431),

acting from duty is the

same as acting from a self-imposed yet universal obligation.
This amounts to the positive freedom of governing oneself by
reasons which are universally valid.
In acting from the thought of duty, we realize autonomy
or "inner freedom."

Since the thought of duty depends on an

awareness of the moral

law, autonomy is equivalent to

governing oneself by pure reason.
claims,

In light of these two

it is easy to understand Kant's third,

rather stern-

sounding claim that:
Since virtue

is based on inner freedom,

it contains a

positive command to man, namely to bring all his
capacities and inclinations under his
control and so to rule over himself,

(reason's)
which goes beyond

forbidding him to let himself be governed by his
feelings and

inclinations

(the duty of a p a t h y ): for

unless reason holds the reins of government
hands,

man's

in its own

feelings and inclinations play the master

over him (DV:408).
Emotions and

inclinations must be checked by reason because

otherwise they become our dominant motives and produce a
heteronomous state of will.

Since autonomy is so central to

the moral life, and autonomy seems
governed by emotions,
significant role

incompatible with being

the emotions do not seem to play any

in the moral life for Kant.

aforementioned claims convey the

15

The three

impression that the moral

life is one in which reason must suppress the emotions so as
to have s.ole reign over the moral subject.
I want to show that this
says that the moral

impression is mistaken.

life is a life

in which reason should

govern the emotions and inclinations;
reason should play the tyrant.

he does not say that

Not all

hostile to reason's moral ends; thus,
must be fought or suppressed.-

Kant

inclinations are

not all

inclinations

Only those dispositions

which are opposed to our adoption of moral ends must be
fought.

In man's struggle

for virtue,

"the v i c e s . the brood

of dispositions opposing the law, are the monsters he has to
fight"

(DV:405, my emphasis).

emotions

favorable to the adoption of moral ends are not,

and of themselves,
become vicious);
good

Those inclinations and

(R:51).

bad

in

(though irrational use of them can

quite on the contrary, Kant considers them

Thus, we have no reason to fight them;

fighting them can be harmful.
emotions cannot enter

indeed,

Rather than claiming that the

into the moral life, Kant even argues

that we have a duty to cultivate emotions which help shape a
moral disposition.
single-handedly,

Far from doing the job of morality

reason enlists certain emotions to help us

cultivate a morally good disposition.

•This has been convincingly shown
by Michael Seidler in his
helpful
article,
"Kant
and
the
Stoics
on
the
Emotions,"
Philosophical
Research Archives.
Volume VII,
1981, e d . Robert
Turnbull (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling
Green State University), Microfiches XII-XIII.
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My claim that certain emotions play a vital role in the
moral life, as Kant conceives of it, raises several
difficult questions.

Perhaps the most obvious one concerns

Kant's sharp distinction between "the moral ord e r ” and "the
order of nature"

(DV:377-8) and his claim that "feeling,

whatever may arouse it, always belongs to the order of
n a ture" (DV:377).
nature,

If feelings belong

how can they ever become part

In order to answer this question,
general

to the order of
of the moral order?

we need to begin with a

inquiry into the relation of anthropology (which

investigates the natural order, as found in human beings)
a metaphysics of morals

to

(which defines the moral order).

The question about the moral status of feeling is bound
up with another problem,
unconditional value

namely,

how moral worth,

the

in Kant's moral system, can attach to

acting from cultivated feelings.

For even if the emotions

can serve as means which help us act i n accordance with
duty, and so are
duties

instrumental to the fulfillment of our

in this sense,

it is far from clear that they help us

act from the motive of duty,

the latter being the only

morally worthy motive.

in other

How,

cultivation of the emotions conducive

words, is the
to a good will?

Here,

it needs to be shown both that feelings can help us adopt
moral ends from the right attitude and that moral worth
attaches to actions which are undertaken from feelings which
have been cultivated with moral ends
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in mind.

Accordingly,

I begin,

in Part I, with an architectonic

investigation into the relation of anthropology to a
metaphysics of morals.

In Part II,

I consider how moral

worth can attach to the cultivation of feelings conducive to
a good will,

that is, how feeling can become part of a

"moral order" at all.

In Part III,

I give a catalogue of

the four main roles that feelings play in the moral life,

to

be filled out in subsequent chapters.

i-L. The. Rgle oi. AnthCQgOlttaY In a. Metaphysics

Morals

A metaphysics of morals contains the system of duties
derived from the moral lav, and so, consists of principles
prescribing how we ought to act rather than principles which
describe how we actually do act.

Nov,

since anthropology

"is based on empirical princ i p l e s ” describing how people
actually do act,

it "is clearly distinguished"

moral doctrine of ends"

(DV:385),

from "the

that is, the Doctrine of

V i r t u e . which constitutes the moral, as opposed to legal,
part of the metaphysics of morals.
ends,

A moral doctrine of

which prescribes ends which we ought to adopt and seek

to realize,

cannot be based on generalization from

experience,

since experience tells us only how people do act

and not how they ought to act.

A moral doctrine of ends

must rather be based on pure reason,

for "reason commands

how men are to act even though no example of this could be
found, and it takes no account of the advantages we can
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thereby gain,

which only experience could teach u s ”

(M M :216 ) ..
Nevertheless,

Kant goes on to emphasize that it does

not detract from the purity of the moral law if we apply it
to objects of experience.
knowledge

Indeed, we need anthropological

in order to apply the moral

law at all.

But just as there must be principles
of nature

He says:

in a metaphysics

for applying those highest principles of

nature in general to objects of experience, a
metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles
of application, and we shall often have to take as our
object the particular nature of man, which is known
only by experience,

in order to show in [human nature]

what can be inferred from universal moral principles.
But this will

in no way detract from the purity of

these principles or cast doubt on their a priori
source.

That

is to say,

in effect,

that a metaphysics

of morals cannot be based on anthropology but can still
be applied to it.
Anthropology,

then,

(MM:216-217)

has a distinct relevance to a

metaphysics of morals,

namely,

"to show in [human nature]

what can be inferred from universal moral principles.”
can mean at least two things.

It can mean either

introducing facts about man in order to derive

This

(a)

from the

moral lav the actual duties which constitute the metaphysics
of morals,

or

(b) deriving those duties a priori and then
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considering them in relation to certain empirical

facts

in

order to determine what they require of us in specific
situations.

I believe that Kant has both in mind.

covered under the heading

(b) is

of "casuistry,” the practice of

applying the moral law to specific situations.

Casuistry is

appended to a metaphysics of morals and describes morally
challenging circumstances designed to train the art of
judgment

(DV:411).7

But how can Kant also intend

The problem in showing how Kant can intend
show how the duties

(a)?

(a)

is to

in the Doctrlne of virtue can be derived

from the moral law in combination with select empirical
elements and still be b i n d i n g , i.e.,

oblige and motivate us

with a necessity that can only be found a priori.
presuppose empirical
duties

from the moral

If we

facts about man in our derivation of
lav, do we not threaten to reduce

these "duties" to mere empirical generalizations

lacking the

obligatory force of commands?
That depends on where
the empirical elements.

in the derivation we introduce

If we allow them to precede the

moral law, we involve ourselves

in the contradiction of

trying to preserve obligation while at the same time doing
away with it. It is contradictory to take,
man's desire for happiness

for example,

(an empirical datum) as basic,

and argue that man can best find happiness by acting from
^For a
helpful discussion of
the relation of
casuistry to
the
metaphysics of morals, see Mary Gregor, The Laws of F r e e d o m ,
p p .14-17.
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duty.

For on such an account,

moral

"duties'* are mere

counsels .of prudence on which we act not from the motive of
duty,

but from that of happiness.

So if we subordinate the

moral law to facts about what man actually desires,

we do

away with obligation altogether--a mistake with which Kant
charges the eudaemonist s , who take the satisfaction of our
preferences as primary, and so end up with merely
hypothetical,

not categorical,

If, however,

imperatives

we begin with the moral

(DV:377-8).
lav and then ask

what features of human agency ve need to be aware of in
order to act morally,

we preserve the binding force of the

law while also being able to introduce facts about man to
derive the duties relevant to human agents.

For the duties

confronting us & a have a special character.

The duties of a

metaphysics of morals pertaining to a different species of
rational beings would look quite different.

For instance,

if there existed rational beings who were finite (had
inclinations which can oppose the law) but immortal,

they

would have no duty to refrain from committing suicide,
that is not possible for them."

Nov,

since

it would seem

plausible to assume that whatever differences exist between

"Onora O'Neill makes a similar point in
"Universal Lavs and
Ends
in Themselves,"
Construct ions af. Reason
(CR), p. 137.
In
general,
she is very sensitive
to the
special shape
that our
duties
take
because of
the fact
that
we are
finite rational
beings.
See CR, p p . 101,
114-15, 118, 125, 140-1.
Mary
Gregor,
in The Laws of F r e e d o m . p . 5, gives the capacity for suicide as an
example of an empirical fact about human beings that is needed to
derive the specific duties of the Metaphvsics a L M o r a l s .
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duties confronting us and duties confronting other
(imaginable)

rational beings are due to empirical

differences alone, and that the principles of reason itself
are the same for all species of rational beings.
however,

is not the case.

reason in a special way,
human agency.

Reason,

The moral

law confronts human

taking on formulations specific to

in other words,

fact that when it subsists
must take a special

This,

is sensitive to the

in finite agents,

its commands

form.

In order to determine the relation of anthropology to a
metaphysics of morals, we need to establish which aspects of
the special character of our duties come from reason, and
which come from empirical

information.

How,

then, does our

finite rational agency affect the way the moral law itself
confronts us?
Human reason,

The first feature to note is a formal one.
fully aware that it subsists

not by nature act on the moral

lav (G:413),

in beings who do
presents the

moral law to us not as a description of the way we sip. act
(as it does to God), but rather as a command for how we
should a c t — a categorical imperative:

"So act that the maxim

of your action could become a universal la w " (DV:389,
G:421).

Thus,

reason presents

its requirements to us as

duties.In addition to this purely formal feature,
categorical

the

imperative contains a reference to agency.

Practical reason is by nature concerned with agency;
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that is

why it is practical reason.

Now,

Onora O'Neill points out

that it i_s a "fundamental requirement of practical reason"
that agents

"should not have ruled out all action."*

means not only that

it be d o s s ible

(consistent)

This

to will the

maxim of the proposed act i o n 10 - - i .e ., that agency be
p reserved--but also that agency be promoted through the
furtherance of the ability of ourselves and others to set
and realize ends.

The Formula of Universal Law quoted above

does not explicitly contain this reference to promoting
agency,

but the second formulation of the categorical

imperative,

the Formula of the E n d -in-Itself, does:

such a way that you always treat humanity whether
person or in the person of another,

•Onora O'Neill,

"Act in

in you own

never simply as a means,

Constructions a £ R e a s o n , p . 99.

1DIn order for it to be possible to will a maxim, the maxim
must
be consistent
with its universalized
typified counterpart
(U T C ), i.e., with the
universalized maxim as it would
appear in
this
world, along with the conditions necessary to realize it in
this world.
The negation of a maxim instantiating a perfect duty
contradicts
its UTC in the sense that
it would be impossible to
carry out the maxim in a world reflecting the UTC.
For instance,
I could
not make a
false promise in a world in which everyone
knows
promises
to
be false,
since
no
one would
believe
me
(G:422).
The negation of a maxim instantiating an imperfect duty
contradicts
not its
UTC as
such, but
the means
necessary for
carrying out the maxim.
For instance, I cannot will a maxim of
non-beneficence
because
I am
not
self-sufficient,
and
will
therefore need
the help of others
to carry out some
of my ends
(the fulfillment of
which I necessarily will, as
an a g e n t ) .
In
the
UTC of
maxim of
non-beneficence,
the means
toward
the
fulfillment of some of my ends
would thus be unavailable.
For a
helpful
discussion of
these examples
and, in general, of
the
nature
of universalizability
in Kant,
see Onora
O'Neill (then
Onora
Nell), Acting
on P r i n c i p l e . Chapter 5.
For
Kant's own
characterization
of
the
difference
between
permissible,
obligatory and forbidden maxims, see MM:221-8.
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but always at the same time as an e n d ” (G: 429 ).13Humanity,_ Kant explains,

is equivalent to agency,

the

ability to set ends and to realize them (DV:395).
humanity "never simply as a means,

To treat

but always at the same

time as an e n d ” is not only to refrain from interfering with
the agency of others,

but also to help "further the ends of

others” (G:430, my emphasis).
it can be undermined in ways

For human agency is fragile:
in which the agency of

omnipotent or self-sufficient beings cannot.

We need minds

and bodies to act, and minds and bodies can be destroyed
through suicide, excess, and allowing one's talents to rust;
we are able to undermine the agency of others by failing to
help and encourage them, emotionally and intellectually as
well as physically,

to realize their ends, and so forth.

This is why practical reason requires of us that we preserve
as well as further human a g e n c y . 13
lxHow
the Formula of Universal Law can be equivalent to the
Formula
of the
End-in-Itself even
though the
former does
not
explicitly contain a reference
to promoting agency
is a puzzle
that
has troubled man Kant commentators.
In "Universal Laws and
Ends
in Themselves,"
(CR, pp.126-44,
esp.
p p . 131-40),
Onora
O'Neill does an admirable
job of showing the equivalence
of the
two formulas.
See also CR, pp.96-101 and p p . 114-15.
iaWere
we
to come
to
interact
with
another species
of
rational beings, we
would have to consider their specific nature
in order to
know what the moral law requires
of us with respect
to
them.
This will
require knowledge of
empirical facts about
them.
For instance, whether it will be a duty for us to promote,
in addition
to preserving, their
agency will depend
on whether
they are self-sufficient or not.
"The problem
of organizing a
state,"
says Kant, "can
be solved
even for
a race
of devils"
("Perpetual
Peace,"
p . 366).
Supposing devils
are
selfsufficient,
our only duties towards
them will be
those of non
interference with their ends, these
being the duties relevant to

24

One could object that the facts about the fragility of
human agency I just noted are empirical,
derive from pure practical reason.
ventured

losing track of what reason itself contributes

Here, ve need to be sensitive to exactly vhat

aspects of human agency reason takes
actual

If so, ve have already

into the anthropological part of the derivation of

our duties,
to them.

and so, cannot

into account.

formulations of the categorical

presuppose the facts I just noted.

The

imperative do not

They only presuppose the

fact of agency as such--that is, the capacity to set ends
and to take pleasure

in realizing them.

belong to all rational agents,

These features

not just to human beings.1 "

From these two facts about rational agency,
two ends which are also duties:
other people's happiness.
obligatory ends as follows.

Kant derives the

one's own perfection and

Very roughly,

he derives these

One's perfection consists of

o n e ’s ability to set and to realize various ends.

enacting a state.

See Onora O'Neill,

CR,

Moral

pp . 114-15.

l,Even God is able
to take pleasure in realizing
his ends.
The
book
of
Genesis iffull
of
references
to God's
taking
pleasure
in his
creation.
After each
of
the
six
days of
creation,
for
instance, God sees
that what
he has
created is
g o o d . This suggests that God can take some sort of satisfaction-if only intellectual--in the attainment
of his ends.
Moreover,
he creates the garden
of Eden in such a way that
man can take a
sensual and
aesthetic delight in its
bounty--pleasures which he
deems g o o d .
We might also speculate that if God could not take
some
form
of
pleasure in things--if
only
intellectual
or
aesthetic d e 1ight--then man would possess some capacities for the
good--and
hence some
capacities for
perfeetion--which God
did
not.
But this would violate the ontological requirement that God
be the most perfect being.
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ends are of course the most

important,

since a good will

is

the only .thing in the world which has unconditional worth
(G:393-4).

But because humanity--the capacity to set any

end whatsoever
good will,

(DV:392)--is a condition of possibility of a

humanity is an end in itself and should therefore

be cultivated

(DV:391-3; G:437-8).

people's happiness

(the realization of their ends),

derived as follows.
own happiness,

The second end,

other
is

As agents, we necessarily desire our

i.e., the realization of our ends.

we are not self-sufficient,

But since

we are required to promote the

happiness of others because we ourselves will eventually
depend on the help of others to realize some of our ends
(D V :387-8,
Now,

450-1; G:423,

430).

it will certainly be objected that the end of

other people's happiness can only be derived a posteriori,
since

it presupposes the fact that human beings are not

self-sufficient.

But reason is responsible for more in this

end than meets the eye.

For practical reason also requires

that we take whatever steps are necessary toward realizing
our ends, since willing the means is analytic to willing the
end

(G:417).

In a world of beings who are self-sufficient,

it is only a duty to promote o n e 's own happiness and not
that of others,

since

of non-beneficence

it is possible to universalize a maxim

in such a world:

secure their own happiness;
realize

it for them.

others are fully able to

hence we need not seek to

(But it would presumably still be a
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duty to wish the happiness of others in such a world

(since

wishing one's own happiness requires that one wish that of
others,
about).

too),

but not to will

it,

i.e., to seek to bring it

We who are not self-sufficient,

however,

are

required to promote the happiness of others because we
ourselves will eventually depend on the help of others to
realize some of our ends
duty to promote others'
an empirical

(DV:387-8,
happiness,

450-1; G:423,

430).

The

then, stems partly from

fact about us — our finitude--but also from the

rational requirement that we promote whatever means are
necessary to realize our ends.

Indeed,

one can see the

positive duty to promote the agency of others as a
conditional principle of reason.

Reason says:

''always

respect the agency of others, and promote it if they cannot
do so themselves."

Whether

it is necessary to promote the

agency of others depends on empirical facts about the type
of beings one happens to be surrounded by.

But that does

not preclude the duty from being inherent in reason itself,
prior to empirical considerations.14
14In The Laws
of F r e e d o m . p p . 4-5, Mary
Gregor provides
a
different,
but to my mind incomplete, solution to the problem of
how
the duties
in the
Doctrine of
Virtue can
admit empirical
elements but still
retain their binding
force.
Gregor
claims,
quite rightly,
that there is an ambiguity in Kant's use
of "a
priori principle."
Although
Kant distinguishes between pure and
a priori
knowledge, he
fails
to observe
that
distinction in
practice.
Pure
knowledge
consists
of
judgments
involving
concepts
independent
of all sense-experience
both
as regards
their
content and their mode of c o n n e c t i o n . A priori knowledge,
by contrast,
consists of judgments involving
concepts which may
be derived from sense-experience, but the connect ion between them
must lie ready in the mind (see CPR, B:3-5, B:48-9/A:32-3, A:187-
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Having established the sense

in which pure practical

reason is. sensitive to the finitude of human agents,
turn to the way in which anthropology enters
derivation of duties

I now

into Kant's

in the Doctrine of V i r t u e .

While the

two ends which are also d u t i e s - - o n e 's own perfection and
other people's happiness--can be seen as requirements of
reason itself, we need empirical
beings

information about human

in order to know how we are to realize these ends

the world in which we live.

This

information,

in

plus the two

obligatory ends, yield the specific duties which constitute
the pggtcine

Virtue.

8/B:230-l).
"Pure"
thus refers to the content and source of the
concepts of judgments,
while "a
priori" refers to
the mode
of
connection between subject and
predicate.
While Kant frequently
characterizes
the duties
in the
Doctrine
of Virtue
as "pure"
principles,
Gregor argues, they are in fact a priori: "We cannot
learn from experience
that men ought not
arbitrarily to destroy
their
lives.
But
the concepts thus
connected contain elements
drawn
from sensuous
experience; it is
from experience
that we
learn
certain characteristics
of men
implied in this law: the
facts that they are mortal and that their lives can
be shortened
artificially.
Such moral laws are a. priori knowledge because the
connection of
subject- and predicate-concepts is made by reason
independently
of
experience.
They are
not,
however,
pure
knowledge because the matter
of the concepts is, in part, given
in
sensuous experience"
(Gregor, p . 5).
What
Gregor fails
to
explain,
however, is
how a connection
between the
sensuously
derived concepts appearing
in our
duties can lie
ready in the
mind a priori.
I find it more convincing to use the analysis
of
agency just given to establish an a priori connection between the
concepts
of ends
and means,
and then to claim
that
empirical
information is needed
to realize the
means toward an end.
In
this way,
an a priori connection can be seen to hold between one
rationally derived concept and one sensuously derived one.
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Since most duties

in the Doctrine of Virtue are

imperfect^3-* they prescribe the adoption of maxims rather
than of particular courses of action--the latter being left
to the judgment of the agent, as Is the case with all
imperfect duties
duties

(DV:390).

The ultimate

intent of these

is, of course, action from the state of will

prescribed

(see DV:441;

LE:143,

200).

But because moral

worth attaches directly to one's motives and only indirectly
to one's actions,

it is the cultivation of a moral

disposition--a good will--with which is Kant's highest
concern in the Doctr ine of V i r t u e : "the highest
unconditional end of pure practical reason"
be its own end and, despite the benefits
men, also its own reward"

(DV:396).

to realize this highest end

is "that virtue

it confers on other

And it is only possible

if one tries with all one's

might to cultivate a good will.

Thus,

in addition to

requiring us to promote the two obligatory ends through our
fulfillment of the specific duties of virtue
(T u o e n p f l i c h t e n ). morality also puts us under an "obligation

1BThe exception is, of course, the perfect duties to oneself
of Book I of the Doctr ine of V i r t u e . It is difficult to explain
in what sense
these duties
are perfect, since,
in addition
to
prohibiting certain courses of action (e.g., suicide), they also
prescribe certain attitudes
appropriate to
hold toward
oneself
(e.g.,
self-respect), and
so,
would seem
closer to
imperfect
duties.
Kant himself gives
no explanation for
the presence of
perfect duties in the Doctr ine of V i r t u e . For a somewhat helpful
discussion of this problem, see Mary Gregor, The Laws of F r e e d o m .
Chapters 7 and 8, esp. p p . 115-127.
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of virtue"

(T u q e n d v erp f l i c h t u n g ) requiring us to strive to

fulfill tjie former duties from the motive of duty.
What sorts of psychological tendencies are relevant to
Kant's derivation of duties

in the Doctr ine of Virtue?

What

distinguishes the facts about man which are morally relevant
from those which are not?
struggle

for virtue,

Recall Kant's claim that in man's

"the v i c e s . the brood of dispositions

opposing the law, are the monsters he has to fight"
my emphasis).

Vices

(DV:405,

include both the dispositions which

oppose the cultivation of a good will and actions so opposed
(duties against the latter prescribe acts of omission, and
so, are classified as perfect duties;

see DV, Book I).

both cases,

is needed to establish

the ways

knowledge of man's nature

in which we can act contrary to the moral

In

law.

As far as sensible dispositions go, Kant distinguishes
between affects and passions.
"precipitate"

feeling such as anger;

"quickly subsides"
nature,

An affect is a "rash" or

(DV:407-8).

it is a "tempest" which

Because of its transitory

an affect can "coexist with the best will,"

reflected in the agent's maxims and settled emotional habits
(DV:408).

A passion,

by contrast,

"is a sensible desire

that has become a lasting inclination
opposed to a n g e r ) ” (DV:407-8).
morally harmful because

(e.g.,

h a t r e d , as

A passion such as hatred

is

"the calm with which one gives

oneself up to it permits reflection and allows the mind to
form principles upon it and so,
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if inclination lights upon

something contrary to the law,

to brood on it, get it rooted

deeply, and so to take up what

is evil

premeditated)

And the evil

evil,

that

into its maxim.

(as something

is, a true v i c e ” (DV:408).

Dispositions opposed to a good will
capacities

is then proper1v

include our

for envy, greed, and malice; actions so opposed

include suicide,

gluttony and failure to cultivate our

capacities of mind.

When such natural dispositions are made

a matter of principle--or

in Kant's terms,

one's maxim--they become vices,

taken up into

standing in opposition to

the moral law either because they debase or even destroy our
humanity

(by undermining our capacity to set and realize

various ends)

or because they show a resolve to be

indifferent to the ends of others or even to prevent them
from attaining their morally permissible ends.
What distinguishes dispositions which are morally
relevant from those which are not is thus that the former
embody tendencies which,

if made a matter of principle, are

either virtuous or vicious: maxims based on them either have
contradictory negations

(in which case cultivating the

underlying disposition is a matter of duty)

or are

themselves contradictory (in which case fightina the
underlying disposition is a matter of duty).

''Mixed”

dispositions--those which can be used for both good and
evil— are all morally relevant since they contain capacities
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for the good which should be strengthened and capacities

for

evil which should be w e a k e n e d . 1*
We are now in a better position to understand Kant's
claim that "a metaphysics of morals cannot be based on
anthropology but can still be applied to it"

(MM:217).

Anthropology provides information about the subjective
tendencies which can either help or hinder the cultivation
of a good will, as well as tendencies which are
to the execution of our duties.
to such anthropological

The moral

information,

us to cultivate dispositions

instrumental

law, when applied

yields duties obliging

favorable to our adoption of

obligatory ends and to combat dispositions opposed to it.
These are the specific duties of the Doctr ine of V i r t u e .
An architectonic difficulty remains,

however.

I have

claimed that anthropology collaborates with principles of
reason by providing information about subjective tendencies
which either help or hinder the adoption of objective ends.

1*An
example of
a
"mixed" disposition,
which can
either
favor or oppose the adoption of moral ends
depending on what use
we make
of it, is our "unsociable
sociability.” Kant says that
we are "unable
to dfl. without associating
peacefully, but also
unable to avoid constantly offending
one another" (A:183).
We
tend to take an exaggerated pride
in our own achievements and to
gloat at other people's failures.
At the same time, we cannot do
without
each other's
company (see
also "Idea
for a Universal
History," 0H:15).
For a general
discussion of
our
unsocial
sociability and a helpful summary of the sort of anthropological
information
that Kant
takes
to
be
relevant
to
his
ethical
project,
see
Allen
Wood,
"Unsociable
Sociability:
The
Anthropological Basis of Kantian Ethics."
For further discussion
of
our unsociable
sociability and
its implications
for Kant's
ethical
project, see Jerome B. Schneewind, "Kant and Natural Law
Ethics," Ethics 104: 53-74.
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But there

is reason to believe that not even this type of

information is allowed

into a metaphysics of morals,

but

rather belongs to a distinct branch of practical philosophy,
namely, moral anthropology,
place

which is supposed to have q a.

in a metaphysics of morals at all.

Kant considers

moral anthropology to be "the counterpart of a metaphysics
of morals," and characterizes

it as a science dealing "only

with the subjective conditions

in human nature that hinder

men or help them in ful f i 11 inq the laws of a metaphysics of
morals"

(MM:217).

Now,

this seems to describe exactly what

I have just claimed that "normal"
anthropology does.

If so,

(as distinct from moral)

it seems that Qfl. form of

anthropology can enter into collaboration with a metaphysics
of morals.

For Kant says the following about moral

anthropology:
It cannot be dispensed with,

but it must not precede a

metaphysics of morals Q i &SL mixed with i t : for one
would then run the risk of bringing forth false or at
least indulgent moral lavs, which would misrepresent as
unattainable what has only not been attained just
because the law has not been seen and presented in its
purity (in which its strength consists)
spurious or impure
itself

or because

incentives were used for what is

in conformity with duty and good.

leave no certain moral principles,

This would

either to guide

judgment or to discipline the mind in observance of
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duty,

the precepts of which must be given a priori by

pure reason alone.

(MM:217, my emphasis)

If "normal" anthropology does the same thing as moral
anthropology,
has no place

then it would seem that "normal" anthropology
in a metaphysics of morals,

since moral

anthropology "cannot be mixed with" a metaphysics of morals.
In order to claim,

then, as I want,

that anthropology has a

legitimate function i n a metaphysics of morals

(namely,

that

a priori principles of reason can be "applied" to
anthropological principles, as Kant claims
earlier at M M : 217),

is possible

I need to show the difference between

moral anthropology and the morally relevant aspects of
"normal" anthropology,

the former being that branch of

practical philosophy which cannot be mixed with a
metaphysics of morals.
Kant says about moral anthropology that "it would deal
with the development,
principles

spreading,

and strengthening of moral

(in education in schools and in popular

instruction), and with other similar teachings and precepts
based on experience"

(MM:217).

This suggests that moral

anthropology deals primarily with the external conditions
for morality rather than with the internal dispositions
conducive to a good will.

For

instance, moral anthropology

might deal with ways of improving public education in ways
which promote

(initially) external conformity to the moral

law, with the indirect aim of also strengthening moral
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principles in. students.

The main purpose of moral

anthropology would be to encourage people to act

in

accordance with duty, and indirectly to strengthen a moral
disposition in them.

This emphasis on action rather than

inner disposition would explain why Kant claims that moral
anthropology is concerned "only with the subjective
conditions

in human nature that hinder men or help them in

fulfi11ino the laws of a metaphysics of morals"

(MM:217).

The morally relevant parts of "normal" anthropology,

by

contrast, are selected because they help promote a morally
good d i s p o s i t i o n .

The difference between moral anthropology

and the morally relevant parts of "normal" anthropology,
then,

seems to be that the former

promoting the external conditions

is concerned with
favorable to morality--

appropriate curricula, educational methods, and so on--while
the latter

is concerned with the psychological dispositions

which help or hinder the cultivation of a good will.
This would at least explain why "normal" but not moral
anthropology has a legitimate function in a doctrine of
v i r t u e . which is primarily concerned with strengthening the
inner disposition to morality.

It does not explain,

however, why Kant thinks "normal," but not moral,
anthropology is relevant to a metaphysics of morals as. a
who l e --including also the Doctrine o £ R i g h t P which is
concerned not with the cultivation of a good will,
with external conformity to the moral
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law.

but only

The explanation

for Kant's exclusion of moral anthropology even from a
doctrine .of right seems to be this.

Kant's description of

moral anthropology suggests that it is concerned primarily
with localized

institutions, and not with circumstances

obtaining throughout human nature.
consider specific curricula,
schools,

e.g.,

rather than curricula

which are found

It might,

for instance,

those of American public

(presumably nonexistent)

in schools all over the world.

By contrast,

the morally relevant parts of "normal" anthropology deals
with propensities that can be found in all human beings.
For if the specific duties of a metaphysics of morals are to
be universally binding,

they must be duties which everyone

can act on simply in virtue of their human nature, and not
in virtue of the specific circumstances they happen to find
themselves

in.

(That is not to say that context

is

irrelevant to judging how one is to act in specific
situations.

That,

which casuistry,

however,

requires the art of judgment,

moral methodology and, to some extent,

aesthetics are supposed to train.)

The difference,

then,

between moral and "normal" anthropology is that the former
treats of characteristics found throughout human nature,
while the latter considers specific

institutions and how to

promote morality within them.
Still,

it is important to note that both moral

anthropology and the morally relevant aspects of "normal"
anthropology are divisions of practical philosophy because
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they constitute a roorallv conditioned body of empirical
knowledge--a body of empirical knowledge to which moral laws
are applied.

They thus become part of what Kant calls a

"system of freedom"
a system of freedom,

(MM:218).

Here

is how Kant conceives of

in contrast to a system of nature:

Anything that is practical and possible
with laws of nature

in accordance

(the distinctive concern of art)

depends

for is precepts entirely upon the theory of

nature:

Only what is practical

in accordance with laws

of freedom can have principles that are
any theory;

independent of

for there is no theory of what goes beyond

the properties of nature.

Hence,

understand by its practical part

philosophy can
(as compared with its

theoretical part) no technically practical doctrine but
only a morally practical doctrine;
proficiency of choice
freedom,

and

if the

in accordance with laws of

in contrast to laws of nature,

is also to be

called art here, by this would have to be understood a
kind of art that makes possible a system of freedom
like a system of nature,

truly a divine art were we in

a position also to carry out fully,

by means of it,

what reason prescribes and put the Idea of it into
effect.

(M M :217-18)

A system of freedom is created according to a morally
practical doctrine,

while a system of nature encompasses,

addition to the laws of nature,
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that which is possible

in

according to a technically practical doctrine.
distinguishes these types of doctrines

is the type of

concept according to which the will operates.
practical doctrine

What

A technically

is one in which the will takes

from concepts describing how things a r e .

its rule

The engineer who

wants to build a bridge takes his rules from the laws of
physics,

chemistry,

and engineering

(see CJ:173 for some of

Kant's examples of technically practical doctrines,
including political economy, dietetics and chemistry).
morally practical doctrine,

by contrast,

will works with natural materials
institutions),

A

is one in which the

(inclinations,

but always takes its law not from nature,

from freedom--from pure reason itself
from how things should be.

but

(CJ:171-3)--and so,

The internal process of

strengthening the moral motive through the removal of
opposing inclinations as well as the external process of
improving moral education both take place according to moral
laws, and thereby become part of a system of freedom.17
We are now in a position to consider the role of the
emotions

in Kant's moral theory.

We have already seen that

information about our emotional capacities,

which

anthropology supplies,

has a legitimate role in a

metaphysics of morals,

namely,

to yield the specific duties

17Kant's published introduction to the Critique
of
contains many
references to the
role of judgment
in especially
the
first of these processes.
See CJ:169-70, 176, 178, and 1967.
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which confront us as human beings--as beings who are not
purely rational but have

inclinations which sometimes tempt

us to deviate from the moral law.
more precisely what that role
conception of virtue.

We now need to consider

is, and how it affects K a n t ’s

I begin with the question of how

cultivating and acting from certain emotions can have any
moral value whatsover,
all

or even be of any moral relevance at

(belong to "the moral order," as Kant puts

it), given

his claim that "feeling . . .always belongs to the order of
n a t u r e " (DV:377).

This will help us define the role which

cultivating feeling plays

II; Virtue*

in a virtuous character.

Moral Worth* aad the Emotions

To get a more definite sense of what Kant takes to be
the main features of a morally good character,

it is helpful

to begin by asking why he thinks that a good will is the
only unconditionally (absolutely) valuable thing in the
world.

A good will, at its barest minimum,

is defined as

the will which intends to act as duty commands and to do so
for the sake of duty.

I'll return to why the concept of

duty holds a special value,
why a good will
A good will

for Kant;

here the question is

is the most basic moral value.
is the only thing in the world which is

good without qualification.

A good will

is good

unconditionally because unlike gifts of nature and of
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fortune

(e.g., health and wealth)

a certain value

though they do have

in themselves, are morally good only under

certain qualifications
use),

which,

a good will

(wealth is good only if put to a good

is morally good

in itself because

the right thing for the right reasons
The value of the good will,

I take

(G:437;

it,

is that

it wills

393-94).
it alone

shows a direct concern for the moral rightness of its
conduct.

The good will manifests

the Phenomenology of good willing)

itself subjectivelv (in
in a willingness to be

truthful about one's condition as it relates to the moral
sphere: a desire to know oneself while at the same time
acknowledging one's limitations and one's moral fallibility.
This can only stem from the awareness that one is bound bv
the moral law and not spontaneously inclined to follow it.
The latter feature also reveals what is valuable about the
good will.

In imposing on itself a universally valid

obligation,

the good will embodies the valuable state of

autonomy,

the condition of governing oneself according to

reasons which are universally acceptable.
will cannot go wrong in its willing;
itself.

Thus the good

its willing is good

in

Having considered the nature of the good will, ve

can now turn to the concept of morally worthy action

(action

from a good will) and how the emotions relate to it.
1 B I take
Kant's use of "good"
in this section to refer to
the
morally good, since
all
the qualifications
he makes are
qualifications which
are relevant only when we are
thinking in
moral terms.
See
also Chapter 2 and Chapter 4,
Part I for some
remarks about the good will and its value.
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At first glance,

it appears inconceivable,

point of view of Kant's moral system,

from the

that moral worth

should be able to attach to the cultivation of the emotions.
The chaotic behavior of emotions seems antithetical to the
rule-governed activity of the good will
morally worthy actions.

issuing forth

In order to see how acting from

cultivated emotions can take on moral worth,

we need to

understand Kant's conception of morally worthy action;

we

can then go on to ask how the cultivation of select emotions
can have moral worth as well as whether acting from emotions
which have been so cultivated can have moral worth.
A morally worthy action, Kant says, must be done not
only in accordance with duty,

but also from duty:

the

thought of the moral law, and the sense of constraint that
its duties entail,
(MM:218-19).

must be the incentive of the action

Morally worthy action is thus action done from

the special feeling of constraint or obligation which the
thought of duty imposes on us

(DV:381-2,

389).

This sets

three requirements on the type of w i l l — the good will
{G:387-8,

439)--which produces morally worthy action:

(a) that we freelv adopt the end which we seek to
realize through the action,
(b) that the end be obligatory,1*
1*At G:403
and 437,
Kant suggests that
permissible maxims
can also produce
morally worthy actions, as long
as they
have
been tested against the moral law.
Presumably the motive of duty
would
here
operate
in conjunction
with
the
(uncultivated)
inclination which gave rise to the maxim before it was tested for
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(c)

that ve adopt the end not

desire

it, that is, not

natural inclination,

(solely)

because ve

(solely) on the basis of a

but because

it is our duty to

adopt the end.
These conditions require some elaboration.
(b),

then move on to (c); and finally,
To adopt an end because

requires,

first of all,

also a duty to have.
obligatory,

lav"

on our maxim,

To determine vhether our end is

"to the condition of its qualifying as
(MM:214).

namely,

hovever,

obligatory maxims.
(e.g.,

it is our duty to do so

that the end fes. an end vhich it is

We here impose a formal condition

that it be a maxim to vhich every

other rational agent could
condition,

to (a).

ve submit our maxim (our subjective principle of

action; G:422n)
universal

I begin vith

in principle consent.

This

obtains both for permissible and for
The difference betveen obligatory maxims

"I vill strive to cultivate my talents") and

permissible maxims
than red meat")
neoations.

(e.g.,

"I vill alvays eat vhite rather

lies in the formal implications of their

The negations of obligatory maxims yield

contradictions when universalized;
maxims do not

those of permissible

(see footnote 11 for a closer description of

vhat universalization involves and vhat sort of
contradiction is generated by impermissible maxims).

its permissibility against the moral lav.
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Acting in a morally worthy way requires not only that
our maxim, have certain formal features, but also that we
have a certain motive.

The motive from which an action is

performed can be thought of as a second-order component of a
maxim,

expressing the attitude with which we will the

m a x i m . ao

The attitudinal difference between willing

permissible and obligatory maxims can be expressed as
follows.

When I hold a permissible maxim,

X as follows:

I think of my end

"I want to bring about X, and I am permitted

to do so because the moral
obligatory maxim,

law allows

by contrast,

it.”

I think:

When I hold an

"I have to bring X

about because the moral law requires

it."

at the same time desire X,

in the latter case,

I cannot,

hold the following attitude:

Even if I should

"I want X, so I'm going to do

what I can to bring it about; and X also happens to be my
aoA motive
is not the
(first-order) purposive clause
of a
maxim,
as some Kant commentators think (see, e.g., Onora O'Neill
(then
Nell),
Acting
on Pr inciple. p p . 84,
97ff),
since
the
purposive clause is reserved to reflect the end of the action and
not
the
m o t i v e . which
is something
quite different.
Ends
(Zwecke ) cannot be equated with motives (B e s t i m munasqrunde)--and
it
is important
to notice
that Kant
himself never
makes this
equation--because
one
can
will
the same
end
from different
motives.
This
is especially
clear
in the
case of
willing
obligatory ends (ends
which it is a duty to have, and so, which
can
be acted on
in a morally worthy way).
For
I can will the
end,
say, of other people's
happiness from the
motive of duty,
from
warm
fellow-feeling,
from pity,
from
the
aesthetic
satisfaction
I get when I see others enjoying themselves, from a
thirst for popularity, and from a number of other motives.
The
actions
I undertake
to
realize
the
end
of
other
people's
happiness can be the same in all cases, and the realization of my
end is also
the same, namely,
that some of
ends of the
person
whose happiness I will are furthered
or realized.
But I can act
toward
that end
from a variety
of
motives, and
that
is why
motives must not be identified with ends.
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duty."

Rather,

I must think:

"X is my duty, and I am going

to bring _it about for that reason.

I also happen to desire

X, but I know I would have to realize X even
desire

it--and

occur,

because I am a finite being, and, as such,

a 1wavs have
DV:397,
then,

409,

it is always possible

if I did not

for such a situation to
will

inclinations which can oppose the law"
441).21

(see

Acting from the awareness of duty,

requires that a certain thought process accompany

one's willing--a thought process characterized by a feeling
of constraint and an awareness of one's f i n i t u d e .
the attitudinal,

This is

or motivational, difference between willing

permissible maxims and willing obligatory m a x i m s . 22
2iThe phrase, "I realize I would have to do X even if
I did
not desire
it"
should not
be interpreted
as a counterfactual
clause
indicating
what
an
agent
would
&g
in different
circumstances.
It should
not be
confused
with a
(misguided,
because
irrelevant) measure
of a
heroically strong
will which
would
br ino about
the
action
even in the
face
of the
most
gruelling
obstacles (e.g., extreme pain resulting from torture).
(For
an
illuminating discussion
of
why counter factual claims
about
what
an agent
would
& g in different
circumstances are
irrelevant to the
moral worth
of her maxims,
see Jay Wallace,
"Kant on Moral Worth and
Moral Luck" (unpublished), esp.
p p . 3031.)
The
counterfactual clause in question does
not indicate
what
an agent
would
£ & under
different
circumstances,
but
expresses
an attitude toward the
moral law and
our standing in
relation to it: the awareness that it binds us regardless of what
we
happen to
feel
or desire.
This thought--essentially
the
thought
which Wallace, at
p . 20
in
the aforementioned
paper,
describes
as
"an
unconditional
commitment
to duty,"
a
preparedness
to act
dutifully
regardless
of
what
one's
inclinations are or will be
in the future--must accompany
every
morally worthy action, and is captured by the sense of constraint
we feel when we think of the law and the duties it imposes on us.
22I here differ from Onora O'Neill,
who suggests that moral
worth
can attach also to the adoption of permissible maxims (see
O'Neill, CR, p . 141).
Her
reason for claiming
this depends
on
Kant's
thesis of the inscrutability of our motives: we can never
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Having clarified conditions
condition

(b) and

(c),

I now turn to

(a).

Freedom of choice,

says Kant,

is the condition of

possibility of any kind of willing,
389).

that is, of our setting

any end whatsoever

(DV:385,

Were we to lose our

freedom of choice,

we would not be w l 1 1 inq anything,

would only be responding to stimuli.
to the level of the beasts,
sensible stimuli
choice,
sensible

then,

(DV:392,

but

This would reduce us

who are determined only by

444-5, MM:213).

Freedom of

is our "independence from being determined by

impulses," even though we are still affected by

them (DV:213).**

It is in virtue of our freedom of choice

that we can be motivated by the formal considerations
inherent

in the moral law.

Without

freedom of choice,

we

would always need an object of desire in order to act, and

be sure of our underlying
maxim or motive, but it is always our
business
to ensure that our
action conforms outwardly with duty
or is at least permissible.
Our actual motive, which
is always
hidden from us,
may even
in the case
of permissible action
be
that of
duty.
This is where I differ from O'Neill.
I believe
that
Kant's inscrutability
thesis is
not as severe
as O'Neill
makes it sound, and that in fact there are several
indicators of
moral worth available to u s — a significant one being the types of
thought
processes I just noted.
It
is fairly clear
that the
thought process accompanying the
adoption of permissible ends is
incompatible
with the
awareness
of constraint
essential to a
sense of
duty.
Kant
thinks we
can
measure
this
sense
of
constraint through the obstacles
we are able to overcome
in our
willing.
This
gives
us a
rough, albeit
merely
subjective.
measure of moral worth.
I discuss this later in Part II.
23Kant characterizes freedom of choice as "negative" freedom
in order to distinguish it from the "positive" or "inner" freedom
which we
realize only when we
act from the motive
of duty (see
D V : 213-14).
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would always be determined by our strongest desire.

But

because we have free choice, we do not need to act on our
strongest desire, and can also be motivated by non-sensuous,
rational considerations.
choice,

then,

It is because of our freedom of

that we can act on the moral law even when all

our desires seem to oppose

it.

We are now in a position to summarize Kant's conception
of moral worth as well as the more basic notion of a good
will.

To have a good will

is to freely set an obligatory

end out of the awareness of constraint inherent in the
thought of duty.

Actions which are undertaken through such

willing have moral worth.
of moral worth,

Having clarified Kant'

conception

I now turn to the difficulties of claiming

that moral worth can attach both to the cultivation of
morally beneficial emotions and even to acting from emotions
which have been cultivated for moral ends.
Feelings possess features which seem to bar them from
the moral realm,
First of all,

the realm of the voluntary, altogether.

having feelings cannot be said to be an

activity in any legitimate sense of the term.

In order to

act, one must set oneself an end, and this can only be done
through free choice.

Kant says the following about the

conditions of possibility of action:
Every action...has

its end; and since no one can have

an end without him s e 1f making the object of his choice
into an end,

to have any end of action whatsoever
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is an

act of freedom on the part of the acting subject,

not

an e.ffect of n a t u r e . (DV:384-5)
Since effects of nature are not brought about through free
willing,

they cannot be said to be act ions in any legitimate

sense of the term.

But feelings are effects of nature:

"feeling," says Kant,

"whatever may arouse

belongs to the order of n a t u r e " (DV:377).
events,

As natural

feelings do not take place through free choice and

in accordance with rational principles,
accordance with laws of nature.
feeling,
nature;

it, always

but rather

in

We cannot choose to have a

just as we cannot choose to change the laws of
we simply have a feeling,

simply a r e .

just as the laws of nature

Having feelings therefore fails to meet the

first requirement on morally worthy action:

that they be

freely willed.
This also explains why having feelings fails the second
requirement.
involved

Since feelings are not actions,

in having a feeling.

Thus, a. fort i o r i . feelings

cannot be directed at obligatory ends.
feelings are,

by and large,

no duty to have a feeling.

no end is

Similarly,

since

beyond our control,

there can be

Take,

the feeling

for instance,

of love:
Love

is a matter of feeling,

cannot

not of willing,

and I

love because I will to, still less because I

ought to

(I cannot be constrained to love);

to love is an absurdity.

so a duty

(DV:401; see also 402)

47

Since having feelings cannot be made a matter of duty,
feelings cannot be chosen from a sense of c o n s t r a i n t . and
so,

fail also the third criterion for moral worth.

then,

How,

can feelings ever become part of the moral order?
It is at this point that Kant makes the crucial

distinction between having and cultivating a feeling.
Having a feeling cannot be a matter of duty,
just given,

but cultivating feelings

activity which

is a freely willed

is a matter of duty when the feelings in

question are conducive to moral ends.
Doctrine

for the reasons

Throughout the

V i r t u e , Kant distinguishes between having and

cultivating feelings, and stresses that the latter is an
activity which

is indeed within our power and therefore can

be made a matter of duty (see D V : 399-402 for especially
clear statements of this ) . 3"*

If Kant can show that

certain feelings are conducive to our setting and
realization of moral ends,

then he can also hold that

cultivating them is a matter of duty.
The sense

in which feelings can be conducive to moral

ends is by no means transparent.

For it would seem that the

two obligatory ends--one's own perfection and other people's
happiness— are realized

in a genuinely moral way only when

they are brought about not just in accordance with the moral
law, but also from a special motive,

namely,

respect for

2 *For a useful discussion of the extent to which, in Kantian
ethics, feelings can be cultivated through "the work of freedom,"
see Mary Gregor, Xhe. La VS. QlL Freedom, PP-74, 197-8.
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duty or a sense of the rightness of the action itself.
there

And

is only one feeling which can be said to be

constitutive of a sense of duty,
lav--a feeling which,

namely,

respect for the

phenoraenologically speaking,

characteristically unpleasant because

is

it involves an

awareness of the constraint which duty imposes on us

(we are

required to do our duty even when we don't feel like
it).29

What,

then, of the other

feelings--say,

love of

man--that Kant claims can be conducive to moral ends?
do they help us act morally if such action

How

is m o r a 1ly worthy

only when undertaken from respect for the law?

29I am here speaking of
the basic phenomenology of
respect
for
duty.
As
Kant
points out
in
the Critique
of Pract ical
Reason, respect for duty also has an uplifting element,
namely,
an awareness of our
own sublimity in being able to act on a law
designed by pure reason
(Cprr:86-87).
But I think
this passage
has to be
read as describing
the value
of acting from
respect
from
the moral
law
(from a sense
of duty) rather
than
the
attitude from which we generally do so.
Even though the
passage
is
found in a chapter entitled "The Incentives of Pure Practical
Reason," thus
certainly suggesting that acting
from respect for
the law really amounts to a joyous awareness of living
up to our
sublimity as its authors,
it should be noted that
Kant's famous
ode to duty (Cprr:86), as purple as it is, raises a philosophical
question about
its origin (" D u t y !...what origin
is there worthy
of
t h e e ...?")--a question which Kant can proudly claim to be the
first
to have answered adequately
(see Chapter 2).
As regards
the way in which the thought of
duty strikes us, however,
Kant
did not claim any originality: "Who would want to introduce a new
principle of morality and, as it were, be its inventor, as if the
world has
hitherto been
ignorant of
what duty is
or had
been
thoroughly
wrong about it?" (Cprr:8n).
I take
this to suggest
that
the thought
of duty
essentially involves
the feeling
of
constraint
which the
world
had hitherto
always recognized
to
belonging to a sense of obligation.
Kant's insight was that duty
is a matter of s e l f -constraint— not that the
thought of duty,
because of our autonomy, is not constraining (see DV:383).
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It is important here,

I think,

to appreciate the

structural complexity of moral willing.
will a moral end--and,
any other end--it
true;

rational

LE:143,

to consistently will

is not enough merely to wish it to come

one must also

DV:441;

for that matter,

To consistently

intend to realize

200).3*

intending,

it through action

(see

This is simply a requirement of

i.e., of w i l l i n g .

In order for a maxim

to be fully universalizable, the means through which we
intend to realize an end must be compatible with the end
itself.

Willing an end,

then,

imposes certain requirements

on the means through which we intend to realize it.

Onora

O'Neill cites five "Principles of Rational Intending ,"3,7
implicit in Kant's account of practical reasoning,

which set

certain rational requirements on the means through which we
intend to realize our ends:
1)

That we intend not only all

indispensable and

necessary but also some sufficient means toward
relizing our end.

Otherwise,

I could intend to eat an

adequate diet but eat no food of any specific sort,

on

the grounds that no food of any specific sort is
indispensable to an adequate d i e t . 3*
3*This point
p p .90-1.

is convincingly made

27See Onora O'Neill,

by Onora O'Neill

in CR,

CR, p p.91-2.

3*This
sort of
requirement can
be gleaned
from D V :391-2,
where Kant
says it is a duty for us "to make ourselves worthy of
humanity and in general, by procuring or promoting
the capacity
to
realize all
sorts
of possible
ends."
This
section
also
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2) That we not only intend all necessary and sufficient
means toward the end,

but also seek to bring them about

when they are not available.

Otherwise,

I could

intend

to bring about a social revolution but do absolutely
nothing,

on the grounds that no revolutionary situation

obtains.

But then I would at best be wish ing and not

w i 1 1 ino a revolution.**
3) That we intend not only the instrumental means
toward what is intended,

but also all necessary and

some sufficient components of what is intended

(these

can also be seen as constitutive means towards our
end).

For

instance,

we must show kindness not only in

deed but also in word and gesture.
4) That the various constitutive means toward our end
be mutually consistent.

Otherwise,

I could coherently

will to be generous to all my friends by giving each
the exclusive use of my possessions.30
5) That the foreseeable results of our actions be
consistent with the underlying end.

implies the second principle of rational
**Kant
explicitly states
L E :143, 200.

this

Otherwise,

I could

intending.

requirement at

DV:441

and

3°This sort of requirement
is implicit in all the
specific
duties
presented in the Doctrine
of Virtue (see
DV:453 for one
example).
Since I will make heavy
use of
this requirement in
subsequent chapters, where I consider the role of the emotions in
helping us fulfill the specific duties of the Doctr ine p i Virtue *
I do not cite further examples here.

51

intend the well-being of a child by protecting her from
the _pain of a life-saving o peration.31
These principles demand that we be sensitive to the
realities confronting us.
we show a knowledge of what
in this w o r l d .

When we rationally intend an end,
is required to realize our ends

While O'Neill's examples focus primarily on

the external conditions that we need to intend
our willing to be rational,

in order

for

I think the same principles can

be applied to our internal d i s p o s i t i o n .

Since we always

have attitudes and inclinations which can oppose a moral
cast of mind,

the principles of rational

intending call upon

us continually to cultivate all dispositions compatible
with,

constitutive of, and conducive to our adoption of

obligatory ends.
According to the principles of rational
intention to cultivate such dispositions

intending,

the

is part of the

intention to cultivate a virtuous frame of mind--the highest
end of the Doctr ine of Virtue

(DV: 387,

392-3,

396 ).

For if

we are truly aware of our finitude, and so, have the sense
of reality reflected

in the principles of rational

intending, we know that we will always have dispositions to
oppose the law, and that these dispositions need continually
to be fought.

We will therefore realize that virtue

is not

33-This
sort
of requirement
is implicit
in all
of Kant's
illustrations of the application of the categorical imperative at
G:421-3 and 429-430.
For a helpful discussion of this procedure,
see Onora O'Neill (then Nell), Acting on P r i n c i p l e . pp.69-93.
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something we can attain or keep without considerable effort,
and that we need to use all means available to us in
striving for it.
always

(That is why Kant says that "Virtue is

in progress and yet always starts from the beginning"

(DV:409;

see also

397 ) . )3a

If certain emotions are

conducive to a moral frame of mind,

it

is therefore

imperative on us to cultivate them as part of our efforts to
attain a virtuous disposition.
This gives us the key to how moral worth can attach to
the cultivation of those emotions which help us shape a
virtuous

frame of mind.

The cultivation of morality in us

is one of the special duties belonging to the obligatory end
of our own perfection

(DV:392-3).

If we adopt this end,

then we must also

intend to pursue the means necessary to

realize it, since

rationality requires of us that we will

the means needed to realize our ends.
adopt,

If, moreover,

we

from a. sense of d u t y , the intention to cultivate a

virtuous disposition,

then we also,

from a. sense of d u t y ,

intend the necessary,

sufficient and constitutive means

32This claim, and the facts about our finite
nature leading
up to
it,
bears against
Mary G r e g o r ’s interpretation
of
the
highest end of the Doctr ine of V i r t u e . She claims
that this end
is a state
of
"inner
freedom,"
which
she
describes
as
"a
condition in which our power of choice is free from the influence
of
sensuous inclination
as
such
and
open
to
that
of
pure
practical
reason with its motive
of duty" (Gregor,
The Laws of
F r e e d o m , p . 27,
my emphasis.
See
also p . 67).
But
it should be
clear by
now
that we
are
never
free from
the
influence
of
sensuous
inclination as
such.
We
therefore need
a different
interpretation of virtue as "inner freedom," which I supply later
in Part I I .
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tovard realizing that end.

Thus,

the activity of

cultivating the emotions conducive to a virtuous frame of
mind

is itself a manifestation of a good will, and our

efforts to cultivate such emotions have moral worth.
While respect

is prominent among those dispositions of

feeling which are either conducive to or presupposed by our
acting from a sense of duty,
In Part IV,

it is by no means the only one.

I will catalogue the four main groups of feeling

which Kant recognizes to be helpful to adopting and
fulfilling obligatory ends, and will also briefly describe
the specific ways

in which each type of feeling is conducive

to, and in some cases even presupposed by, acting from the
motive of duty.

In subsequent chapters,

I will address the

issue of how not only cultivating but also acting from
emotions which have been cultivated out of a sense of duty
can have moral worth.

The account will be supplemented by a

detailed discussion of specific feelings and the process
through which we cultivate

them.

It might seem that feelings
moral

other than respect for the

law can at best play an instrumental rather than a

constitutive role in the virtuous dispositlon--that

is, that

cultivating various emotions can at best make us more likely
to adopt and realize moral

ends,

morally worthy,

adoption and realization of those

the actual

but that,

in order to be

ends must be done solely from respect for the law.

Since I

want to make the stronger claim that cultivating not just

54

respect,

but many other emotions as well,

const itutive of a virtuous

is actually

frame of mind--albeit from a

subjective point of viev--I need to show how the cultivation
of morally beneficial

feelings fits into Kant's broader

conception of virtue.

Ill •

T.VQ Conceptions o£ Virt ue

In the Doctr ine

V i r t u e . Kant gives two definitions

of virtue the equivalence of which is not immediately
apparent.

The first is the following:

perfection is to do his d u t y from duty

"Man's greatest moral
(for the law to be

not only the rule but also the incentive of his actions)"
(DV:392).
virtue,
this

Since I have already clarified this conception of

I will not so again here.

Suffice

it to say that

is the conception of virtue which is traditionally

attributed to Kant and for which he is most warmly lauded by
friends and most hotly criticized by enemies.
this conception of virtue,

The merits of

in the eyes of Kant's friends,

are that it confirms our nature as free and rational beings
and makes virtue accessible to everyone as a result.
possible for everyone to be virtuous,

It is

on this definition,

since we all have access to the moral law and have the
freedom of choice to be motivated by it even when all of our
inclinations oppose

it.
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This also happens to be what strikes Kant's critics as
reprehens.ible.

Virtue,

in their eyes,

is a settled

disposition which needs to be cultivated, and not a power we
have

in virtue of some mysterious free will.

Aristotelian

critics say that the process of cultivation takes place
through habituation, which brings our sensible side in
harmony with our rational side.

In their eyes,

it is

impossible to act morally if all our inclinations oppose
reason;

hence Kant's definition strikes them as unrealistic,

if not absurd.
is inert,

Empiricist critics claim that since reason

it is not reason but emotion which guides the

virtuous disposition.

Here,

too, cultivation enters in

because we need to allow ourselves to be motivated only by
emotions which are morally appropriate,

notably sympathy.

While this takes place through a reflective process,

it is

nonetheless feeling itself, and not an y reason-based moral
law, which gives the motive for acting morally.
gist of both criticisms

The common

is that virtue requires work on the

emotions either through habituation or through reflection.
Ironically, Kant's second definition of virtue
acknowledges precisely this requirement.
Kant,

"Virtue," says

"signifies a moral strength of the will"

(DV:405).

Since "strength of any kind can be recognized only by the
obstacles

it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these

obstacles are natural
this definition,

inclinations"

(DV:394),

virtue,

on

is "the strength of [man's] resolution in
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conflict with powerful opposing inclinations” (D:477).
virtuous person,

on this definition,

will as much as a strong will,
measured by the obstacles

A

does not have a free

the power of which is

it can overcome.

Even though this

conception of virtue is a far cry from the Aristotelian and
empiricist conceptions

in that it recognizes conflict and

struggle as moral realities while the others see virtue as a
harmonious state,

it is still closer to them than the

previous definition because

it introduces the concept of

strength p i w i l l , which can be acquired only through
cultivating

inclinations favorable to the adoption of moral

maxims and fighting those opposed to the same.
But precisely because the second definition is closer
to the "enemy" conceptions,
which Kant,

it seems to entail difficulties

well aware of his predecessors,

first definition.

avoids

in his

This is the reason why Kant scholars tend

to underemphasize the second definition,
confusion on Kant's part.

thinking it a

The problem with the second

definition is that it seems to do away with freedom and
rationality altogether,
moved by one's strongest

making choice a matter of being
incentive rather than of endorsing

a motive by freely incorporating it into one's maxim,
regardless of its strength.

On this picture of choice,

competing incentives "battle

it out" by exercising contrary

psychic forces on the will,

and the strongest one wins.

Rather than acting on freely adopted principles,
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the agent

becomes the passive

locus of psychic battles.

"act" in a morally worthy way,

on this view,

simply have and endorse the motive of duty;
one's strongest motive,
incentives.

In order to
one does not

it must also be

winning the battle against contrary

This view has become known as the "battle

citation model" of moral w o r t h . 3*

A consequence of this

view is that one can have a good will only if one has a
strong will.*'*

This makes virtue unavailable to those

with a weak will, and so goes against the basic democratic
intent of Kant's ethics.
There

is, however, another way to interpret the

definition of virtue as moral strength of will which not
only makes

it compatible with Kant's attribution of

principle-guided freedom of choice to us but also explains
how the cultivation of our emotions can be a measure of
virtue

itself--albeit only a subjective one,

not to be

confused with the objective condition of morality itself,
inherent in our true, but hidden, disposition

(DV:397).

When we cultivate morally favorable dispositions and weaken
our dispositions to vice,

we indicate that we have adopted

**Richard G. Henson coins this term in "What Kant Might Have
Said: Moral
Worth and the Overdeterraination
of Dutiful Action,"
Philosophical
Review
88
(1979), p p . 365-82,
and
attributes
a
"battle citation view of
choice" to the Kant of
the G r o u n d w o r k .
For
a discussion
of this
view
and
its
problems, see
Henry
Allison, Kant's Theory q± F r e e d o m , pp.114-27.
**For
a good
explanation of
why the
good will
cannot be
equivalent
to a
strong will,
see Jay Wallace, "Kant
On Moral
Worth and Moral Luck" (unpublished).
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the basic intention to cultivate morality in ourselves.39
Our success at that activity is measured by the severity and
magnitude of the vices ve are able to overcome,

and success

at that activity Is. virtue, as strength of will.
Kant's account of virtue as strength of will

is

compatible with his attribution of principle-guided freedom
of choice to us because the cultivation of the emotions
itself a freely chosen task,

reflected

in the maxim:

is

"I

intend to use all means within my power as a finite rational
being to cultivate a virtuous disposition."
cultivated dispositions,

Kant stresses,

Acting on

can never become a

matter of habit f for then we would lose the freedom in the
adoption of obligatory ends which is essential to morality
(DV:409).

But we can faci1 itate our free choice of such

ends by removing obstacles to such choices and cultivating
dispositions which facilitate them.

We always face

competing incentives— this is a fact about our nature as
finite rational beings
choose
maxims.

(D V :397)--and we are always able to

freely among them by incorporating them into various
But we can make

by changing our

it easier to adopt the right maxims

inclinations,

and that process

is itself

39See Mary Gregor's introduction to her
translation of The
Metaphvsics of M o r a l s , p . 25, for a discussion of how this process
of
cultivation is also commanded
by the specific
duties in The
P Q g t C jpe 2i. Virtue .
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"the work of freedom."1*

This,

entail that the strongest
adopt.

does not

incentive will be the one we

We will only have made

act on the proper

of course,

it more

likely that we will

incentive by weakening those

incentives

which stand opposed to it.
It is in this sense--by reference to a long-term
process and not a single moment of choice--that virtue
measured by the magnitude of obstacles
virtuous choice

is

it can overcome: a

is the product not only of the momentary

flash of a noumenal will

(as Iris Murdoch would have it),

but also of a long process of clearing our subjective
disposition of obstacles which stand in the way of such a
ch oice.37

Consider Kant's solution to the problem of how

a man can be under duty to make himself good when he is

3*See
discussion
f r e e d o m ."

Mary Gregor,
The
Laws
F r e e d o m . p p . 197-8 for
a
of
how cultivating
emotions
can
be
"the work
of

17I therefore
consider
it
oversimplified
to
argue,
as
Barbara Herman does in "On the Value of Acting from the Motive of
Duty", The Practice a t Moral J u d g m e n t , p.*** that struggle
with
recalcitrant inclination is
no special
mark of virtue.
It
is
true
that
the
moral worth
of
any
particular
action is
not
affected by the presence or absence of recalcitrant inclinations.
But
that does not entail that the long-term process of weakening
recalcitrant inclinations does
not have moral worth.
Since Kant
thinks we always have
recalcitrant inclinations to contend with,
due to our finite nature (DV:397), it is always imperative on
us
to fight them,
and this
struggle is. a mark
of virtue.
See
MM:228, 394,
397, 405;
LE, 139-40;
R:71
for especially clear
statements of this
claim.
For a helpful
discussion of
Kant's
conception of
virtue as
the process of
overcoming recalcitrant
dispositions, see Christine Korsgaard,
"Morality as Freedom," in
Kant
Practical Philosophy R e c o n s i d e r e d . 1989), pp. 23-48, esp.
p p .44-5.
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"corrupt

in the very ground of his maxims" and will,

moreover,, always have

inclinations which oppose the law:

But if a man is corrupt
maxims,

in the very ground of his

how can he possibly bring about this revolution

by his own powers and by himself become a good man?
Yet duty bids us do this, and duty demands nothing of
us which we cannot do.

There

is no reconciliation

possible here except by saying that man is under the
necessity of, and is therefore capable of, a revolution
in his cast of mind,
his sensuous nature
of the former).

but only of a. gradual reform in
(which places obstacles in the way

That is,

if a man reverses,

single unchangeable decision,

that highest ground of

his maxims whereby he was an evil man
a new man),

(and thus puts on

he is, so far as his principle and cast of

mind are concerned,

a subject susceptible of goodness,

but only in continuous
man

by a

labor and growth jjg. he a good

(R:43, emphases mine).

What becomes clear here

is that although good character may

be indicated by the presence of the firm resolution to make
oneself good

(an intention signalled by a revolution in

one's cast of mind),
intention--that

the actual realization of this

is, the process of actually becoming good--

can only consist in a gradual reform of one's sensuous
character.

The "gradual" and "absolute" conceptions of
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moral

improvement are thus not really at odds;

they only

show the difference between intention and action.
Striving for moral perfection,
reform of our sensuous character.
acting on certain emotions

then,

involves a gradual

Since cultivating and

is itself constitutive of a

virtuous frame of mind, albeit from a subjective point of
viev--that

is,

from our point of view as finite rational

a g ents— striving to be virtuous
point of view,

is equivalent,

from that

to making it e a s i e r . more p r o b a b l e . that we

act in morally worthy ways.

So if we commit ourselves to

making ourselves more sensitive to the call of duty as it
presents itself in particular situations,

then we have

adopted the basic intention to be virtuous.

And we do this

precisely by resolving to battle our dispositions to vices
and strengthen our dispositions to virtue.

Far from

entailing a "battle citation model of moral worth"
picture of choice

in which the strongest

(a

incentive always

wins), Kant's conception of virtue as strength of will
therefore presupposes the freedom of choice characteristic
of his received view of a g e n c y . "•
"•Because
virtue
always
presupposes
the
existence
of
obstacles
to be overcome (whether
past or present), moral worth
or
merit
will
always
be
proportional
to
the
magnitude
of
obstacles
that have been overcome
(see esp. MM:227-8).
I thus
disagree
with Thomas
Hill
Jr.'s
claim
that
virtue
must be
distinguished from merit because
only the former
presupposes a
struggle against recalcitrant inclinations (see Hill, Dignity and
Practical R e a s o n . p.168).
I also
disagree with Barbara Herman's
conception
of moral worth for the same reason (see footnote 32),
even though Kerman is right
to point out that one can display a
good will without performing meritorious act s — namely, by forming
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Kant's two definitions of virtue are therefore
compatible.

The difference between them is that the first

captures the objective condition of morality,
second describes morality as
finite subject.

it manifests

while the

itself

in the

That Kant recognizes the difference,

sees the two conceptions of virtue as complementary,
clear

but
is

in the following passage:
It is also correct to say that man is under obligation
to [acquire] virtue
capacity

(as moral strength).

For while the

(facultas ) to overcome all opposing sensible

impulses can and must simply be presupposed

in man on

account of his freedom, yet this capacity as strength
(r o b u r ) is something he must acquire; and the way to
acquire

it is to enhance the moral incentive

(the

thought of the law), both by contemplating the dignity
of the pure law in us
practicing virtue

(c o n t e m p l a t i o n e ) and by

(executio ) (DV:397).

To acquire virtue as strength of will,

it is necessary both

to reflect on the moral law and what it entails about human
beings

(that they are ends

in themselves and therefore

possess d i g n i t y ) and to cultivate those emotions favorable
to a moral frame of mind--both through outer

(if only legal)

action and through the inner adoption of attitudes which
help bring about those emotions.

For instance,

to feel

virtuous
intentions (see
Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality,"
p .239)--although here, too,
the intention must be formed
from a
sense of duty.
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proper humility before the moral

law, we must not see

ourselves, as possessing more worth than others,
everyone has the capacity for morality;

since

to feel love, we

must refrain from judging people and must take an interest
in their ends,

and so forth.

Since the adoption of such

attitudes--the thinking of such thoughts--is
(an inner act of the mind;

freely chosen

see DV:393), and such acts of

mind can help bring about morally appropriate emotions,
is always within our power to affect how ve feel.

it

We can

thus cultivate feelings either through thought or through
external action.
This view of the emotions explains why Kant,

only one

page after having asserted that all feeling belongs to "the
order of nature"

(DV:377),

can also claim that "pleasure

that must be preceded by the law in order to be felt is in
the moral ord e r " (DV:378).

Emotions which are cultivated

because they help shape a moral frame of mind are products
of moral
moral

intending--that is,

intending according to the

lav--and so, become part of the moral order.

The

moral order also includes emotions which are contrary to a
moral frame of mind,

but which have nevertheless been

cultivated with that awareness
an e v i 1 disposition).
everything that

(they belong,

The moral order,

of course,

in short,

is open to moral evaluation;

to

includes

that is, all

actions which are undertaken through an aware n e s s — favorable
or unfavorable--of the moral law as well as all feelinas and
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dispositions which have been cultivated through such an
awareness.. 39
The multifarious activity of acquiring virtue as
strength of will requires relentless self-scrutiny.

For

in

order to know which inclinations are morally problematic and
which are not,

one must be perfectly honest with oneself

about why one has them, what their significance
whether one should change them.
self-knowledge

This

is, and

is why Kant makes

"the first command of all duties to oneself"

(DV:441), and so,

indirectly, makes

it the first command of

all duties, since all duties are duties to oneself in the
sense that virtue must spring from an attitude of mind
conforming to the dignity of one's humanity.*0
command,

The

"Know yourself!" means:

3*What Kant
means
by
"the
moral order"
is,
of
course,
ambiguous,
since it can mean either a) intentions and actions to
realize moral ends
which are made
from a sense
of duty, or
b)
those acts
and products
of acts--e.g., feelings--which
do help
realize moral
ends
but which
are not
necessarily willed
from
duty, as
well as
actions contrary
to the
moral law which are
undertaken with that awareness.
I think (b) is most plausible,
not
only
because
it
includes
all
actions
open
to moral
evaluation, but also because of Kant's claim that p l e a s u r e . which
itself does not carry any moral worth, belongs to the moral order
(DV:378).
"The moral
order" is thus roughly equivalent
to what
Kant
meant by
"the intelligible
world" in the
G r o u n d w o r k : an
interpretation of the sensible world according to moral laws.
*°Mary Gregor gives the following examples to illustrate how
Kant conceives of all
duties as indirectly duties to
ourselves:
"a duty of
forgiving someone who has injured us
is indirectly a
duty to ourselves of not degrading our soul
with hatred, and our
duty to benevolence is
indirectly a duty to ourselves
of making
ourselves the source
of others' happiness" (Gregor, The
Laws of
F r e e d o m , p . 128, fn.l).
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Know your heart--whether

it is good or evil, whether

the .source of your actions
can be

is pure or impure, and what

imputed to you as belonging originally to the

substance of man or as derived

{acquired or developed)

and belonging to your moral c o n d i t i o n . (DV:441)
It is significant that Kant here leaves room for actions
based on inclinations which are morally irrelevant:.
belong to "the substance of man,"

These

i.e, to our natural

constitution,

and include such matters as whether we prefer

fish to beef,

blondes to brunettes,

so forth.

These

jogging to swimming, and

inclinations are irrelevant to evaluating

one's moral standing;

hence, we should not see

matter of d u t y to change them.

Indeed,

it as a

if we did

include

them in the moral order, we would commit the vice of
"micrology," a "concern with petty d e t a i l s ...which, were it
admitted into the doctrine of virtue,
government of virtue

into tyranny"

would turn the

(DV:409).

Since there

are two possible sources of inclinations--nature and
freedom--one must know whether a given inclination belongs
to one's natural state or to one's moral c o n d i t i o n .
Only in the latter case does the inclination reflect one's
moral standing,

since

only then does

it belong

to "the moral

‘*1It
is important to note that in the process
of evaluating
those dispositions
which belong to one's
"moral condition," one
must
not only attend to
one's present actions
and motives, but
also
to one's past record.
For inclinations
are desires which
require experience with the object of desire, and
so, presuppose
the past
(see R:24,
note).
Inclinations
thus include
settled
character traits.
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order," which alone

is open to moral evaluation.

Still,

both sorts of inclinations can be cultivated through free
choice
past).

(one can learn to like things one did not like in the
The cultivation of inclinations belonging to our

natural condition,

though,

is morally irrelevant.

We can now summarize the systematic import of feeling
in the virtuous

life, as Kant conceives of it.

strength of will, we saw,
knowledge

Virtue as

is bound up with the call to self-

implicit in Kant's doctrine of the inscrutability

of motives— a call to know ourselves as deeply as possible
given our finite rational nature.

Self-knowledge

is

important not because we are interested in knowing whether
we are virtuous,
virtue.

but because

it puts us on the road to

Since we always have inclinations which are

contrary to moral ends,

but are also always aware of

ourselves as subject to a law of duty (A:185) and so never
sanction an evil

inclination of which we are aware

knowledge of the existence of morally harmful
puts us on the road to self-improvement.

(A:159),

inclinations

Cultivating those

emotions favorable to the adoption of moral ends is a
central aim of self-improvement because it marks the basic
intention to strive

for a virtuous disposition;

and strivino

for such a disposition is the highest end we can have as
human beings,

since our real motives are inscrutable to us.

We are now in a position to turn to the specific ways in

which the cultivation of feeling helps shape a virtuous
disposition.

EaJLjL IV-L TJlS SJB.ec.ifLg R e l e s a i. Feeling in. the Moral Life

What follows

is a sketch of the main roles which

feeling can play in the moral life.

In subsequent chapters,

the sketch will be filled out by a more detailed discussion
of each type of feeling and its role in the moral life.
I have identified three basic types of feelings,
distinguished by the role they play in the moral life as
Kant conceives of it:
1. D u ty-fee1i n g s : feelings which we need in order
to

recognize duty at all;

2. Dignity-f e e l i n g s : feelings which help us shape
a

conception of ourselves which is in harmony

with the dignity of our humanity (primarily
associated with our duties toward ourselves);
3. Helping feelings:

feelings which help us carry

out our duties toward others by shaping loving
and

respectful attitudes toward them,

including feelings which make virtue and

its

outward manifestations aesthetically appealing.
As we will see,
categories,

there is often an overlap between these

since feelings found in one category can also

have functions defined by another category.
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While I discuss

each type of feeling in detail
here a brief sketch of each,
of duty to cultivate

in following chapters,

I give

showing how it can be a matter

feelings of that type.

It is important

to remember that each argument for a duty to cultivate
feeling sets out from a conception of ourselves as finite
rational beings--beings who,

unlike God, do not

spontaneously act on the moral law because of internal
obstacles which we need to overcome.

Lu Duty-feelinos

At DV:399-403, Kant specifies four d u t y - f e e l i n g s :
a) Moral feeling
b) Conscience
c) Love of man
d) Self-respect.
Their common feature,

says Kant,

is that "they lie at the

basis of morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness
to the concept of duty,
mo r a l i t y ” (DV:399).

not as objective conditions of

To do our duty from duty is the

objective condition of morality.

These subjective

predispositions do not constitute that condition,

but are

presupposed by it, since we need them in order to recognize
and tig. responsive to duty, and so,

to act morally at all.

As we will see, some form of at least one of these feelings
is involved
above.

in the other categories of feeling enumerated

The duty-feelings cover all the basic character
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traits of the virtuous

individual,

but these qualities

receive further specification in the categories which
foll o w .
In particular,

I want to show that since even though

the duty-feelings carry certain similarities to select
natural

feelings

(love of man is similar,

identical to, natural sympathy),

though not

the morally mature agent

is

able to judge whether a given feeling carries the husk of
moral thinking around

it or not

toward

She can therefore also determine

its objects).

(reflected in our attitude

whether the motive of duty is present
feeling

in or along with the

(present i n it if the feeling is one of the moral

feelings; along with it if the feeling
beneficial natural

feeling).

is a morally

The morally mature

individual

is therefore able to express her sense of duty in a more
heartfelt way than the moral novice

is able to.

The fact that some form of at least one of the dutyfeelings

is involved

morally beneficial

in each of the subsequent categories of

feelings has some

The notable one is that,

interesting results.

since duty-feelings affect us

simply in virtue of our awareness of the moral
within the power of each individual,

law,

it is

regardless of

dispositional quirks or warmth v s . coldness of personality,
to acquire the qualities which characterize virtue
most full-blooded sense.
[duty-feelings],

and

in its

Kant says that "every man has

it is by virtue of them that he can be
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put under obligation"

(DV:399).

If this

is true,

then each

of us can use our duty-feelings as a basis for cultivating
the more specific feelings defined
And,

in subsequent categories.

vice v e r s a , ve can refine our natural

feelings

in such

a way that they make the motive of duty itself more
heartfelt.
Since duty-feelings,

however,

accessible to each individual
the moral

lav, Kant

weakly felt, are

in virtue of her awareness of

is immune to the common charge that he

is forced to pay insufficient attention to emotions as a
result of his twin claims that a) virtue must be accessible
to each

individual, and b) since we vary in our emotional

make-up,

emotion cannot be the basis of virtue.

(among them,

Bernard Williams,

Critics

whose criticisms of Kant on

the emotions--including the one just mentioned--I will
consider

in detail

in Chapter

5) have inferred from these

two claims that up. state of the emotions— except perhaps the
absence of emotion altogether--can be required
Kantian character.

in a virtuous

But if moral action presupposes feelings

(viz the aforementioned

"duty-feelings") and if, moreover,

it is possible for us to use these universally possessed
predispositions to cultivate morally beneficial natural
feelings
which,

(feelings which help us fulfill our duties but

unlike the four "duty-feelings," are not grounded

a grasp of the moral lav),

in

then Kant can clearly hold both
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that virtue

is accessible to every individual and that at

least some emotions play a crucial role in the moral life.
Since each of the four duty-feelings
other three categories of feeling,
separately,

but rather

however,

all categories:

I will not discuss them

in conjunction with the feelings of

the other three categories.
the moral law,

is involved in the

Moral

feeling or reverence

for

is an exception since it is basic to

it is the ultimate precondition for

recognizing and being responsive to the concept of duty.
Accordingly,

I begin by giving a brief characterization of

moral feeling,
What Kant
feeling"

to be filled out in Chapter 3.
in the Doctrine of Virtue calls "moral

(D V : 399-400),

he elsewhere

(in other works and at

DV:387 and 467-8) calls "respect" or "reverence"
for the moral

law:

the feeling of constraint which we

experience when we think of the moral
imposes on us.

(A c h t u n a )

law and the duties

it

This feeling of constraint is accompanied by

an interest in acting on the moral

law, since the law stems

from our own rational nature, and so is elevating at the
same time as it is constraining.
Even though respect has a dual nature,
whole a positive attitude toward the moral
as something worth following.

it is on the
law, a view of it

Accordingly,

when we

undertake a course of action which is opposed to the moral
law, we feel displeasure; and when our actions are
consistent with the law, we feel pleasure
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(DV:399).

In the

Doctr ine af. V i r t u e . Kant takes the feeling of pleasure or
displeasure which accompanies our actions to be part of the
moral

feeling,

which also

includes respect for the law.

the Cr itiaue o£ Practical R e a s o n , however,

In

he is careful to

distinguish the feeling of pleasure or displeasure which
follows our actions--which he defines as moral feeling--frora
the moral motive of respect

for the law on the grounds that

pleasure and pain are only effects of our actions and cannot
be seen as motives

(C p r r :116-17).

I shall take this

distinction to be implicit in the Doctr ine of V i r t u e .
While each of us feels respect

for the law, we still

have a duty to strengthen that feeling "through wonder at
its inscrutable source, ” that is, by thinking about how the
moral law differs from merely sensuous
that

incentive

incentives and how

"is induced most intensely in its purity by a

merely rational representation"

(DV:400).

Reflecting on the

fact that we can be motivated by something which has a
purely rational origin makes the moral law a stronger
incent i v e .

li , BlqnULy-t s.e1inqs
The central feeling in this category is self-respect.
It is closely connected to moral feeling in that its object
is the moral law; the difference

is that self-respect

directed at the self as the subject of the moral

law, while

moral feeling is directed at the moral law and only

73

is

indirectly at the self
respect

(cf. LE:126).

is akin to pride.

The feeling of self-

Its main function is to remind us

of our dignity as subjects of the moral law, a fact about us
which imposes certain duties on how we should think about
ourselves and how we should comport ourselves— namely, as
subjects worthy of the humanity within us and of its highest
end, morality.

Self-respect,

certain duties,

that is, of certain actions that are

consistent with

[man's] duty to himself"

LE:121)).

Self-respect,

duties to oneself.

Kant says,

then,

"is the basis for

(DV:403, c f .

is primarily connected with

It form the basis both of duties to act

in certain ways and of duties to combat feelings opposed to
the dignity of our humanity.
One feeling which self-respect
is false humility,

i.e., servility.

is meant to counteract
The only appropriate

object of humility is the moral law itself

(DV:436); any

humility toward other men should be based only on the fact
that they,

too, are legislators of the moral

law.

Any other

form of humility--"bowing and scraping" before men (DV:437),
revering or flattering them--is
"degrades one's personality"

false humility,

(DV:435-6;

467-8).

contrary to our duty towards other men because

since it
It is even
it displays

"a [kind of] am b i t i o n " reflected in the belief that through
such behavior,
have

(DV:436).

one will acquire a greater worth than they
To cultivate self-respect,

it is necessary

not only to reflect on oneself as subject of the moral law
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and to hold certain attitudes toward oneself,

but also to

act in ways that are appropriate to our elevated status.
For in doing so, we counteract the vice of servility and
thereby strengthen our self-respect.
clear

This

is an especially

instance of how certain actions can bring about

morally beneficial

feelings.

From the foregoing,
us act

it is clear that self-respect makes

in ways which underscore our role as legislators of

duty, and so, helps us fulfill our duties
than dejected or grudging way.

in a proud rather

But how does self-respect

serve as a precondition for recognizing the concept of duty
in the first place?

In including self-respect among duty-

feelings, Kant implies it must have such a role.

I think

the feature of duty to which self-respect makes us sensitive
is the fact that every duty is indirectly a duty toward
oneself

(see LE:121,

223).

As Mary Gregor points out,

"a

duty of forgiving someone who has injured us is indirectly a
duty to ourselves of not degrading our soul with hatred, and
our duty to benevolence is indirectly a duty to ourselves of
making ourselves the source of others'

h a p p i n e s s ."«*

All

virtuous deeds must spring from a proud attitude--a state of
mind conforming to the dignity of our humanity.
attitude

This

is of course first adopted through thought and not

through feeling,
of self-respect.
42See Gregor,

but it causes us to have a stronger feeling
Thoughts or attitudes are thus

The Laws of F r e e d o m , p . 128,
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fn.l.

included

among the actions

(in this case, acts of mind) vhich help

cultivate, morally beneficial

feelings and, ultimately,

a

virtuous character.
I have already observed that the pride appropriate to
our dignity is limited only by humility before the moral
lav.

This humility is bound up with another dignity-feeling

relevant to our duties to ourselves,

namely,

conscience.

Kant defines conscience as "consciousness of an internal
court

in man

{'before vhich his thoughts accuse or excuse

one another')"

(DV:438).

Conscience

is the pover of

judgment applied to one's own actions,

for vhich reason then

gives the verdict "guilty" or "innocent."

This activity is

something ve cannot escape; ve can only bring ourselves
conditions of extreme depravity)
(DV:438).

Since conscience

(in

no longer to heed it

is inescapable,

it inspires awe

in u s :
Every man has a conscience and finds himself observed,
threatened,

and,

in general,

coupled with fear)

kept

in ave

(respect

by an internal judge; and this

authority watching over the law in him is not something
that he himself
incorporated

(voluntarily) m a k e s . but something

into his b e i n a .

It follows him like a

shadow when he plans to escape.

(DV:438)

Conscience is thus not strictly a feeling.

It is rather an

activity of judgment bound up with the feeling of awe
coupled with respect).

The judgments of conscience
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(fear

(or

rather,

of reason) are followed by either relief or pain,

depending, on whether the verdict was "innocent" or "guilty"
(DV:440).

Since conscience

is something we cannot escape

but can only dull our senses to, we do not have a duty to
acquire a conscience;

we only have a duty to cultivate

We do this by heeding its verdicts,

it.

by sharpening our

attentiveness to its voice, and by enlightening our
understanding about what is and what is not our duty, which
is the same as using "every means to obtain a hearing for
[the voice of conscience]"

(DV:401, my insert).

Kant does not explain why
duty to oneself
DV:437),

heeding one's conscience

(though he classifies

but I think

is a

it as a such a duty at

it is plausible to see this duty--

characterized as a duty to "judge" oneself
bound up with the duty to know oneself

(DV:438)--as

(which Kant at DV:441

calls the "first command of all duties to oneself").

For

conscience judges not only the legality of our actions,
also of their morality.

We have a bad conscience

but

if someone

interprets our act as beneficent when in fact it was done
from a selfish motive.

Similarly,

if we plan to act in a

certain way, conscience judges

the moral worth of the action

even before we have undertaken

it (DV:438).

important

This gives

us

information regarding our long-standing

motivations.

Heeding our conscience

aspect of self-knowledge.
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is thus an important

How,

finally,

does conscience help us recognize and be

responsive to duty?
before

It helps us recognize duty by holding

its court of justice each action we contemplate

undertaking

(DV:438).

This makes us aware of the

implications of acting contrary to duty, and so, reminds us
of the severity of its commands and the necessity with which
duty binds us.
of the moral

Conscience thus reminds us of the necessity

law--of the fact that we cannot make ourselves

an exception to it.

Conscience helps us respond to duty

because we know that we cannot escape the verdict of
conscience.

This

is not a motive of fear;

it is rather an

awareness of the inevitability of practical reason within
us.

The awareness that practical reason will

actions whatever we may do provides a powerful

judge our
incentive to

conform to the commands of the moral law.

i n t H?lP,inq Feelings
These feelings are connected primarily with our duties
toward others.
mankind.

The central

feeling here is the love of

While Kant says that it cannot be a duty to have

this feeling,

since love cannot be felt out of the

constraint inherent in the thought of duty,

it is still a

duty to cultivate it by practicing beneficence
2).*3

Kant's assumption here

(DV:401-

is that by doing good to

■•"Kant's claim
that beneficence produces a
feeling of love
(DV:402)
can of course be
interpreted not as
a claim about our
duties but as a claim about the effect of beneficence.
That is,
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others, we will come to love them

(DV:402,

of course^ a tenuous assumption.

But

plausible

457).

is,

it becomes more

if we think of a concrete situation in which we

help someone.

Our

interaction with the person gives us

familiarity with her, and her sense of decency
has any!)

This

(assuming she

will prompt her to show gratitude toward us.

The

experience will most likely be amiable, and so, will inspire
in us an affection for her.
Kant's

This at least seems to be

idea, and I intend to make

it plausible in Chapter 4,

the chapter devoted to helping feelings.
While the duty of beneficence gives us a latitude in
deciding whom to help and when--the most likely recipients
of our beneficence being,
(DV:452)--it

of course,

our nearest and dearest

is conjoined with the duty to friendship

(a

relationship characterized by mutual love and respect;
DV:469),

which

imposes on us the ultimate aim of becoming a

"friend of man," that is, someone who takes an active
interest in the well-being not only of those who are near
and dear,

but also of those who are not, and does so with

respect and not with the unwarranted pride of a benefactor
(DV:472-3).

Engaging in friendships also helps break down

the reserve we feel toward those we do not know.

Love

Kant might not be making it a duty to cultivate love, but only to
practice beneficence.
However, since he classifies
love of man
among the subjective predispositions
to dut y itself and,
in his
discussion of the other subjective predispositions, clearly makes
it a duty to cultivate
them (see DV:399-401),
I think he
also
sees it as incumbent on us to cultivate love of man.
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toward particular

individuals is thus meant to serve as a

foundation for a more generalized

love of mankind,

by

the ease which particular

up

to those whom we do not know (LE:206-7).
In what sense

mediated

friendships give us inopening

is love of mankind a subjective

precondition for recognizing and responding to duty?

This

is

difficult to establish, since love can becultivated

by

recognizing duty in the first place--that

practicing beneficence.

is, by

Kant gives no explanation for why

he includes love of man among the duty-feelings.
plausible to assume,

only

however,

It is

that the love of man,

if not a

necessary requirement for our recognition of duty, will
render the universality-requirement of the moral law more
concrete to us.

If we take an active interest in the well

being of others,

we are better able to see the law not just

as an abstract requirement of reason,

but as a principle

urging us to be concerned with the well-being and rights of
individuals in specific situations.

I submit,

then,

that

the love of man helps us recognize duty by making its
requirements more concrete to us.
The love of man also helps us respond more readily to
the requirements of duty because as finite beings, we are
morally fallible, and so, will not always act on the moral
law simply because

it is our duty to do so.

Cultivating

love of man is a way of spurring us along the right course
of action even when duty is not a sufficient motive.
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This

is why Kant says that sympathy is "one of the impulses that
nature has

implanted

in us to do what the representation of

duty alone could not accomplish"
rational nature,

(DV:457).

Given our finite

it is incumbent on us to use whatever means

available to fulfill our obligatory ends.

If duty cannot

motivate us, we must use our natural sympathy to carry out
the demands of duty.

For action is, after all,

the ultimate

end of all duties--the end for the sake of which we
cultivate all the morally appropriate dispositions and
feelings

(see DV:441;

There

LE,

143,

is also a class of feelings directed primarily at

the aesthetic appeal of virtue.
here.

200).««

In the Critiaue

q£

Love is the central feeling

J u d g m e n t f Kant draws a close

connection between the sense of beauty and the feeling of
love

(CJ:267). This connection is exploited for moral ends

in the Doctr ine of V i r t u e .

Virtuous behavior has

aesthetically appealing outward manifestations which make us
take an interest in virtue,

if not for its own sake, then at

least for its aesthetic appeal

(DV:473-4).

Similarly,

of man is a "moral ornament" to the world,

required to

love

"represent the world as a beautiful moral whole in its
complete perfection"

(DV,

458).

By helping us imagine the

•^Kant's claim that action is the ultimate goal of
morality
is somewhat difficult to reconcile with his claim that the duties
of the Doctrine of Virtue
prescribe primarily the cultivation of
the
inner
disposition--the
good
w i 11--required
for
morality
(DV:392-3).
In subsequent
chapters, I hope
to show how the
cultivation
of a moral disposition relates to the fulfillment of
duty through action.
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world as it should be, as a "beautiful moral whole," the
love of man gives us a concrete representation of the
ultimate aim of reason.

This is an especially clear

instance of reason enlisting certain emotions for the
fulfillment of its ends,
beings who are

given that human reason exists

in

imperfectly rational.

It may be objected that acting out of love of man is
not morally r e q u i r e d , since all that morality requires
striving to act out of sense of duty.
we are required, as finite beings,

is

But we have seen that

to cultivate all the

motives which help us realize the two obligatory ends.

The

aesthetic appeal of love of man gives us yet another
incentive to cultivate

it.

An action will be more graceful

if we do it not just out of duty,
inclination--that

but also out of

is, if our desires are in harmony with the

requirements of reason.

Actions possessing this sort of

harmony have no greater moral worth than actions performed
from duty but against inclination

(G:397-9).

Nevertheless,

they have an aesthetic value because they lend harmony and
grace to the otherwise stern life of duty.

Those emotions

which help us fulfill moral ends can therefore be seen as
fulfilling an aesthetic desideratum of harmony and balance.
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Conclusion
I hope that I have,
import of feeling

by now, made clear the systematic

in the moral life,

for Kant.

We have a

duty to cultivate feelings because we are not holy wills.
We will always have inclinations which oppose morality;
hence we are under obligation to use every means within our
power to shape within ourselves a morally good disposition.
Even if we should succeed in fulfilling our duties from the
motive of duties and so attain,

from an objective point of

view, a state of moral perfection, we. could never k n o w , from
our own subjective standpoint,

that we had attained such a

state because our motives are inscrutable to us.

Because we

can never assume that we have attained a morally perfect
state and because of the ever-present possibility of
temptation,

we are obliged to continue the process of

cultivating morally beneficial emotions throughout our moral
lives.

In subsequent chapters,

detail how

I hope to explore

in greater

cultivating and acting on morally beneficial

emotions can actually be constitutive of a virtuous frame of
mind in its most full-blooded sense.
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Chapter

3:

The Fee 1 ing of Respe c t for. the Moral Law

For Kant,

the notion of moral obligation poses a

special problem.
obligation

Previous thinkers had conceived of

in essentially motivational terms.

When they

asked how moral standards obligate us, they were asking how
they could motivate us to act on them.

Because they

characterized obligations in terms of antecedent deslres-either se l £-directed

(fear, self-love)

(sociability, benevolence,

or other-directed

love of God)--these thinkers had

no problem explaining how we come to act on an obligation:
obligations are conditioned by natural

feelings or desires

and so follow upon the very motive for acting on them.
Kant breaks with this tradition.

He argues that, since

moral obligations bind us regardless of what we happen to
desire,

the concept of moral obligation cannot be defined in

terms of antecedent desires;
terms of a categorical
unconditionally.

rather,

it must be defined

in

imperative which commands

In defining moral obligation this way,

Kant severs the concept of obligation from the concept of
sensuous motivation,

for

it is definitive of the categorical

imperative that it binds us regardless of what we happen to
des i r e .
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Having made this move, Kant faces a problem.
possible for moral obligations to motivate us?
be move d to act on an unconditional command?

How is it

How can we
Kant has to be

able to answer this question if pure reason is to be able,
without the help of empirical
will--that

is,

incentives,

to determine the

if pure reason is to be practical.

Kant's

solution to

the problem is the following.

He holds that

pure reason

is indeed practical because it generates its own

special motive, namely, a feeling of respect for the moral
law.

Moral

through the

obliaations,

then, are capable

of motivating us

feeling of respect which they evoke in us.

Kant's solution to the problem of moral motivation is
by no means unambiguous, as is evidenced by the many
divergent

Interpretations of how the moral law comes to

motivate us.

Several commentators reject any involvement of

respect in moral motivation.

They see us as being motivated

by pure reason and conceive of respect as the
e ffect of being so motivated.1

(pa th ol o gi ca l)

Others accept respect as

the motive for acting on the moral law, but disagree about
its nature:

some see it as a process of glorying in the

thought of our intelligible natur e, 3 while others portray

^Paul
Guyer is a representative of this
view (see Chapter
10, Kant and the Experience of F r e e d o m ). There are also strands
of this view in Andrews Reath's account of the "sensible" side of
respect (see "Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the
Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination," esp. pp.289-90.
3A
representative of this view is A. Murray MacBeath,
on Moral Feeling," Kant -S tudien 64 (1973), pp. 283-314.
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"Kant

it as the recognition of the moral law as a sufficient
reason .to a c t 3 or as a recognition of the formal
consistency in acting on the moral

law.-

This divergence

in the oresent understanding of Kant's views on moral
motivation shows that we still need an account of how the
moral

law produces a motive

for acting on it.

My aim in this paper is to put forth a reading of
respect which fills this need.

I align myself with the

group that sees respect as the motive for acting on the
moral

law, but I disagree with most of their accounts of the

nature of respect.

These commentators uniformly shy away

from the notion that respect,
a full-blooded f e e ll ng .

in its motivating capacity,

is

They see it instead as a rational

insight, deemphasizing its "pathological" side.®

In a

3Representatives
of this
view
are Andrews
Reath, "Kant's
Theory
of Moral Sensibility: Respect
for the Moral
Law and the
Influence
of Inclination,"
K an t - Studlen 80
(1989), p p . 284-302;
Henry Allison, K a n t 's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1990 ) , p.127.
-A representative of this
view is J. Schneewind, "Autonomy,
Obligation, and Virtue," in The Cambridge Companion to K a n t . e d .
Paul
Guyer
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
UP,
1992),
p . 309-31,
esp.
p p .326-29.
*1 am convinced that they do this because they think it will
violate
Kant's conception of
agency to see moral motivation as
anything
but
purely rational.
They
think
that if
the moral
motive contains
any non-rational
admixture, we are
somehow not
tx.es. when
we act
on
the moral
law.
Thus,
in spite
of his
admirable construal of choice--lncluding
patholodlcally affected
choice--as the
free incorporation of Incentives
into our maxims
(Reath, "Kant's Theory," pp . 290-1), Andrews Reath feels compelled
to believe that anything
but a purely rational construal
of the
moral motive
would violate the model of
free choice he just put
forth (Reath, " K a n t ’s Theory," p . 295).
In fact, na incentive can
violate the model
of free choice, since our freedom of choice is
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sense,

they are

pathological,

justified

in doinq so,

for

if respect is

it seems contingent that it should occur

alongside our rational recognition of the moral
respect

is contingent,

it could not serve as the stable

source of motivation that Kant wants it to be.
show that this type of worry is unfounded,
the moral

law; and if

law is a qenuine

feelinq

I want to

since respect for

(in a sense yet to be

defined) which arises n e c e ss ar 1ly upon reflection on the
moral

law.

Feeling

is thus an essential aspect of the

"pure" moral motive and thus of the motive of duty itself.
First, a few words on why I align myself with the group
of commentators which thinks of respect as the motive to
rather than the effect of moral w i 1 1ing--that is, as a
consequence of our recognition of the moral law but a
presupposition for acting on it.

Eart I_l why respect preced.es rather than follows .moral
w i 1 1 inq

On the face of it, the claim that respect precedes
moral willing and must serve as the motive for moral action
seems slnqularly un-Kantian.
morally worthy actions,

Kant repeatedly claims that in

the moral

law must determine the

will directly and not through an intervening feelinq
preserved regardless of the nature of our choices.
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(CP:25,

27, 38, 48, 71).

This

is a requirement we would expect from

someone who wants to show that pure reason is practical.
order for pure reason to be practical,

the moral

law--the

supreme law of pure reason— must be able to determine
will without the help of empirical
feelings of various sorts

(G:461).

Incentives,

In

the

includinq

But this seems to

suggest that the feeling of respect can have no role in
moral motivation.

Even though Kant describes respect as a

feeling known a priori
a feel in g.

(CP:75,

76, 77, 81),

it still remains

All that is known a priori about respect is

that, as the consciousness of the determination of the will
by the moral

law,

it involves the diminuition of the

influence of sensuous
156).

inclination on the will

(CP:75,

79,

But that takes place on the sensuous plane, and so,

seems to suggest that respect is itself sensuous
character.

in

If its presence is needed to move us to act on a

law of pure reason,

it seems to obliterate Kant's

requirement that pure reason must be sufficient of. itself to
determine the will.®

*Beck notes the apparent inconsistency between claiming that
the moral
law directly determines the
will and that it does so
through
a
feeling of
respect.
But he does
not
resolve the
inconsistency,
for
he
fails
to distinguish
subjective
from
objective
determining
grounds of
the
will--as
do most
other
commentators.
As a
result, he takes the expression
"the direct
determination of the will
by the moral law"
to mean the
actual
choice to adhere to the moral law rather than, as I interpret it,
the mere
awareness of
the moral
law
as a possible practical
principle.
See
Beck,
A Commenta ry on
Kan t 1s Cr.it igue. of
PracticaJ,
Reason
(Chicaqo:
The
University
of Chicaqo Press,
1960), p p . 222-3, esp. fn.37.
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I believe, however,

that Kant can consistently maintain

that pure reason is sufficient of itself to determine the
will and that it does so through the feelinq of respect.

To

see why, we need to consider the sense in which Kant intends
respect to be a feelinq.

If we think that by "feelinq"

fGelQjil), Kant must mean something pathological, his claim
that reason motivates us through a feeling does
paradoxical.

For

indeed seem

inclinations are at best in contingent

conformity with the moral

law, but the moral motive must be

present whether or not our inclinations conform to it
<G:425; CP:21-6);
inclination

thus,

the moral motive cannot be an

(that is why Kant repeatedly stresses that we

cannot have a feeling for the moral
9, 75).

But if,

law as such; see C P : 38-

instead, we think of feeling as a

reflective process, which involves pathological elements but
is primarily conditioned by a judgment o.£ rea s o n . we qet a
view of feeling which

incorporates both a rational element

(the recognition of the moral law as bindinq on us) and
feelings of pleasure and pain.
I suggest, that respect

It is in this latter sense,

is a feeling.

Respect can only

arise is response to our recognition of the moral law as
supremely authoritative for us.

It thus qualifies as a

unique type of feeling, generated in response to an a priori
concept.

Because of its a priori origin,

respect is

sufficiently permanent to motivate us in every situation.
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Does our
the puzzle?

judgment-laden view of respect help resolve
It seems it does not.

For there still appears

to be an inconsistency in claiminq both that the moral

law

dirjejptly determines the will and that it does so only by
means of the feelinq of respect--whether or not respect
feelinq

in the latter,

judqment-laden sense.’7

is a

To resolve

this inconsistency, we need to recoqnize Kant's distinction
between subjective and objective determining grounds of the
will.

This distinction is present already in the
where Kant characterizes the moral will as

determined "objectively" by the moral
by "pure respect for this practical
and CP:81).

law and "subjectively"

law"

(G:400; also 460

What does the distinction amount to?

An objective determining ground of the will
rational principle.
informed by reason,
rational being.

It is objective

is a

in the sense that it is

though it need not be valid for every

A maxim,

for instance,

is an objective

determining qround of the will which is valid only for me
(CP:19).

A law, by constrast,

is a principle which is valid

not only for me, but for all rational beinqs, whether finite
(such as ourselves)

or infinite

(such as God).

It is an

objective determining ground of the will which is also
objectively valid.

Such a principle, e.g.,

false promises," belongs to reason as such:

"Never makes
reason need not

7For now, I am flaqging the "judgment-laden" view of r e s D e c t
and will return to it
in Part IV, where I discuss
the structure
and character of respect.
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venture beyond

itself

into the realm of pathological desires

in order to specify such a principle

(CP:20-1).

Amonq

objectively valid principles of reason are also hypothetical
imperatives, e.g.,
power to attain

"If you desire an end, do what

it."

Hypothetical

is in your

imperatives, while

objectively valid, are not laws because they require,
their formulation, material

for

from the pathological realm.

Because they are based on externally given desires,
not "determine the will as will," but determine

they do

it "only in

respect to a desired effect"--an effect whose occurrence is
at best contingent because conditioned by a continqent
choice or desire

(CP:20).

which determine the will

In this,

they differ from laws,

"as will," and so, necessarily.

will explain this sense of necessity in further detail
Part III.)

(I

in

So, within the category of objective determining

grounds of the will, we have principles of reason which are
either subjectively or objectively valid.
the former category;

Maxims belong to

laws and imperatives to the latter

(see

G :4 OOn , 422n).
A subjective determining ground of the will
incentive.

is an

Kant defines an Incentive as "a subjective

determining ground of a will whose reason does not by its
nature necessarily conform to the objective law"
also 32).*

(CP:72;

Such beinqs--ourselves figurinq notoriously

■Beck defines
an incentive (T r l e b f e d e r ) as
"the dynamic or
conative factor
in willing."
This conative
factor is present
only in finite rational belnqs (Beck, Commentary, pp. 216-17.)
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amonq them--have an internal

resistance toward actinq in a

perfectly rational manner, and so must be "impelled" to act
on principles of reason.

In other words,

incentives

incentive to act on the

(CP:79).®

The

they need

hypothetical

imperative,

for example,

is the desire to be rich: qiven that desire,

is easier

"If you want to be rich, call now,"

for me to follow the principle

it

(thouqh I can

always adopt the end reqardless of whether

I desire

it).

Similarly, we have an internal resistance to the moral law;
thus, we need a moral

incentive to motivate us.

God, who

acts on the moral law by nature, needs no incentive and so
does not feel respect
the moral

(CP:74, 76, 79-80,

82).

Respect, as

incentive, thus applies only to finite rational

beinqs such as ourselves

(CP:79).

To summarize, a

subjective determininq qround of the will

is a motive or

feelinq, while an objective determininq qround of the will
is a rational principle.10
•Unlike
formalist commentators,
I take
Kant's use
of the
term "impelled"
(anaetrieben ) quite seriously--not
in the sense
of implyinq
physical determinism, which
of course it does not,
but in the sense of
siqnifyinq the need to have a f eeling serve
as
the motive to morality.
Only
a feelinq is able to match the
promise
of pleasure implicit in the
claims of the inclinations.
It is just this promise which
serves as an obstacle to moralitv;
hence, we need to be "impelled" toward morality and away from the
claims of the inclinations by a contrary incentive.
10 It is because Andrews Reath falls to
see that incentives
are not principles but
rather feelings that he has
such trouble
explaininq Kant's claim that "no
Incentives can be attributed to
the
divine will"
(CP:72).
If he were to
construe subjective
determininq
grounds of the will as
feelinqs rather than reasons
capable of beinq objectively valid, he would see that they do not
apply to a divine will (see Reath, "Kant's Theory," p . 286, tn.6^.
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Kant does not always explicitly distinguish between
subjective and objective determining qrounds of the will,
but once we recoqnize the distinction,

the apparent

inconsistency noted above falls away.

For while the moral

law must directly determine the will obJejrJt iv e l y , it does
not do so subjectively.

Only throuqh respect, as the

subjective determining ground of the will, can the moral law
become an incentive for us.
objective grounds"

The moral law "furnishes the

for respect, but respect

is "the

subjective effect that the law exercises upon the w i l l , ” and
it is this effect which constitutes the moral
so furnishes the moral motive
says that "the moral

(G:460).

interest and

Thus, while Kant

law determines the will directly ami

objectively in the judgment of reason"

(CP:78, emphasis

mine), he can also claim, on the next page, that the feelinq
of respect is "a subjective ground of activity, as an
incentive for obedience to the law"

(CP:79).

It is possible

to act ob j e c t ively according to the moral law but not
s ub j e c t i v e l y .

This happens when judge that the moral

law is

the right principle to act on and conform our actions to its
requirements, but act from a non-moral motive
this "legality":

CP:81,

152).

(Kant calls

In order to have a moral

disposition, we need not only to judqe that the moral law is
the right principle to act on (an objective

judgment), but

also to act from r_es.pect for the law (a subjective feelinq).
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The distinction between subjective and objective
determining grounds of the will clarifies an otherwise
puzzling sentence

in a footnote in the G r o u n d w o r k . where

Kant says that "Itlhe immediate determination of the will by
the law, and the consciousness thereof,
(G:401n).

The sentence

is called respect"

is puzzling because

appear as though "respect"

it makes

it

is a mere label for the direct

and purely rational choice to act on the moral

law.

This

would make respect, as a feeling which precedes the choice
to act on the moral

law, motivationally idle, since it seems

to suggest that we can be moved to act solely on the basis
of pure reason.

What Kant means to say, however,

is that

respect is the way in which the sheer consciousness of the
moral law affects the feeling subject.

Thus, the sentence

continues,

respect is "the effect of the law upon the

subject."

The thought of the moral

law gives rise to a

feeling of respect, which can then serve as a subjective
determining ground of the choice to act on the moral
The phrase,
not,

law.

"the effect of the law upon the subject" should

then, be taken to refer to the effect of choosing the

moral law as one's principle of action;

it should rather be

taken to refer to the effect of thinking the moral
the supreme principle of action,

law as

regardless of whether or

not one actually ends up obeying the law.11

Only thus can

i:LIn this, I differ from
Paul G u y e r , who
denies that
the
feeling of respect plays any role in moral motivation (whether as
an incentive to act
or as the physical "propulsion"
which moves
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we explain why Kant claims that even sinners--people who
manifestly violate the moral
(C P :79-80; see also R : 41-2,

law--feel respect for the law
44).

For it is only if respect

precedes actinq on the moral law (though follows recognition
of it) that is it possible for someone to feel respect for
the moral

law but still fail to act on it.

Motivational

purists, who want moral motivation to be a

purely rational process, would object that my readinq
iqnores Kant's explicit claim that respect i_& "Itlhe
immediate determination of the will by the law"

("Die

unmittelbare Bestlmmunq des Wlllens durchs Gesetz"; G:401n).
This passage seems to suggest that respect just i.s a purely
rational choice to adhere to the law, and so, that we do
need not to invoke any mysterious feeling to motivate us.
On my reading, however,

respect is not the immediate

determination of the will by the law, but Is rather the
co nsciousness of that determination.

It is a feelinq

arising from our recognition that the law alone is capable
of objectively determininlng the will.
It is important to note that "the determination of the
will by the law" does not signify an actual choice to adhere

us).
Guyer
maintaints that
adoptlnq
the
moral
law as
our
incentive is a purely
rational decision which
nevertheless has
certain effec ts
on our
emotional set,
the
feelinq of
respect
beinq
the most notable one (book manuscript, pp. 486-9).
He qoes
on
to argue that the decision
to act on the
moral law can have
effects on one's entire
characte, not just on one's
capacity to
el
respect (pp.493-8).
I agree with the latter claim, but see
as compatible with taking respect to be the moral motive.
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to the moral
choice..

law.

It only signifies a poss.lb_i_l_ity of

The decision to act on a qlven principle

a matter of free choice

(see R:19).

Similarly,

Is always

the decision

to act from a qiven motive is a matter of free choice, and
is therefore

independent on the permanence or even the

strenqth of one's motive

(R:19).

One can therefore feel

respect without adoptinq

it as one's motive:

feelinq respect

does not entail that one will actually act fxojn respect.
Our capacity for free choice also affects the relation
between our intentions and our actions.

Even Intending to

act from respect--that is,

it into one's

incorporating

maxim--does not entail that one will actually act on that
morally worthy maxim.

As Kant puts it, "there is a great

gap between the maxim and the deed"
possible,

in other words,

(R:42; also 43).

It is

to adopt respect as one's motive

yet fail to act accordingly.
For these reasons,

I find Karl Ameriks'

readinq of

respect as a feeling which follows upon the moral choice and
is needed to get us to "move to morality" dubious.12
Ameriks'

reading,

On

respect is a feeling which arises

necessarily upon the choice to act on the moral
thinks that we have to decide to ad o p t the moral

law.

He

law as our

motive without the help of feeling--this choice must be a

12Karl Ameriks, "The Heqelian Critique of Kantian Morality,"
in New Essays
on Kant, e d s . Bernard den Ouden
and Marcia
Moen
(New York and Bern: Peter
Lanq, 1987), pp.178-212.
Quote from
p . 186, emphasis mine.
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"noumenal acceptance of pure duty"--but that we then need
the feelinq of respect as the "force"

(Ameriks'

actually propels us to moral a c t i on .1 *

Ameriks'

term) which
reading

seems confirmed by Kant's reference to respect as a
Triebfeder,

a "sprinq" of action

this term in a different way.

(CP:72), but I Interpret

On my readinq,

respect as a

Tr iebfeder does not move us to morality in any physical
sense at all;

rather,

it moves us in the sense of creatinq

an interest in acting on the moral

law.

so is the topic of Parts III and IV.)
suggestinq that,

(Just how it does
Ameriks seems to be

in order to act, we need to be "propelled"

to motion by some feeling.

But this contradicts Kant's

theory of free aqency, on which we are never propelled to
act, by feeling or by anything else.

On Kant's view, we act

in a certain way because we have chosen so to act.
enters

Feelinq

in as the basi s for our various choices and not as

the "fuel"

for

implementing them.

My reasons for believing that respect is the motive to
moral willing rather than the effect thereof should by now
be clear.

In Part II, I explain why it is necessary to view

^ A m e r i k s , p p . 186-7.
Ameriks goes on to arque that respect,
as
the effect
of
the moral
choice,
can
then
temper
other
feelings, so as
to allow a whole range of feelings to move us to
action
in this
way (p.187).
I aqree with
Ameriks' claim that
respect can
inform and condition other feelings; indeed, that is
part of my claim about
the way in which respect is conducive to
human
flourishing.
But I disagree with Ameriks' view of respect
as following
the choice to adhere to the moral law.
On my view,
respect precedes the moral choice
in the sense
of creating
an
interest in acting on the moral law.
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respect as a feeling rather than a purely rational
I then .go on,

insiqht.

In Parts III and IV, to specify the character

of that feelinq.

Part IT: Why the moral motive Is a feelinq

If we are correctly to understand Kant's notion of
moral

interest, we must see it as bound up with respect for

the moral

law, where respect is understood as a full-blown

feelinq, not just a rational

insiqht.

This emphasis on

feeling seems to go against much of what Kant says both

in

the Groundwork and in the second Cr itlaue about the purely
rational character of moral

interest.

In particular,

it

seems to contradict his claim that it is "reason's form,
viz.,

the practical law of the universal validity of

maxims," and so the idea of reason "in its relation to a
pure intelliqible world as...a cause determining the will"
(G:462)

that gives rise to our interest in obeyinq the moral

law. These considerations--of

the form of universal

our membership, as legislators of such law,

law and

in an

intelligible world--are purely rational; and so, one would
think, the moral

interest which arises in response to them

must itself be purely rational.
that the moral
which arises

It thus seems odd to claim

interest is founded on a Reeling of respect

in response to these purely rational
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considerations.

That, however,

is just what Kant maintains.

He claims that resDect is a feelinq which arises when we
reflect on the moral

law, and that this feelinq serves as an

incentive for obeyinq the moral law.
qives rise to a rational

This feelinq,

in turn,

interest in obeyinq the law:

respect "produces an interest in obedience to the law, and
this we call moral

interest"

(CP:80;

see also G:459-460).

Why does Kant think we need feelinq in order to take an
interest

in the moral

law?

Why can't the moral

interest

arise as a direct rational response to contemplatinq the
moral

law?

rational:

The moral

interest is Itself, after all, purely

it is "a pure nonsensuous interest of the

practical reason alone"
therefore,

(CP:79).

to claim, as Kant does,

It seems stranqe,
that the moral

interest

can only arise Ln. response to a feelinq of respect.
a purely rational

How can

interest be qenerated out of a feelinq of

respect, and why is respect needed at all in order to
qenerate that interest?

And further, why,

if respect is

already present as an incentive for obeying the law, do we
need,

in addition, a rational

interest in doinq the same?

There seems to be a motivational overdetermination here:

we

have both a feellnq-based incentive to obey the law and a
rational

interest

in doinq the same.

Surely it would

suffice if one of them were present.
To appreciate the logic of this seeming redundancy, we
need to make an architectonic excursion and remind ourselves
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of the standpoint
of moral

from which Kant proceeds in his discussion

interests and incentives

This discussion takes place

in the second Crdtique.

in Chapter 3, entitled "The

Incentives of Pure Practical Reason."
which Kant proceeds
of pure practical
3-Ubject.

The standpoint

from

in this discussion is the standpoint not

reason, but of the fijii.tg raJLiojial

We are not concerned here with laying out the

principles proper to a rational will; we are concerned with
how a being who does not necessarily act on these principles
comes to be motivated by them.
necessarily acts on the moral
nor

(Recall that God, who
law, needs neither

incentives to move him to act morally;

simply do not apply to him; see CP:79.)

interests

these concepts

Laying out the

principles and workings of a rational will was

indeed the

concern of Chapter 1 of the Analytic of Pure Practical
Reason, and this could be done from the standpoint of pure
practical

reason

(though human finitude had at times to be

taken into account, as in the inclusion of Imperatives amonq
the principles of reason; see CP:20).

The topic of Chapter

3, however, cannot be addressed from a purely rational
standpoint.

The task of this chapter is to show how the

sensuously affected subject comes to be m o v ed bv the purely
rational principles laid out in Chapter l--to show,

in other

words, how the principles of reason apply "to the subject
and its sensuous fac u l ty" (CP:16, emphasis mine).
3, then, deals with reason's

Chapter

impact on feelinq, where
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feelinq is construed as essentially motivatinq, as "a
subjective qround of desire"
demands a shift

(CP:90).

The discussion thus

from the standpoint of pure practical

reason

to that of the sensuously affected yet rational subject.
It is this shift
apparent redundancy.

in standpoints which explains the
Kant has

introduced another dimension-

-the sensuous--into his discussion,
the rational dimension.
moral motive must,

but he has not removed

Whatever will

fill the place of the

from this point of view,

of bo£h reason and sensibility.
this place, contains

Respect,

just these elements

contain elements

that which fills
(I will describe

these in detail shortly, but see CP:79-80).

The solution to

the apparent redundancy (respect as "sensuous"
opposed to rational

interest)

respect is b oth a "sensuous"
interest.

It is a rational

incentive as

is thus to realize that
Incentive and a rational

interest

subject looks to its rational side;

in so far as the finite
it is an incentive

far as the subject looks to its finite side.

in so

The dual

nature of respect explains Kant's claim that an interest
"indicates an incentive of the will

so far as it is

presented by reas on " (CP:79, emphasis mine):

the rational

incentive !
ls> respect, as viewed from the point of view of
reason.

But this rational

interest remains part of a

fe.elJjig, i.e., a s_ubj^Gtlye ground of determining the will,
and so, Kant can say that "the capacity for taking...an
Interest in the moral law (or of having respect for the
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moral

law itself)

is reallv moral feeling"

capacity to take an interest in the moral

(CP:80).

Our

law is rational,

but Kant Identifies this capacity with respect and calls it
a moral

feelinq because

it is bound up with a subjective and

irreduclbly aesthetic outlook

(I say "aesthetic"

rather than

"sensuous" because, as we will see in Part IV, the
"sensuous" side of respect is really not pa th o lo qi ca l; it is
more akin to an aesthetic attitude.)
the moral

incentive and the moral

Respect,

interest.

then,

is both

The apparent

redundancy disappears.
Another architectonic puzzle remains.
discussion of moral

What does Kant's

incentives in Chapter 3 add to his "Fact

of Reason" discussion

in Chapter 1?

observes that we recognize the moral

In Chapter 1, Kant
law as supremely

authoritative and immediately directive for us (an insiqht
which he terms "The Fact of Reason"; see C P i S l 1-4).
Because the moral

law determines the will objectively in

respect of its form alone,

the will which recognizes it as

bindinq must do so independently of any empirical object of
desire.

Such a will

is "wholly independent of the natural

law of appearances in their mutual relations," and so,
free (CP:29-30).

is

The Fact of Reason thus discloses our

1 '*There are
actually several
references
to
the Fact
of
Reason in the second Cr i t i a u e . some of which appear incompatible.
For an attempt to sort them out, see Beck, C ommentary . pp.166-75;
Allison,
K a n t 's T heory
of
Freedom Chapter
13;
and
Rawls's
unpublished lectures, "The Fact of Reason," esp. Lecture 1.
I am
following Rawls in my
formulation of The Fact of
Reason (Rawls,
"Themes," p.102).
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freedom to us.

Now,

this insight--that because we are bound

by the .moral law, we are also afeJe to act on it--could
arquably serve as sufficient evidence that reason can
motivate us.

But does not that render superfluous Kant's

discussion of incentives

in Chapter

3, which seems to fill

the same purpose?
Not at all.
moral

In Chapter 1, Kant

law is valid for us.

is showinq that the

In Chapter 3, by contrast,

oivinq his moral psychology--explaininq how the moral
manifests

itself in beings such as ourselves

phenomenoloqy of respect")
duty within us.

law

("the

and how we experience the call of

It is the effect of the moral

sensuous subject which Kant labels "feeling"
which

he is

law on the

(CP:90) and

is the province of Kant's moral psycholoqy.

The

phenomenology of respect as a feeling will thus differ from
his own philosophical insight into the nature of the moral
law and what it reveals about us.

Such epistemic insiqhts

are introduced in Chapter 1 for the purpose of justifying or
authenticating the moral law.1 *

That discussion is

“ Strictly speakinq,
the moral
law can have
no deduction,
since it does not concern itself with properties of objects given
to us.
It does,
however, admit
of an authentication,
i.e., a
demonstration that it alone can fill a need of reason
that is at
the same
time speculative and practical,
namely, to demonstrate
the
objective
reality
of
freedom (CP:46-8).
For
a helpful
discussion of the Fact
of Reason doctrine and its
connection to
the authentication of the moral law, see John R a w l s ’s
"Themes in
Kant's
Moral
Philosophy,"
(hereafter
"Themes")
in Kant's,
Transcendental D e d u c t i o n s . e d . Eckart Fdrster (Stanford: Stanford
UP, 1989), pp. 81-113.
This article draws on Rawls's unpublished
lecture series, The Fact of R e a s o n . from the NEH Institute of the
summer of 1983, organized by Jerome Schneewlnd and David Hoy.
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intended to show that pure reason is objectively practical,
i.e., that beinqs who recoqnize the principles of reason as
bindinq on them are also a ble to act on these principles.
How reason actjjalJLy comes to motivate finite rational
creatures,

i.e., how reason becomes subjectively practical,

is not yet at issue.

It is first in Chapter

3 of Part I

that Kant takes up this issue.
It is important to note, however, that it is not until
Part II of the second Cr it i q u e . in the slender "Methodoloqy
of Pure Practical Reason,"

that Kant claims to be giving an

account of "the way we can make the objectively practical
reason also subjectively practical"

(CP:151).

This seems to

suggest that there has been no prior account of how reason
comes to be subjectively practical.

Since

I am clalminq

that it is precisely the task of Part I, Chapter 3 to show
how reason motivates us, we need to establish the connection
between that chapter and the Methodology.

Kant claims that

the purpose of the Methodology is to provide a way to
"secure the laws of pure practical reason access to the
human mind and an influence on its maxims"
becomes clear, as one reads the chapter,

(CP:151).

It

that Kant means by

this to provide a method for cultivating moral

feelinq,

i.e., for instilllnq and strengthening respect for the moral
law.

The purpose of the Methodoloqy is thus essentially

pedagogical.

The purpose of Part I, by contrast,

is

o hi losophical : to give a theoretical account of how
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practical reason operates,
aspects

in both

its truthful and

illusorv

(the Analytic, where we find Chapter 3, qives

reason's "rule of truth," while the dialectic exnoses and
resolves reason's illusory judgments; CP:16).
of Chapter 3 is thus to explain,

The purpose

in a purely theoretical

way, how the principles of reason come to influence the
subject, whereas the purpose of the Methodology is to show
us how w^ can affect and strengthen this influence.
The connection between the theoretical and the
pedagoqical discussion

is nevertheless intimate, as is

evidenced by Kant's incorporation of some of the material
from Part I into the Methodology.
argue,

This inclusion,

I shall

is precisely what we should expect, given Kant's

conception of self-knowledge
condition)

(truthfulness about one's

as that which gives respect it3 moral worth.

respect the categorical

We

imperative because it is appropriate

for us to act on it: the categorical

imperative reflects our

station in the order of creation, mirroring our essence as
finite rational creatures.

It is because respect carries

this insight into the human condition that it is the only
truthful attitude, and it is only because respect is a
truthful attitude that it qualifies as the moral motive.
Truthfulness in the sense of knowing oneself,

then,

is what

accounts for the m e r 1t in acting from respect rather than
from some other motive.

Because truthfulness

to Kant's account of respect,

is so central

it is not surprising that the
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Methodology should draw on the scientific discussion of Part
I.

For it is precisely a knowledge of our finite n a ture

andthat

Is needed to cultivate the moral motive in such a

way as to avoid moral

fanaticism--the attitude which takes

morality to be a matter of sponteneous compliance with the
moral

law through mere

inclination

(CP:162-3).

The

discussion of Part I thus has a pedagogical significance
which dovetails nicely into the discussion

in the

Methodology.
I have attempted to show not only that the moral motive
is a feeling,

but also how complex a feeling it is.

Respect

cannot be understood as a mere inclination, since it is
built on rational

insights.

But it would also be wronq to

think of it as purely cognitive,

since that ignores its

identity as a f e e l i n g . its role as "a subjective ground of
desire"
rational

(CP:90).

In Part III, I will consider the types of

insights respect

is based on.

In Part IV, I

consider the "subjective" dimension of respect,

i.e., what

sort of feeling it is and what this reveals about

its nature

as a moral motive.

Part III: The

ideas of reason underlying respect

I noted above that the moral

knowledge of the Doctrine

of Elements serves as a foundation for the cultivation of
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moral feeling in the Methodoloqy.
e p is te mo lo g y, however,

Kant's moral

contains numerous rational

only a few of which play a motivating role.

insiqhts,

In order to

arrive at a proper conception of respect, we need therefore
to determine which insiqhts have motivating potential and
which do not.
Some commentators have taken Kant to hold that purely
formal considerations supply the motive for acting on the
moral

law.

They maintain that the recognition of formal

consistency in maxims provides a motive for acting on the
moral law:
between

that,

if one's maxim generates no contradiction

itself and its universalized counterpart, we have a

motive to act on the moral law.3-*

The idea here seems to

be that contradiction is so painful to us that we abhor
and pursue consistency.

As evidence,

cite the following type of passage:
in so far as it is contained

it

these commentators

"the legislative form,

in the maxim,

is the only thing

which can constitute a determining ground of the [free}
will"

(CP:29; also G:460n).

This type of passage

is then

taken to confirm a formalist view of motivation on which the
avoidance of contradiction is the sole motivating force.
There are both textual and philosophical problems with
this type of reading.

The philosophical problem is that it

seems to put the cart before the horse:

in order to heed the

“ A
representative of this view Is J. Schneewind, who says
that it
is the "bare lawfulness of the act" that moves us (p.326
in G u y e r , e d .).
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consistency-requirements

implicit in the cateqorical

imperative procedure, we must already have chosen to adhere
to the moral

law.

Consistency,

therefore, cannot supply the

motive for choosinq the adhere to the moral law in the first
place.

This type of objection might be avoided by claiming

that the desire to avoid contradiction is present even
before we choose to adhere

to the moral law, and so, can

supply the motive for acting on the moral

law.

Textual

considerations, however, show that the formalist view of
motivation

is not what Kant has in mind.

I, what Kant is discussing

As we saw in Part

in the type of passage quoted

above

(CP:29)

is the oJiiectivg. determining ground of the

will,

i.e., the principle from which the act was done.

Formal consistency in one's maxim can indeed characterize
the princi pl e on which one acts, but it can never be the
subjective determining ground or motive from which one acts.
This much becomes clear in the Methodology, where Kant
insists that a sheer recognition of formal consistency in
maxims does not provide a motive for acting on the moral
law.

Let us consider that discussion.
The task of the Methodoloqy, we recall,

is to specify

"the way we can make objectively practical reason also
subjectively practical"

(CP:151),

i.e., to make reason

capable not only of Judging moral action, but also of
motivating us without the help of empirical

incentives.

Kant divides the Methodology into two steps, the first
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describing the process of sharpening moral

judgment;

second, the process of strengthening moral

feelinq

161).

the

(CP:159-

In the first step, the pupil learns to distinguish

between various duties and between the morality and leqality
of actions.
whether

This involves focusing on the maxim and judging

the act was done not only in accordance with but

also for the sake of the moral

law (C P :159).17

stresses that while this process
extends our reasoning powers,

Kant

is pleasing because

it

it does not itself give rise

to a motive tg ac t on the m oral l a w :
But this occupation of the faculty of judgment, which
makes us feel our powers of knowledge, is not yet
Interest in actions and their morality itself.
It only
enables one to entertain himself with such judqing and
gives virtue or a turn of mind based on moral laws a
form of beauty which is admired but not yet sought
("[Honesty] is praised and starves"). (CP:160)
The process of comparing actions with the moral

law enables

us to appreciate the beauty of a character which heeds the
moral

law, but

it does not give rise to a moral

Interest.

This is because the process Is carried out from a purely
formal point of view.

Our pleasure here is akin to the

pleasure we take in a qeometric theorem which we admire for
its formal features rather than, say, for its utility.

Just

as we look at the theorem as something to be contemplated
rather than applied, we look at virtue as something to be
17But
a maxim is a subjective p r inciple of jre.ason, and that
is not the same as
a subjective determining ground of the will.
This becomes clear in
the following passage: "on the
concept of
an incentive rests
that of
a maxim" (p.82),
which indicates
a
maxim must be defined aftex the motive has been given.
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"admired but not yet souqht."

I am not suqqestinq that

morality must be seen as useful

in order to move us; my

point is only that something other than formal consistency
is needed for the moral

law to motivate.

An additional

insiqht, a deeper appreciation of what the formal
requirements of the moral law reveal ajdout us, is needed to
qenerate the feelinq of respect and the moral

interest

intrinsic to it.1*
The additional

insiqht required to produce an interest

in morality is the experience of the virtuous disposition as
embodied in the pure will.

How this insiqht awakens the

moral

in step two of the Methodoloqy.

interest

is described

This exercise "lies in calling to notice the purity of will
by a vivid exhibition of the moral disposition
(CP:160).

The role of examples here

in examples"

is not to encouraqe the

pupil to imitate moral actions, but to allow the pupil

to

idejULLfy with the moral disposition and so to expexience

it.

only through experiencing the moral disposition by imaglnlnq
oneself making a moral choice can one cultivate o n e ’s

“ Similar problems arise for the other formalist readinqs of
moral motivation,
i.e., those of Andrews Reath,
Paul Guyer, and
Henry
Allison.
To respect
the moral
law, according
to Henrv
Allison,
is "to have a sufficient reason (althouqh not a desire)
to
obey it" (Allison, p.127).
But unless
Allison explains the
sense in which
a sufficient
reason is su bjectively as well
as
objectively practical--whlch he has not done--he cannot
identify
the moral motive with a sufficient reason.
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respect.1*

In his example,

Kant describes the struqqle of

deciding whether to confess to an
against a person whom I
my injustice,

injustice

otherwise dislike.

I have committed
I alone know of

and several of my 1nclinations--"vanlty,

selfishness, and an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to
the man whose rights I have
confession.

impaired"--speak against

But "if I can set aside all these

c onsid er at 1o n s , there is a consciousness of an independence
from inclinations and circumstances and of the

doss 1b l 11

tv

of being suf ficient tQ mys.elf . . ." (CP: 161, my emphasis; see
also CP:87,

152).

This suggests that it is the possibility

of beinq self-sufficient that supplies the incentive to
morali t y .
Wherein does this possibility of self-sufficiency
reside?

in identifying with the moral agent,

I discover

that I can put aside considerations of vanity,
etc. and sJti1JL ag_£.

The possibility of acting independently

of and even contrary tomy inclinations shows
in the following sense:
not conditioned by

selfishness,

that I am free

I am able to act on a law that is

the forces of nature, a law

not determine the will "only in respect to its

which does
(desired)

effect and its sufficiency to bring this effect

“ The
importance
of the
first-person point of
view
is
underscored
by Kant's
use of
the pronoun
"I" in his example,
facilitating
the pupil's
identif1cation with
the agent.
Note
that the
aqent
can be
imaqinary just
as well
as actual:
the
important
feature is the pupil's appreciation of the idea of the
moral disposition,
reqardless of
whether or not
there are
any
actual instances of morality in the world (see G:408).

Ill

a b o u t " (C P :20)--a law which does not make me, as Christine
Korsqaard puts
I am able,
the will

it, "a mere conduit for natural

in other words,

forces."20

to act on a law that determines

"as will" rather than as Instrument of my desires.

This law commands with a necessitv that is "completely
independent of patholoqical conditions,
only contingently related to the will"
other than the moral

law:

i.e., conditions
(CP:20).

It none

"So act that the maxim of your

will could always hold at the same time as a principle
establishing universal

law"

(CP:30).

Our ability to act on the moral law exemplifies selfsufficiency in the following way.

The moral law is a l a w .

i.e., a principle of reason that is universally valid.

Now,

the necessity of a universally valid principle depends on no
pathological desire, this necessitv must oriqinate
reason.

I myself, have legislated this law.

in my own

Universally

valid principles thus exemplify a self-sufficiency of
reason:

in legislating universal

law, "reason need

presuppose paly Itsel f" (CP:20-1, my emphasis).

This self-

sufficiency of reason is met with only in universally valid
legislation.

in any other type of legislation,

go beyond itself to external objects of desire
summon the binding force for its principle.
the hypothetical

imperative,

in order to

For instance,

"If you are hunqry, qet

something to eat" is binding only because
2°Korsqaar,

reason must

"Morality as Freedom" p . 32.

112

I am hungry:

it

binds with a necessity which depends on the phvsioloqical
fact that I am hunqry.

My hunqer

is external to reason,

since my reason cannot affect that desire.
Imperative thus is not universally valid.

The hypothetical
Since the moral

law is the only law which is universally valid, we are selfsufficient only when we act on the moral law.

It is this

recognition which underlies our respect for the moral

law.

I have suqqested that governing ourselves throuqh
reason exemplifies a self-sufficiency that constitutes the
object of respect.

But is acting on the moral

law really

the only way to attain this self-sufficiency?

Since

hypothetical

(CP:20), they

imperatives are objectively valid

too miqht seem to exemplify the self-sufficiency I claim to
be unique to the moral law.
the hypothetical
necessity is not.

But Kant insists that although

imperative is objectively valid,
A principle

its

is objectively valid when

it

expresses the reasonable course of action--what ouqht to
happen as opposed to what does happen.

Now the hypothetical

imperative is an objectively valid principle because

it

prescribes the reasonable means for attaining an end:
avoid a parking ticket, put money in the meter."
objectively valid because

"To

It is

it is possible for us imperfectly

rational ceatures to violate

it (CP:20):

we may fall to put

money in the parking meter even though we know we risk
gettinq a ticket.

But even though reason prescribes the

r u l e . its necessitv does not depend on reason.
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The

hypothetical

imperative

is bindinq only relative to the

existence of a contingently occurring desire
avoid qettinq a ticket).
give up this end.

(my desire to

It stops bindinq me as soon as I

Its necessity,

in other words,

is

"dependent only on subjective conditions, and one cannot
assume

it in equal measure

reason must qo beyond

in all men"

(CP:20).

Because

itself to external objects of desire

in order to summon the binding force for its principle,
hypothetical

the

imperative is not universally valid, and so, we

are not self-sufficient when we act on It.

Only universally

valid principles exemplify a self-sufficiency of reason:
legislating universal law,

in

"reason need presuppose only

Itse l f " (CP: 20-1, my emphas 1s ) .a *■
21This, I think, is the only way of explaining the
sense in
which
acting on the moral
law is the
supreme instance of self
activity
through reason.
Governing our
passive
inclinations
throuqh
reason can
take
place in a
number of
ways,
through
categorical
or hypothetical imperatives.
But it is onlv when we
act
on the cateao rl ea l imperative that we are governed pyxeJy by
reason and so
are supremely self-active.
It
is for this reason
that
I believe
Paul
Guyer's account
of
the self-activity
of
reason
as
the
source
of value
in Kant's
ethical philosophy
(manuscript. Chapter 10, p p . 471-4) needs supplementation.
Guver
emphasizes
that self-activity
is important
for Kant,
but only
explains
it in terms of
free choice according
to sojnae rational
Drinciple.
This
fails
to explain
how choosing to
act
on a
hypothetical imperative— o r , for that
matter, an evil
maxim--is
any
le_ss active
than choosing
to act
on the moral law.
The
former
types of choices, after all, are both free and principleguided (and so, are governed by reason).
Hence,
they would seem
to manifest self-activity
just as well as moral
choices.
It is
onlv when
we see that the moral law requires
nothing e_l_se than
reason that we can explain why it entails
self-sufficiency and
se lf -a ct iv it y .
A
similar
problem
arises
for
Christine
Korsgaard's
claim that it is humanity, construed as the power of
rational choice,
which is
the
source of
value for
Kant.
On
Korsgaard's
view,
amy
rational
choice
is value-conferrlnq
("Kant's Formula of Humanity," Kant_-§t_Udlen 79 (1983), pp.196-7).
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The moral

interest thus emerqes via the following

series .of rational

insiqhts.

Throuqh reflecting on the

obligation that the moral law imposes on me,

I discover that

I am free in the negative sense of belnq able to choose
contrary to mv inclinations.

This leads to a discovery that

I am also free in a positive sense:
I am able to legislate universal

I am autonomous because

law (CP:33; G:431,

435).

This freedom carries with it a self-sufficiency that Is
captured by no principle other than the moral law.

The

recognition that I can exemplify this self-sufficiency only
bv acting on the moral

law is what motivates me to act on

it.
"Freedom," however,

is a notoriously slippery term.

The reader has probably noticed the following ambiguity
creeplnq

into my discussion:

freedom, on the one hand, can

be our caGL.ae.ity for legislating universal law (autonomy); on
the other,

it can be the state of actua l ly resolving to act.

on the moral

law and for the sake of duty (the qood will).

The question then arises, are we always free or are we free
only when we resolve to act on the moral
always able to legislate universal

law?

Since we are

law--even when we fail to

act on it--we are always free in the sense of being
But this
falls to account for
the connection Kant
is trying to
draw between respect and the moral law.
If reason as such is the
object of respect,
then any principle-quided choice
would be an
object
of respect.
But that goes against
Kant's point in step
two
of the Methodoloqy: that the moral disposition is the proper
object
of resoect.
Kant
clearly wants to
avoid the conclusion
that any reason-guided choice is as good as a moral choice.
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autonomous

(see G:439, where Kant identifies autonomy with

"the pjqsaiblfi legislation of universal
maxims of the will").

law by means of the

But we are not always free in the

sense of havina a qood will.

It is crucial,

therefore,

to

establish which of these conceptions of freedom is the
object of respect,

for it Is only when we understand the

object of respect that we get a proper sense of the attitude
which respect embodies.
Before qettinq

into the issue of freedom,

I want to

conclude my general discussion of the structure of respect
by noting that it should be clear by now that Kant did not
hold a formalist view of moral motivation, a view on which
the avoidance of non-contradiction is the sole motivating
force.

The moral

Interest does Indeed rely on formal

considerations to the extent that it refers to the universal
validity of laws.

But it is generated only by going beyond

considerations of universal validity to a deeper realization
about human nature.

We feel respect for the moral law when

we reflect on what the formal demands of the moral law
reveal ab o u t us--namely,

that we ourselves, as the authors

of universal law, are able fully to determine ourselves and
are therefore free.
of contradiction,

It is freedom,

then, and not the pain

that is the proper object of respect.

In what sense is freedom the object of respect?
respect freedom as the capacity to legislate universal
or as the actual adherence to the moral law?
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Do we
law

Sometimes Kant

says that we respect our capacity for legislating universal
law.

He calls this capacity our "personality" and says that

"the idea of personality awakens respect"

(CP:87).

That he

conceives of personality as a kind of freedom is clear from
the followlnq definition of personality:
It is...the freedom and independence from the mechanism
of nature reqarded as a capacity of a beinq which is
subject to special laws (pure practical laws given by
its own reason), so that the person as belonglnq to the
world of sense is subject to his own personality so far
as he belongs to the intelligible world. (CP:87)
Freedom,

in the sense of personality,

legislate universal
reason.

laws,

i.e.,

is the capacity to

laws of pure practical

If personality is the proper object of respect,

then the actual

representation of the moral disposition is

not needed to awaken respect, since our reflection on the
mere ca p a c i ty to legislate universal law--a capacity we all
have in virtue of our reason— is sufficient to awaken
respect.
respect,

For other passages which confirm thi3 reading of
see G:436,

439-440.

These passages refer to

humanity rather than personality, but "humanity"
beinq used in the same sense as "personality."

is here
Thus, G:440:

"And the dignity of humanity consists just in its capacity
to legislate universal

law, though with the condition of

humanity's being at the same time Itself subject to this
very same legislation."
short, signifies

"Humanity" or "personality,"

in

autonomy construed as our capacity to

legislate universal

law.

Since this is a property which

belongs to every rational being, every rational being is an
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object of respect,

on this reading.

The strenqth of this

reading is that it captures the spirit of Kant's doctrine of
humanity as an end
not

in itself, on which every human being,

lust those who are virtuous,

(G:428).

is an end in Itself

Even though we do not necessarily act on the moral

law, we are still capable of Leals la_tJjLg universal

law, and

this makes us worthy of respect.aa
Other passaqes suqgest that Kant has a more exclusive
conception of the object of respect:

that what we respect

is

not something which automaticallv belonqs to us In virtue of
our reason, but rather, something we must e a z n .

These

passaqes suqqest that the proper object of respect Is the
qood will, the will which acts from a sense of duty (G:4001).

Cons i d e r :
Our own will, insofar as it were to act only under the
condition of its being able to legislate universal law
by means of its maxims--this will, ideALly possible for
us, is the proper object of respect. (G:440, mv
emphas is )

Here, the object of respect is not a property we all share
in virtue of our reason

(viz., autonomy), but rather,

the

will which intends to act only from the idea of dutv:

the

good will.
of respect.

To put it another wav, virtue is here the object
That Kant conceives of virtue as a form of

freedom, and that this type of freedom is the proper object
*sFor
an llluminatlnq
discussion of
the meaning
of human
diqnity
centerinq
on the
problem I have been
considering and
issuing in
the reading of
humanity as an
end in itself
that I
just
put forth, see Hardy Jones, KanJtAs. Princ ip le ojE Personality
(Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1971), p p . 127-135.
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of respect,

is also suggested by the following passage:

"The

law of -duty, through the positive worth which obedience to
it makes us feel,
for ourselves
Also:

finds easier access through the respect

in the consciousness of our freedom"

<CP:161).

"the pure thought of virtue...is the strongest

incentive to the good"

(CP:152; also 156).

These passaqes

sugqest that the object of respect is not autonomy, but
vi r t u e .
The strenqth of the latter view of respect

is that it

makes virtue s e 1f-moti va tl nq : we need not seek a source of
value outside of morality, since
motivates us.
of weakness,

This, of course, can also be seen as a source
for how can morality motivate those who are not

already disposed toward

it?

Kant, however,

are disposed toward morality.
moral

it is morality itself which

thinks all of us

He thinks that insofar as the

law confronts us at a.1.1 (and it does confront every

rational beinq), we have a motive to act on it.

He refers

to this disposition as the "predisposition to personality"
(R:21-3), and defines

it as "the capacity for respect for

the moral law as La itself a. sufficient
w l 1 1 H (R:22-3).

lacjejLtlvs. of. the.

Kant is not naively claiming that we desire

by nature to be virtuous.
motive to moralltv,

He is only maklnq room for the

all the while leavinq open the

possibility of Immoral choice: we are always able to choose
against morality because we have free will or "Willkur."
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which,
or morality?

then,

is the proper object of respect:

autonomy

Is it possible to reconcile the reading of

respect on which virtue is "the strongest

incentive to the

good" with the reading on which autonomy is the object of
resoect?

Kant thinks so.

He makes virtue the primary

object of respect, but makes humanity derivatively an object
of respect because
Without autonomy,

it is the necessary condition of virtue.
a qood will could not exist because a good

will must act out of respect for a self-made law.
qood will

is the only thinq

without qualification

in the world that

is good

(G:393), autonomy, as the necessary

precondition of the qood will,
This, at anv rate,

Since a

is also an end in itself.

is Kant's reasonlnq at G:437-440, where

he seeks to connect the concept of humanity (autonomy)
end in itself with the concept of the qood will.
of the need to find something which
derives

as an

He speaks

is an end in itself, and

it by reference to the idea of "a possible

absolutely qood will":
Now this end can be nothing but the subject of all
possible ends themselves, because the. s u b ject is at the
same time the subject o_f a possible ab_so.lut.ely good
w i l l : for such a will cannot without contradiction be
subordinated to any other object (G:437, emphasis
m i n e ).
"The subject of all possible ends themselves," or the
rational subject,

is an end in Itself because

be the subject of a qood will.
an end in itself because
law rather than because

it alone can

That the rational subject

it Is able to leqislate universal
it is able to leqislate rational
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is

principles jn general becomes clear in the following
passage:
Now there follows incontestably from this that every
rational being as an end in himself must be able to
reqard himself with reference to all laws to which he
may be subject as being at the same time the legislator
of universal law, for just this very fitness of his
maxims for the legislation o_f universal Law
distinguishes him as an end in himself. (G:438,
emphasis mine)
Humanity,

or rational nature,

is an end in itself because it

is able to legislate universal

law.

But why should the

legislation of universal law be important?

For no other

reason than that it is a necessary prereouisite for the
existence of a good will.

The qood will

is the proper

object of respect, but humanity is derivatively an object of
respect because it is indispensable for the existence of a
qood will.

That it is the good will rather than humanity

that is the primarv object of respect becomes clear in the
following passage, which we have already quoted:
Our own will, insofar as it were to act only under the
condition of its belnq able to legislate universal law
by means of its maxims--this will, ideally possible for
us, is the proper object of respect. (G:440, emphasis
mine)
Even though the good will

is the proper object of respect,

humanity, as rational nature capable of legislating
universal law, is an object of respect
because

it has the potentlal

(has "dignity")

for producing a good will:

Now morality is the condition under which alone a
rational being can be an end in himself, for only
thereby can he be a legislating member in the kingdom
of ends.
Hence morality and humanity, Insofar as it is
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capable of morality,
also C P :87)
Humanity,
m orallty.

alone have dLqnltv.

(G-.435-6 ; see

then, has dlqnitv Insofar as it is capable of
It is only because it has the capacity for

realizing a good will

that humanity,

or rational nature,

is

an object of respect.
It should be noted that on this arqument, any aspect of
rational nature that is necessary for the existence of the
qood wlll--for example, our animal belnq--is thereby an
object of respect.

This mlqht seem objectionable,

appears to water down the notion of respect.

since

Could It

really be that our animal being deserves respect?

Kant

suqqests a positive answer to this question when,

in his

cataloque of perfect duties to oneself

it

in The Do ctrlne q £

V i r t u e , he Includes not only the duty to preserve the mental
capacities required for the realization of a qood will, but
also the dutv to preserve the physical substratum required
for the existence of a qood will.

This suggests that our

animal nature, as part of the rational nature required for
the existence of a good will,

is an end in itself.

The

Inference does appear drastic, but as long as one keeps in
mind that something

is an end in Itself only because

it is

Indispensable to a good will, and not because of some other
value

it may have, the conclusion makes sense.

The idea of

a good will confers value on the necessary conditions of a
good will.
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We have seen that the idea of virtue, or equivalently,
the idea of a good will,
In the next section,

is the proper object of respect.

I will consider how this idea gives

rise to the feeling of respect, and what thl3 process
discloses about respect as an attitude and as a moral
motive.

Paxt

IV; Thje g e n e s i s and n a t u r e

of resnect

in considering the process

by which the idea

of a good

will awakens respect

in us.

outset that the mere

idea of virtue suffices to engender the

feeling of respect.

we do not need to experience an actual

instance of virtue--whether
order to feel respect.

It is important to note from the

in ourselves or

in others--in

All we need to do is to hold before

the mind's eye the idea or image of vlrtue--to imaqine,
other words,

a person who resolves to act for thesake

duty.

this is a somewhat controversial

Since

claim,

in
of

I will

offer some justification for it.
If we had to experience virtue
feel respect,

in ourselves in order to

it would be hard to see how the process of

moral education could qet off the ground.

For we would then

have to be virtuous before we could cultivate the moral
motive, and that would defeat the purpose of moral
education.

Granted, moral education could qet off the
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ground if we had to observe virtue
paragons").

But there

in others

is a separate reason to be skeptical

about the possibility of experiencing actual
virtue, whether

(as "moral

cases of

in ourselves or in others, and that is the

inscrutabilltv of motives.

Kant thinks we can never be sure

that what appears to be a virtuous action was not in fact
done from self-love.

Since "we can n e v e r ... completely plumb

the depths of the secret

incentives of our actions,"

"there

is absolutely no possibility by means of experience to make
out with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim
of an action...has rested solely on moral grounds"
We can never point to an actual
had to experience an actual

Instance of virtue.

If we

case of virtue before we could

feel respect, we could never feel respect,
certifiable

(G:407).

since there

is no

instance of virtue.

However,

there are passaqes which suggest that we can

actually know when we have acted morally and that we need to
experience the moral disposition within us in order to feel
respect.

Thus:

which obedience

"the law of duty,

to It makes us feel,

through respect for ourselves
freedom"

through the positive worth

(CP:161).

in the consciousness of our

Kant goes on to suqqest that the

awareness of one's actual moral worth
our "freedom")

finds easier access

is "the best.

(or what he here calls

Indeed the only, guard that can

keep Ignoble and corrupting influences from burstinq
the mind"

(CP:161).

in upon

These passages suggest that in order to
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cultivate the moral motive, we need actually to have adopted
duty as our Incentive--!.e ., have made a pure moral
resolution--and that merely lmaq_lni.n_g. the moral disposition
is not sufficient to enqender respect

in us.

this would confirm the view I arqued against

(Note that
in Part i--the

view which claims that respect is the effect of moral
w i 11in q . )
The passaqes, however,
Indeed,

I want to suqqest,

can be read another wav.
there is only one coherent way of

readinq them, qiven Kant's thesis of the Inscrutability of
motives, and that is to read "the positive worth which
obedience to [the law of duty] makes us feel" as the worth
we feel when we imagine ourselves to be actlnq
of duty, whether or not we actually do.

for the sake

We cannot know, for

any qiven action, whether we had the moral disposition,
i.e., adhered to the law for the sake of duty.
however, know whether our action had leqality,
violate the moral

law.

We can,
i.e., did not

The "positive worth" we feel

in

obeyinq the law thus refers to the neqative awareness of not
having violated the law, and leaves open the question of
whether the moral disposition was actually present.

A

consciousness of the legality of our action, thouqh by no
means a sufficient condition for having moral worth,
know, at least,

lets us

that we have not violated the moral law,

is the consciousness of leqality,
as "the consciousness that

then, that Kant describes

[a person! has honored and
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it

preserved humanitv in his own person and in its diqnitv,
that he does not have to shame himself
(CP:88).

so

in his own eyes"

So the consciousness of a "positive worth" should

not be taken as the consciousness of moralitv--of having
acted for the sake of duty--but only as the consciousness
that one has not done anythinq contrary to duty, whatever
one's

motive.

Notice,

however,

that even thouqh we can never tell

whether respect was our actual motive
can still

in a given action, we

feel respect and strengthen it so as to make it

easier to act from respect.

And we can do this without

thinkinq of actual acts we or others have undertaken.

Since

the process of strengthening respect mimics the qenesis of
respect, we can learn somethinq about the nature of respect
by considering

its cultivation.

to mind "through examples"

The moral motive

is brought

(CP:160), where this involves

imagining cases of virtuous acts and coming to LdeiLtity with
the disposition of the imagined agents.

It is this process

of identification which "teaches a man to feel his own
worth"

(CP:152).

What does "his own worth"

involve?

It

refers not to the pupil's actual virtue but to his capacity
for virtue:

the moral disposition

is presented as an idea

which the pupil comes to value and so wants to realize.
thinking of the moral disposition,

in short,

the pupil

envisions "the qreatness of soul to which he sees himself
called"

(CP:152).

we see again that it Is the thought of
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in

virtue,

and not actual

instances of virtue, which is the

object .of respect.
What type of attitude does respect embody?
Droress of "qlorylnq"

Is it a

in our capacity for virtue, or is it

somethlnq sliahtlv more sober?
defines respect as follows:

In the third Critique,

"The feellnq of our

to attain to an idea that is a law for us,
(CJ:257, emphasis mine).

Kant

ioc.apacity

is RESPECT"

The awareness of an incapacity

does not seem much of a cause for celebration.

Neither does

it seem to carry the motivating force that respect, as an
incentive, must have.

How can such a neqative feeling serve

as an incentive to morality?
To approach an answer, and to see what incapacity Kant
has in mind, we need to realize that the very Idea of virtue
contains a negative element:
disposition

virtue is the "moral

I.q c o n f l l e t . and not holiness

in the supposed

possession of perfect purity of the intentions of the will"
(CP:84, emphasis mine;
element of conflict

see also 32-3,

is crucial.

80-1,

83).

This

Without it, the disposition

in question would be not virtue but moral

fanaticism--the

attitude of those who think that virtue comes naturally to
them and "flatter themselves with a spontaneous qoodness of
heart"

(CP:84-5).

false because

such an attitude

Is always

inherently

It ignores the fact that we are finite

rational creatures,

creatures who have sensuous desires in

127

addition to reason and so do not by nature act on the moral
1a w :
If a rational creature could ever attain the staqe of
thoroughly likinq to do all moral laws, it would mean
that there was no possibility of there beinq in him a
desire which could tempt him to deviate from them, for
overcoming such a desire always costs the subject some
sacrifice and requires s e l f -c om p ul si on , i.e., an inner
constraint to do what one does not quite like to do.
To such a level of moral disposition no creature can
ever attain.
For since he is a creature, and
consequently is always dependent with respect to what
he needs for complete satisfaction with his condition,
he can never be wholly free from desires and
inclinations which, because they rest on physical
causes, do not of themselves aqree with the moral law,
which has an entirely different source. (CP:83-4)
Because we are finite rational creatures, moral requirements
strike us as constraints, not as precepts which we qladly
follow.

To deny this

is to deceive ourselves about our

cond i t i o n :
For men and all rational creatures, the moral necessity
is a constraint, an obllqation.
Every action based on
it is to be considered as duty, and not as a manner of
acting which we naturally favor or which we sometimes
might favor.
This would be tantamount to believing we
could finally brinq it about that, without resoect for
the law (which is always connected with fear or at
least apprehension that we might
transgress it) we,
like the independent deity, might come into possession
of holiness of will through irrefragable agreement of
the will with the pure moral law becoming, as it were,
our very nature. (CP:81)
To think we can come to act morally by nature is to think we
are God.

This i3 the height of self-deception,

denies that we have natural desires.
for the moral

law, by contrast,

since it

To act from respect

is to recognize that it will

alwave- be a str.uq.qle for us inclination-bound creatures to
meet the demands of the moral

law.
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When Kant defines

respect as "the feellnq of our

incapacity to attain to an

idea that is a law for us," he is calllnq attention to just
this sense of resistance.
denial

Far from beinq a super-rational

of physicalitv, virtue

of our physical nature.

is actually an acknowledgement

To act virtuously is to be true to

our nature as finite rational beings.
To acknowledge the resistance we inevitably feel when
confronted with the moral
station in life.

law is

For the moral

to accept suffering as our
law Imposes on us

requirement that we do not like to comply with,
complying with it is nevertheless

imperative.

a
but

Now,

recall

that Kant thinks the idea of virtue is "the strongest
incentive to the good"
that virtue

(CP:152).

Involves suffering.

really become an incentive?

But we have

just learned

Can the idea of suffering

Kant thinks so: he says that

"morality must have more power over the human heart the more
purely it is presented," and that "it is in suffering" that
morality is most purely presented
The

idea of sufferinq,

virtue!

then,

(CP:156, emphasis mine).

is the stronqest

incentive to

How is this possible?

Kant's own explanation

is ofno qreat

help.

just described the plight of an honest man who,

He has
in the face

of threats to his well-beinq and even to his life,
to give false testimony aqainst Anne Boleyn.

refuses

"All the

admiration and even the endeavor to be like this character,
he says,

"rest here solely on the purity of the moral

129

principle, which can be clearlv shown onlv bv removinq from
the incentive of the action evervthlnq which men might count
as a part of happiness"

(CP:156).

is isolated by contrasting
throuah

The incentive to moralitv

it with empirical

lncentives--

imagining a situation like the one above,

the agent refuses to act on empirical

Incentives.

in which
But a

process of elimination discloses nothing about the nature of
the moral

incentive

itself.

Kant's emphatic denial that satisfaction of anv sort-whether

it be sensuous or rational--ls an Incentive to

morality

(CP:116) as well as his conception of the moral law

as a cateqorlcal

imperative should make us wary of any

deslre-fulf 1llment view of moral motivation.
a desire.

Nevertheless,

motivate us.
desire?

Respsct

l_s not

it is supposed to be able to

How can a feellnq motivate without beinq a

One way is to think of respect as slqnifvinq

something about Q.yr nature:

as expressing what we are rather

than pointinq to something we want to be.

Of course,

this

miqht seem to presuppose that we are satisfied with what we
are, and so, would seem to presuppose that we desLre to be
that wav.

If so, respect, though not itself a desire, would

reflect or confirm a desire, and so would seem to return us
to a d e s l r e -f ul f1llment view of moral motivation.

But we do

not need to think of ourselves as havinq any particular
attitude toward our nature.
us:

it is our essence,

After all,

it is just given to

neither good nor bad.
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If we can

connect respect for the moral law to our essence as finite
rational creatures, we might then be able to conceive of
respect as the only truthful attitude.

As an attitude,

respect could be distinguished from a desire, but it would
still be capable of motivating us in the sense of confirnlng
our complete essence.
Of course, any act could be seen as confirming what we
are in the sense of beinq undertaken by its..
all actions confirm our complete essence.
sake of mv own happiness,

However,

not

Actlnq for the

for Instance, confirms my animal

identity as well as mv capacity for prudential reasoning.
But it neglects my capacity to act on the moral
violates

its character as an unconditional principle bv

subordinating
R:31-2).

law, for it

it to the condition of my own happiness

(see

Were I to subordinate my own happiness to the

requirements of the moral

law, by contrast,

I would be

confirming both my capacity for prudential reasoning and mv
capacity for moral reasoning,

for I would then seek to

satisfy my inclinations only on the condition that the moral
law allowed it.

I would then be preserving "the original

moral order among the incentives"
ordering which
Incentives,

(R:45-6; see also 44)--an

incorporates the spectrum of possible

subordinating some to others in such a wav that

the essence of each is preserved
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(for an account of these

incentives,

see R:21-3),

Only actions which heed the moral

law preserve this order and express our full essence.23
The moral

law is the suoreme law of our belnq--a law

which does not exclude

lower principles but qives them rein

onlv on the condition that it is itself
limiting aspect of the moral

law is reflected

negative, painful side of respect.
two aspects:

the moral

down self-conceit"

fulfilled.

This

in the

This side of respect has

law "checks selfishness" and "strikes

(CP:73).

It checks selfishness by

restricting the satisfaction of our desires to the condition
of agreeing with the moral
conceit.

law.

But It strikes down self-

Self-conceit Is self-love "when it makes itself

legislative and an unconditional practical principle"
(CP:74), and so might be expressed by the principle,

"make

the satisfaction of your desires your hlqhest end."2**
is struck down when the moral

It

law shows itself to be the

only objective and universally valid practical orinclple-22For
an early version of this type of argument, see Sermon
II of Joseph
Butler S e r m o n s . reprinted
in J. Schneewind,
Moral
Philosophy
fxoin Mo.ntai.gne
to Kant_: An A ntho l o g y . Volume
II
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), esp. p p . 533-4.
Butler is trying
to
show that
those who
are moral are
"a law
unto themselves"
(Rom:2:14) in the sense that
they follow
their proper
nature,
where
man's "proper nature"
is characterized by
an ordering of
principles, with the
passions at the bottom, "cool self-love" in
the middle, and the moral conscience
at the top.
Failing to act
according to one's conscience is to
act "disporoportlonately to
one's
nature"
in
the
sense
that
one
subordinates
to other
orinciples the principle which is In fact superior.
2-*ln fhis formulation of the principle of self-conceit, I am
following
Henry Allison in K.ant.'X Theory of. Freedom, o.T24.
For
a
definition
of
self-love
as
the
principle
of
one's
own
happiness,

fee C P : 22.
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that is, the only qenuine law (CP:20-1).

In both of these

cases, our pathologically determined self tries to make
pretensions acceptable

"as first and oriqinal claims,

as If it were our entire self"
moral

its

just

(CP:74, emphasis mine).

The

law strikes down these pretensions by reminding i h

that they do not express our entire self.
that Kant conceives of the moral
expression of our self.

law as the most complete

In reflecting on the idea of

virtue, we realize that suffering

is the inevitable uoshot

of the way the moral law expresses Itself
order of incentives.

Again, we see

Sufferlnq,

in the natural

then, becomes part of the

expression of our complete nature.
Morality is freedom in the sense of s e J - k n o w L e d g e .

It

has more to do with enlightenment than with liberating us
from the fetters of nature.
dominance bv natural

Morality frees us from

inclinations only to the extent that it

confirms our capacity to r^sXst them; but that capacity,
attributable to our ever-present freedom of choice,
confirmed by any choice.

is

Still, we can never completely rid

ourselves from our dependence on nature; neither should we
try,

for to think we can is to delude ourselves about our

identity.

Morality, at its core,

is the acceptance of our

essence as finite rational creatures, and so,
with self-knowledge.

is identical

The dictum of the critical project--

Know your 1 im i t s !--thus reverberates throuqh Kant's ethical
corpus.
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Chapter

F e elin g s A ssociated

2_l

Wittl our Duties Toward Ourselves

In Kant's moral scheme,

each of us has an unconditional

value which can never diminish regardless of the morality or
immorality of our actions.
our humanity,

our

We have this value

in virtue of

identity as legislators of the moral law.

Because every human being has an unconditional worth,
morality imposes certain duties on us directing us to treat
ourselves and others as ends-in-themselves--duties,

that is,

prohibiting others from treating us as means to their ends
and prohibiting us from making ourselves a means to the ends
of ourselves or other s. 1

Fulfilling these duties gives us

moral worth and/or moral perfection
worthy of happiness)

(CPrR:61-62,

(thereby making us

110-11).*

While our

moral perfection depends on our moral choices,

the value of

our humanity is independent of circumstance and of choice:
it exists an en d- i n - i t s e l f .3
1 In Chapter 5, I will consider the relation of
the Formula
of
the End-In-Itself to our
duties of love
toward others, that
is, as a basis for deriving a duty to not
only avoid interfering
with but also to promote the ends of others.
*While our
moral worth
increases only
be acting from
the
motive of duty, our
moral perfection can be augmented
even when
we fulfill our duties in a merely legal way.
3Kant's various claims
about humanity (or rational
nature)
and why
it exists as
an end-in-itself
have been the
source of
much
speculation.
At
G:428-9, and
435-6, Kant
suggests that
human beings are ends-in-themselves
because they are legislators
of
the
moral law and are
hence
able to
form universalizable
maxims
in response
to the
concept of duty.
At
G:437-440, he
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Humanity has this absolute value because

it exists as

the necessary condition of possibility of a good will,
only unconditionally valuable thing in the world.
will

the

A good

is good unconditionally because unlike gifts of nature

and of fortune

(e.g., health and wealth) which,

have a certain value in themselves,
under certain qualifications

though they

are only morally good

(wealth,

for instance,

is good

only if put to a good use), a good will is good without
qualification

(G: 437;

393-94 ).'*

The fact that the locus of

connects this conception of humanity with the absolute value of a
good
will, suggesting that
human beings
are ends-in-themselves
because
they are the potential vessels
of a good will, the only
absolutely
valuable thing in the
world (see G:393).
At DV:387
and 392, however, Kant
thinks of humanity more generally as the
capacity
to
set
and to
pursue
ends,
whether
moral or
not.
Although
these
definitions
are not
strictly
incompatible--in
order to act virtuously
one must, after all, not
only legislate
moral
law
but
also
be able
to
set
and
pursue
ends--many
commentators still see it as necessary to come down
on one side
of the
issue.
Those who see
humanity as
the general capacity to
set and pursue ends are the majority and include Thomas Hill, Jr.
in "Humanity as an
End in Itself," Dionitv and
Practical Reason
in K a n t 's Moral T h e o r y . 38-57 (see especially 38-41 or a helpful
discussion of whether
humanity refers to rational nature or more
specifically to
human
nature), Christine
Korsgaard in
"Kant's
Formula of
Humanity," and
Onora O'Neill in
"Between Consenting
Adults," Constructions
of R e a s o n . 105-25, (esp. 114-15).
For a
critical account
which
interprets humanity as the capacity
for
d istinctively moral action, see
Pepita Haezrahi, "The Concept of
Man as an End-in-HimseIf," in K a n t ; A Collection
of Cr itical
E s s a v s . 291-313.
Since Kant argues
for the unconditional value
of a good
will in terms of its being
good without Qualification
(G:393-4),
I place
myself
in the
latter
camp,
since
the
structural
analogy between the absolute value of a good will and
that of humanity must
be preserved and
the capacity to set
and
realize
ends, though
good, is
not good
without q ua lification,
since we can set and realize evil ends.
*That Kant makes
the good will
an unconditional value
and
humanity
the mere cond it ion of poss ibi1 ity of a good will should
not
be taken imply that the unconditional value of the good will
cannot "transfer" itself
to humanity.
Humanity is a
necessary
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humanity is the

individual gives each of us, qua individual,

a dignity which utilitarians,
(though still

intrinsic)

who use a merely contingent

source of value

(v i z . pleasure)

have a hard time defining.
As bearers of humanity we possess dianitv (DV:462).
this chapter,

I consider the emotional

Kantian starting point.

In

implications of this

I show that by cultivating certain

self-regarding e mo ti on s— in particular,
a dlqni fied attitude towards ourselves

those which reflect
(e.g.,

pride)--we

create good character and become better prepared to carry
out our duties toward ourselves.
My prime concern is show that cultivating one's
feelings--both natural and mor a l— in accordance with the
idea of one's dignity not only strengthens and refines the
feelings themselves but also helps establish good character
in the moral sense.

Among our character traits are our

long-standing dispositions to feeling, and we shape good
moral character partly by refining and cultivating our
sensuous character.

To this end,

knowing one's sensible character
Kant.

I will first show that
is a moral requirement,

for

Knowing one's own dispositions to feel certain ways

in certain circumstances and how these dispositions figure
condition of possibility
of a good will, and
the condition
of
possibility for the realization of
something absolutely valuable
is,
qua
such
a
condition
of
possibility,
also
absolutely
valuable.
Kant's move should also not be taken to imply that the
value of the good will is somehow less than, because "contingent"
upon,
that of humanity, since
he derives the
value of humanity
from that of the good will rather than vice versa.
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in one's character

(the way one expresses them in word,

thought and deed)

is a necessary precondition for moral

improvement--that

is,

for virtue as strength of will.

The main "dignity-feelings" I plan here to discuss are
courage,

pride, and love of honor.

Each of these feelings

is bound up with a sense of dignity and is thus a means for
cultivating other emotions
our dignity,

in accordance with the idea of

thereby bringing them in line with reason.

Two

other morally significant feelings bound up with the demand
to live up to our dignity are the pleasure and pain we feel
when our conscience judges our actions or intentions good or
bad, r e s p e c t i v e l y .

But before considering what it is to

cultivate one's emotions in accordance with the idea of
dignity, we need to consider

just whv dignity should be a

leading idea in our lives.

L . The Siqnii i c ancs slL Dignity

Why is it so important to live a dignified life?

Why

isn't it just as valuable to live a wild and natural life,
free of the stiffness conveyed by the word "dignity"?
obvious but unpenetrating Kantian answer
we have chosen to be moral at all,
value dignity,

The

is that insofar as

we have also chosen to

since heeding the dignity of our humanity is

just what we are doing when we live up to the requirements
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of the moral law (DV:420).

To ask why dignity is important

is in this sense to ask "Why be moral?"--a question which
Kant,

being the sophisticated moral philosopher he was,

never took seriously.
But we can also give a deeper Kantian answer to why
dignity should be a leading idea in our lives.

Although it

is possible to have good character and still live a wild and
natural

life,

living such a life without a sense of dignity

will most likely produce a weak and compromising character.
For without a sense of dignity,
for anything--whether
one's commitments.

one is incapable of standing

it be the truth,

And what

one's real needs,

is good character

or

if it does

not involve the ability to stand for something?

We should

therefore heed our dignity for the sake of shaping good
character.

Kant's own use of "dignity"

linked up with a o r a 1 concerns:

is of course

he is not immediately

interested in whether our sense of dignity can also further
character in a more

individualized sense

(and we might have

to look to Nietzsche for such an argument);

but in Part V, I

will give two character sketches which I hope will at least
show that the universal commands of morality need not force
our individual personalities

into a cookie-cutter

conformism, since the moral law actually dictates that we
use our

individual character traits--including dispositions

to feeling which are distinctive of us--to strengthen
morality within us.
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What,

then,

is a sense of dignity?

dignity, .according to Kant,

To have sense of

is have a sense of o n e ’s

absolute vorth--a worth which stems from the fact that one
not only faces but also places oneself under moral
obligations.

All practically rational beings, as

legislators of the moral law,

possess this worth.

Some will

certainly find this an extremely narrow definition of human
dignity.

But whether or not we agree with Kant on his

definition the object of dignity (i.e.,
virtue of which we possess dignity),

the capacity in

we can agree that a

sense of dignity is central to cultivating character
moral sense,

in the

since steadfastness and resolution are

dignified traits which are essential to the moral
individual.

In order to live up to one's dignity and

absolute worth--an endeavor which often involves great
personal sacrifice— one needs both pride and courage:

pride

in one's unconditional worth and the courage and
perseverance to live up to it (L E :126-129).
courage are

Pride and

in this sense necessary attributes of a morally

steadfast character,

a character disposed to virtue.

That Kant took a sense of dignity to be essential to
the cultivation of good moral character
aversion toward any form of d i s h o n e s t v .
linkage between the notions of honesty,
character

is especially clear

is implicit in his
Kant's close
dignity,

and good

in the following passage

the Anthropology:
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from

In short,

the sole proof a man's consciousness affords

him .that he has good character

is his having made it

his supreme maxim to be truthful,
admissions to himself and
other man.

both in his

in his conduct toward every

And since having character

is both the

minimum that can be required of a reasonable man and
the maximum of inner worth
man of principles

(of human dignity),

to be a

(to have a determinate character)

must be possible for the most ordinary human reason and
yet, according to its dignity,
talent

surpass the greatest

(A:159).

Kant thus sees honesty as a precondition for preserving
one's dignity and so,

for shaping good character.

Moreover,

Kant's classification of honesty not as a duty toward others
but as a duty toward ourselves

(DV:429; LE:118)

suggests

that dishonesty injures the very core of our being.®

In

*In
the
Lectures
on E t h i c s .
Kant
also
classifies
truthfulness
in social
intercourse
as a duty
toward
others
(LE:224) primarily because the free
exchange of sentiments is a
condition
of society and of
the enjoyment of
conversation.
In
the
Doctrine
of V i r t u e . however, it
is clear that
he thinks
dishonesty does something
much more insidious than
that: it not
only undermines the listener's
capacity to take pleasure
in the
conversation honesty but annihilates the speaker's dignity.
That
is why lying is always a duty toward ourselves in the Doctrine of
V i r t u e . My claim that
honesty is important
primarily for
the
purpose of shaping a strong character supports both Kant's narrow
classification of it as
a duty toward ourselves and
his broader
(and earlier) conception of honesty also as a stance we
need to
hold because
of the social value of communicating our sentiments
in word, expression and gesture.
Such interaction, I shall show
in Chapter 4,
is the
foremost "training ground"
for shaping
a
virtuous
disposition.
To shape strong
moral character, we need
to
be
honest
toward
ourselves
regarding
our
faults
and
limitations, including
wicked propensities in our
passions; and
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lying, man may surely do harm to others;

but worse,

he

"throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a
man"

(DV:429).

Kant thus sees honesty as a precondition for

preserving our own dignity.
cowardly character:

In lying, we show a weak and

we hide behind lies,

not daring to

reveal or even acknowledge who we really are.
makes us lose our self-respect;

Cowardice

and the person who has no

self-respect cannot have good moral character,

since self-

respect is the very foundation of moral self-awareness.
Truthfulness toward oneself and others

is thus a

precondition for having good character

in the moral sense.

A more detailed explanation of why honesty--and in the
case of our duties toward ourselves,

especially honesty

toward o n eself--is crucial to having good character can be
found in the following passage, where Kant gives his
exposition of the three vices opposed to man's duty toward
himself only as a moral being:
The vices contrary to this duty are I v i n a , a v a r i c e . and
false hu m i 1 itv (servility).

These adopt principles

that are directly contrary to man's character as a
moral being

(in terms of its very form),

inner freedom,

that is, to

the innate dignity of man, which is

since much of our
knowledge about our own sentiments
comes from
what
we experience
in communication
with
others--whether
as
actor,
demonstrator,
friend, disputer
or converser--dishonesty
(hiding
ourselves)
in conversation
robs
us
of
a valuable
opportunity
for learning
about
our own
beliefs and
emotional
tendencies, both good and bad.
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tantamount to saying that they make

it o n e ’s basic

principle to have no basic principle and hence no
c h a r a c t e r .* that

is, to throw oneself away and make

oneself and object of contempt.

The virtue that is

opposed to all these vices could be called love of

frpnor (hanes-fcag Interna, iuaturo s_ui a e s t i m i u m ), a cast
of mind far removed from ambition
be quite mean).

(a m b i t i o ) (which can

But it will appear prominently later

on, under this name

(DV:420).'7

The three vices which Kant names--lying,

avarice,

and false

h u m i 1 ity--are all forms of deception which make it
impossible to have good character:

"they make it one's basic

principle to have no basic principle and hence 02. c h a r a c t e r .
that is, to throw oneself away and make oneself an object of
contempt."

Here,

truthfulness becomes the main prerequisite

for good moral character— for heeding one's sense of
dionitv.

Before going on to explore the full implications

of the centrality of truthfulness toward oneself
moral philosophy,

in Kant's

I shall briefly explain why two of the

•My emphasis.
7Kant
does
not discuss
love of honor
"later on"
in the
Doctrine of V i r t u e .
Ambition does
receives short treatment
in
connection with
his discussion of
servility, but love
of honor
remains unmentioned.
This leads me to believe that
"it"
in the
last
sentence refers
not
to ambition
but to love of honor.
Fortunately,
there is a long and
interesting discussion of love
of honor in the Lectures on E t h i c s . which I will have occasion to
discuss in Section III.
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aforementioned forms of d i s h o n e s t y - - lying and false
humi1ity--work directly against morally good character.
Lying to oneself or to others
for the truth.

is an inability to stand

It is the basest form of deception,

revealing a cowardice and an inability to stand for one's
qualities and deeds which makes the liar lose his selfrespect--"He makes himself contemptible

in his own eyes and

violates the dignity of humanity in his own person"
(D V :429)--and others lose their respect for him.

The liar

usually lies because he is afraid of the consequences of
telling the truth.
consequences

In ordinary cases,

the expected

include a harsh judgment from others--a

judgment which he expects to be well-founded and against
which he takes himself to have no defense."

But in

expecting a harsh and justified judgment from others,
liar reveals a low opinion of himself.
of himself,

If he thought highly

he would expect others to think likewise;

would not feel the need to lie.
opinions of others,

he

In his fearfulness of the

the liar betrays his sense that he has

less worth than they.
world's judgment

the

Kant stresses the power of the

in correcting our own opinions:

"our

•Kant
himself never explains
why we
have a propensity to
lie.
He
simply says we do: "it already belongs
to the basic
composition of a human creature and to the concept of his species
to
explore the thoughts of
others but to withhold one's ow n — a
nice
quality
that
does not
fail
to progress gradually
from
d i s s i m u l a t ion to
d e c e p t i on and finally
to lying"
(A:192).
In
what follows, I try to describe the motivation for lying in terms
of the weaknesses of character which often lead up to it.
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cognitions must stand the test of universal r e a s o n ....Others
may err as well,

but it is unlikely that they would fall

into exactly the same trap as ourselves"
corrective force of other people's

(LE.-190).

judgment

But this

is cancelled

if

one misleads them from the outset and presumes a negative
judgment of oneself.
dignity,
value.

To do so is directly contrary to

which gives every person an unconditional source of
It is this psychological pattern of underestimating

one's worth which characterizes the liar.
The person who has an unduly high opinion of herself
can of course also rob herself of the corrective of others'
opinions,

but she does so not through external

lies but

through ignoring the judgment of others when they do not
harmonize with her high opinion of herself.
is guilty of arrogance

(LE:237-8),

Such a person

which is a form of

internal

lying when others are judging fairly.

At bottom,

however,

the arrogant person shows the same lack of self-

respect and of self-esteem as the "ordinary" liar of the
previous paragraph:

both use others as means because they

would find it easy to be used as means.

As Kant puts

it,

"an arrogant man is always mean in the depths of his soul.
For he would not demand that others think little of
themselves in comparison with him unless he knew that, were
his fortune suddenly to change,

he himself would not find it

hard to grovel and to waive any claim to respect from
others"

(DV-.466).
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A person can of course also have a high opinion of
herself which is well-founded,
understand her and therefore

e.g.,

when most people do not

judge her unfairly.

Such a

person is not lying to herself when she ignores the opinions
of others;

she simply displays the "noble pride" which

the mark of good character
such malicious

(LE:126).

Indeed,

is

paying heed to

judgments "is already a sign of weakness,"

unbefitting to the upright character

(A:159); and that is

why Kant holds that "a tyranny of popular mores would be
contrary to man's duty to himself"

(DV:464).

Having made these qualifications,
the following generalization:

we can safely make

lying is usually motivated by

an inadequate sense of one's own worth with respect to
others'

opinion of ones e l f — a weakness of character.

most insidiously,

lying not only betrays a weakness,

also makes one weaker,

but

for in erecting barriers of falsehood

between oneself and the world,
of strength,

And

one eliminates a great source

namely the bonds of communication and

unconcealed affection which can exist between oneself and
other human beings

(see Chapter 5).

Since strength is

directly conducive to good character--virtue is, after all,
strength of will,

which can be facilitated by cultivating a

willinaness to do one's duty--and lying not only signals
lack of strength

(in the form of lack of self-respect),

but

also deprives one of the strength one derives from open
social ties,

lying works directly against good c h a r a c t e r .

145

False humility,
human beings,

finally,

is perhaps the clearest example of failing to

heed one's dignity.
one's

or servility toward other

It involves deceiving oneself about

identity as a practically rational being.

Since this

identity makes one as valuable as any other human being-absolutely v a l u a b l e - o n e
others

(DV:435-6).

has no reason to be servile towards

Indeed,

ourselves with others

measuring our worth by comparing

instead of with the moral

law is

outright harmful because there will always be individuals
whom we admire,

and concluding that we are less worthy than

they are ''makes us hate them and produces envy and jealousy"
(LE:137), emotions which damage our dignity.
others

in a servile way is equally harmful:

cowardice and bad character because

Treating
it reveals

it involves taking the

easy way out, choosing courses of action which appeal to
others through flattery or aggrandizement of them rather
than through making them,
us.

through their own accord,

respect

The aspiring actress who "sleeps" her way up through

the Hollywood hierarchy to acquire acting jobs is an example
of the servile character:

she gains the favor of others not

by proving that she has the talent and force of personality
needed for good acting but by pleasing them in ways which
demean her person.

The servile person presumes that she has

less worth than others, and so fails to heed her own innate
dignity,
moral

outmatched by no other human being but only by the

law (DV:436).
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Avoiding the vices of lying and servility-- each a form
of d is.hoaesty--is then at least the first step towards
cultivating a good character.

I will now go on to show that

Kant's requirement of honesty reaches deeper than merely
asking us to refrain from lying, avarice and false humility.
It also extends to knowing our particular sensuous character
and searching our hearts for our true motives,
conscience plays a key role.

and here

But before discussing

conscience and the status of Kant's honesty-requirement-which, at bottom, amounts to a requirement for selfknowledge-- in light of his thesis of the inscrutability of
our motives and in light of the possibility of selfdeception,

I will consider how Kant can hold that morality

requires us to know and to change our particular sensuous
characters when he also suggests that our m o r a 1 character

is

all we can really change.

Section 1 1 T h e

Moral Significance si. Individual Character

In the Anth r o p o l o g y . Kant distinguishes between having
a certain type of character and having moral character
s i m p l i c i t e r : "on the one hand we say that a certain man has
this or that

(physical)

character or, on the other hand,

that he has character simply
latter sense there

(moral character).

In this

is only one character--a man either has
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it QX_ has. H & character a£. a l l " (A:151, my emphasis).

A man

can be born with a certain temperament and certain emotional
dispositions which form his sensuous character,
does not abide by moral principles--the most
which

but if he

important of

is truthfulness*--he has no character at all

moral sense.

in the

Kant goes on to strongly suggest that we can

change only our moral character and not our sensuous
constitution.

He describes

character--the sanguine,
the phlegmatic

four types of sensuous

the melancholy,

the choleric and

(A :153-7)10--all of which exaemplify "what

nature makes of man;" moral character,
"what man makes gjE. himself" (A:157).
discussion of these four temperaments,

by contrast,

shows

Throughout his
he stresses that he

is only referring to a person's sensuous constitution and
not to his "way of thinking"

(A:157), which he freely adopts

and which belongs to his moral character.

All this might

lead one to believe that a person's sensuous character
irrelevant to her moral character,
be changed.

But in fact,

is

since only the latter can

I want to argue,

this is not the

•See A:159 for a list of the main principles that have to do
with moral character.
All of them are principles of uprightness
and honesty, e.g., not to dissemble, not to lie, etc.
10While
Kant classifies
the
sanguine and
the
melancholy
temperaments under "temperaments of
feeling," while the choleric
and
phlegmatic temperaments are "temperaments of activity," each
category includes
dispositions to both
feel and act
in certain
ways.
The ancient
quadripartite division of
temperaments into
sanguine, melancholy,
choleric and phlegmatic can also be found
in the QbsecvetiPns OH the. Feeling ol_ the Beautiful
and SybUJie
(1764),
where Kant
describes them
in a way which
is slightly
different but on the whole consistent with the present.
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case,

since one can change one's sensuous character through

one's way. of thinking.
In Chapter 1, I argued that the subjective side of
moral

improvement

involves strengthening emotions favorable

to the adoption of moral maxims and weakening those opposed
to the same.

The successful result of this process

is what

Kant calls "virtue as strength of will," a capacity measured
by the magnitude of the obstacles
recalcitrant inclinations)

it can overcome

want to apply this model of moral
individual character.

(in the form of
(DV:394).

I now

improvement to the case of

I want to argue that knowledge of

one's sensuous character

is a precondition for moral

improvement because one's sensuous character holds the key
to one's own particular strengths and weaknesses, an
awareness of which helps

increase the probability that one

will adopt the right maxims and act from the right motives.
Knowing and
sense

improving one's sensuous character

is in this

instrumental to developing a moral character.
In Part VI,

I shall use two of Kant's four temperaments

as case studies of various types of individual character,
each with its specific strengths and weaknesses,
illustrate the ways

in order to

in which one can cultivate one's

sensuous character for the sake of moral ends.

Here,

I give

the argument which must undergird such a case study--namely,
showing w h v . given Kant's sharp distinction between moral
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and sensuous character, a knowledge of the latter is at all
relevant to the cultivation of the former.
To cultivate a moral character
incumbent on us, and

is, of course,

it is helpful to begin with a

consideration of this duty.

The duty to increase one's

moral perfection has two components:
motive
one's

is pure,

morally

1) ensuring that one's

that is, ensuring that the law alone

incentive;

is

and 2) fulfilling all one's duties —

adopting and acting on the right naxins— and "attaining
completely one's moral end with regard to oneself"

(DV:446).

(The quoted part of (2) presumably refers to our duties
toward ourselves,

but since Kant strongly suggests that all

our duties are really duties towards ourselves
223),

(LE:121,

we can extend Kant's meaning here to encompass the

fulfillment of all our duties.)
Suppose,
perfection.

then,

If we rationally intend an end, we are required

not only to choose
action.

that we have chosen the end of moral

it but also to seek to realize

it through

When our end is one of the two obligatory ends — our

own perfection and other people's h a p p i n e s s - c e r t a i n
complications arise.

If we were purely rational beings,

would have no problem realizing these ends:

we

we would only

have to intend them and we would always act to realize them.
But we are finite rational beings,

beings who are often

tempted to violate moral requirements.

For that reason,

Kant stresses that the although the duty to increase our
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moral perfection

is "narrow and perfect

qualityM--that is,

in terms of what

only be "wide and imperfect

in terms of its

it prescribes— it can

in terms of its degree, because

of the frailty (f raqili t a s ) of human nature"

(DV:446).

Human beings are frail because although we may intend to act
on the right maxims,
intention

we often fail to carry out this

in practice:

The frailty of human nature
complaint of an Apostle,

is expressed even in the

"What I would,

I adopt the good

that I do not!"

In other

words,

(the lav)

maxim of

my will, but this good, which objectively,

its ideal concept i o n ... is an irresistible
subjectively
followed,

into the
in

incentive,

is

(ig h v p o t h e s i ). when the maxim is to be

the weaker

(in comparison with inclination)

(R:24-5) .
It is because

we have inclinations opposed to the law that

we often fail

to do what we

in all earnest

intend to do; and

since we can never completely rid ourselves of such
inclinations,

morality requires us to fight those emotional

dispositions which tempt us to violate our duties and to
cultivate those which can help us fulfill them.

Our

compliance with the duty to increase our moral perfection
can therefore "consist only in continual progress"

(DV:446).

It is thus not reaching moral perfection which is our duty,
but only striving for it (DV:446).

151

One might ask how this conception of moral

improvement

as a gradual process can harmonize with the equally
prevalent Kantian conception of moral

improvement as a

rebirth--a rejection of one's previous,

corrupt way of

thinking and a simultaneous adoption of a steadfast sense of
principle.
prevalent

The latter model of moral improvement

is

in the R e l j g i o n . where Kant characterizes

"revolution"

in one's cast of mind

(R:43).

it as a

It is also found

in the following passage from the A n t h r o p o l o g y , where Kant
seems to be making an outright rejection of any view of
moral

improvement as a gradual process:
Since the act of establishing character,

like a kind of

rebirth,

is a certain ceremony of making a vow to

oneself,

we may also assume that the solemnity of the

act makes

it and the moment when the transformation

took place unforgettable to him,
a new epoch.

Education,

like the beginning of

examples and instruction

cannot produce this firmness and steadfastness
principles gradually,

but only, as it were,

in our

by an

explosion that results from our being sick and tired of
the precarious state of instinct....

Wanting to become

a better man in a fragmentary way is a futile endeavor,
since one impression dies out while we are working on
another;

the act of establishing character,

absolute unity of the

however,

inner principle of conduct

generally (A:159).
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is

If the act of establishing moral character takes place
through an absolute transformation of one's cast of mind,
how can one's compliance with the duty to perfect oneself
morally "consist only in continual progress"

(DV:446)?

The solution to this antinomy lies, characteristically
for Kant,

in the distinction between one's

one's sensible character.

intelligible and

Consider his solution to the

closely related problem of how a man can be under duty to
make himself good when he is "corrupt

in the very ground of

his maxims" and will, moreover, always have inclinations
which oppose the law:
But if a man is corrupt in the very ground of his
maxims,

how can he possibly bring about this revolution

by his own powers and by himself become a good man?
Yet duty bids us do this, and duty demands nothing of
us which we cannot do.

There is no reconciliation

possible here except by saying that man

is under the

necessity of, and is therefore capable of, a revolution
in his cast of mind,
his sensuous nature
of the former).

but o n l y Q± 3. gradual reform ig
(which places obstacles

That is,

if a man reverses,

single unchangeable decision,

by a

that highest ground of

his maxims whereby he was an evil man
a new man),

in the way

(and thus puts on

he is, so far as his principle and cast of

mind are concerned,

a subject susceptible of goodness,
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but only in continuous
man

labor and growth is. he a good

(R:43, emphases mine).

What becomes clear here

is that although good character may

be indicated by the presence of the firm resolution to make
oneself good

(an intention signalled by a revolution in

one's cast of mind),
intention--that

the actual realization of this

is, the process of actually becomino good--

can only consist in a gradual reform of one's sensuous
character.
moral

The "gradual" and "absolute" conceptions of

improvement are thus not really at odds; they only

show the difference between

intention and a c t i o n .3
-3
-

Striving for moral perfection thus
reform of our sensuous character.
positive and a negative side:

involves a gradual

This process has both a

it involves both strengthening

our disposition to act dutifully and from duty, and
weakening our disposition to act against duty and from
1 1 It should
be noted,
however, that
since willing is
the
same
as intending to a c t . the concept of
good willing contains
analytically the concept of striving to act in certain ways.
The
objective condition of a good will, reflected in the vow to be a
good person, is
therefore not
a static condition
but rather
a
dynamic s t r i v i n q . Our efforts to cultivate our natural feelings,
as
efforts
directed at
the realization
of the
two obligatory
ends, have moral worth because they are the manifestation of this
striving of the
good will.
However, when we
promote those ends
from
natural
feelings
alone,
without
the
thought
of
the
obiigatorv nature of the a c t . our action has no moral worth.
Qua
instance of fulfilling obligatory ends
the act might have
moral
worth, as
it may qua instance of
cultivating morally beneficial
feelings;
but since the thought of duty is, gJS. h v p o t h e s i . absent
from our
minds in instances
of this sort,
promoting obligatory
ends and the means for realizing them cannot
be the intention in
actions done from feeling
alone.
Thus, actions done
without an
explicit
concern for duty (for the morality of the act) can have
no moral worth.
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impure motives.

On the side of action,

this

involves

disposing ourselves to adopt and act on the right maxims
and fighting dispositions which make us stray.

,

For example,

a person may have a tendency to forget appointments not
because she wants to, but because she gets absorbed
conversation with others.

Moral progress,

in

for this person,

will consist partly in avoiding social situations which are
likely to make her forget her appointments.
As regards the purity of our motives,

moral

improvement

involves striving to make duty alone the motive from which
we act--a process which involves strengthening the motive of
duty not just by reflecting on the moral law but also by
cultivating the "moral" feelings which stem from our
awareness of the law (a process I will consider
detail

in greater

in Section IV of this chapter and in Chapter 5)--but

also making an effort to strengthen their natural
counterparts and to weaken morally harmful feelings.

This

change of feelings will be accompanied by a change of
attitudes towards their objects,

since feelings have both a

sensible and a reflective component.

A person may have a

disposition to help others not because

it is her duty to do

so but because she enjoys feeling that they need her.
weaken this arrogant motive,

she might,

just once,

To

refrain

from helping someone so as to prove to herself that others
actually do quite well on their own.

Or she might reflect

on why she needs to feel needed and discover that it is not
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so much arrogance as low self-esteem that is motivating her.
If so, she needs to take steps to strengthen her selfrespect .
In Sections

IV and V,

the process of moral
sensuous character,

I will describe

in greater detail

improvement through reform of our
paying particular attention to how

cultivating our emotional strengths might help us purify our
moral motives.

I will also emphasize that cultivating our

dignity-feelings enables us to act on our characteristic
emotions

in a way which harmonizes with moral requirements,

and in this sense helps us cultivate virtuous character

in a

way which is sensitive to our individual temperaments.
Here,

I hope at least to have shown that knowing our

own strengths and weaknesses is a precondition for moral
improvement.

Only with a conception of ourselves as unique

persons with specific emotional tendencies,
different

from anybody else's,

tendencies according to the
be.

often quite

can we shape our emotional

idea of the persons we ought to

Since these emotional tendencies belong to our sensuous

character,
character

it should be clear that knowing our sensuous
is a precondition for developing good character

the moral sense and is therefore a moral requirement,
Kant.

in

for

By perfecting and refining the sensuous dispositions

which can help us realize moral ends,
progress.
therefore

we make moral

Knowing and cultivating our sensuous character
instrumental to virtue itself.
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is

Having established the relevance of individual
character to establishing moral character,
feature of our sensible life which

is important for self-

knowledge and for establishing ways
change ourselves,

namely,

I now turn to a

in which we need to

the workings of conscience.

Section LULL IllS. workings q_L Conscience

Among the internal voices dissuading us from deceiving
ourselves about our moral standing,
powerful.

conscience

is the most

While conscience might appear to be a capacity of

thought and not of feeling,

Kant classifies it among the

"natural predispositions of the mind

(p r a e d i s a o s i t i o ) for

being affected by concepts of duty, antecedent
predispositions on the side of feeling" (DV:399).
Conscience
feeling.

is thus, at least for Kant, a capacity of
And it fits the model of distinctively moral

feelings which I gave

in the Introduction and

in Chapter 1:

it is, at least in its healthy state, conditioned by an
awareness of the moral

law and by moral judgments,

but still

falls under the category of feeling because it signifies the
sensible effect which such judgments have on us.
I have already observed that the pride appropriate to
our dignity is limited only by humility before the moral
law.

This humility is not meant to make us dejected,
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but is

rather supposed to make us strive to conform to our moral
requirements.
has a similar

Conscience,
function.

in its awe-inspiring presence,

Kant defines conscience as

"consciousness of an internal court

in man

('before which

his thoughts accuse or excuse one another')"
Conscience
actions,

escape;

is reason's judgment applied to one's own

yielding a verdict of either

"innocent."

"guilty" or

This judging activity is something we cannot

we can only bring ourselves

extreme depravity)
conscience

(DV:438).

(in conditions of

no longer to heed

is inescapable,

it (DV:438).

Since

it inspires awe in us:

Every man has a conscience and finds himself observed,
threatened,

and,

in general,

coupled with fear)

kept in awe

(respect

by an internal judge; and this

authority watching over the law in him is not something
that he himself
incorporated

(voluntarily) m a k e s . but something

into his b e i n a .

It follows him like a

shadow when he plans to escape.
Conscience

(DV:438)

is thus not strictly a feeling.

It is rather an

activity of judgment bound u p with the feeling of awe

(fear

coupled with respect) and followed by either relief or pain,
depending on whether the verdict was "innocent" or "guilty"
(DV:440).

The fact that the judgments of conscience are

bound up with the feeling of awe and in particular with
relief or pain is the reason why Kant classifies conscience
among our capacities

for feeling:
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"He who has no immediate

loathing for what

is morally wicked, and finds no pleasure

in what is morally good,
man has no conscience"
Since conscience

has no moral

feeling,

and such a

(LE:130).
is something we cannot escape but can

only dull our senses to, we do not have a duty to acquire a
conscience;

we only have a duty to cultivate

by heeding its verdicts,

it.

We do this

by sharpening our attentiveness to

its voice, and by enlightening our understanding about what
is and what

is not our duty--in short,

to obtain a hearing for

by using "every means

[the voice of conscience]"

(DV:401,

my insertion).
Kant does not explain why heeding one's conscience
duty to oneself
DV:437),

(though he classifies

it as a such a duty at

but I think it is plausible to see this duty as

bound up with the duty to know oneself,

which is the "first

command of all duties to oneself" and tells us:
heart--whether it is good or evil,
actions

is a

"know your

whether the source of our

is pure or impure, and what can be imputed to you as

belonging originally to the substance of man or as derived
(acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral
condition" (DV:441).

For conscience

judges not only the

legality of our actions,

but also their morality (LE:69-72).

We have a bad conscience

if someone

interprets us as

genuinely meaning to help him when in fact we are acting
from a self-serving motive.

Similarly,

if we plan to act

in

a certain way, conscience judges the morality of our maxims
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long before we undertake the action

(DV:438).

Since our

conscience can inform us about our long-standing
motivations,

heeding our conscience

is an important aspect

of self-knowledge.
But heeding one's conscience
self-knowledge;
deception.

is not always a means to

it can also become an

instrument of self-

Even though a just conscience

is veridical,

can become corrupted by false principles, e.g.,

it

by the

principle to hold oneself to standards more lenient than
those to which one holds others

(LE:132)1*.

If we think

of our conscience as a court of law in which the accused
(our full-blooded,
defender

sensuo-rational self)

is granted a

(the voice of the inclinations, supported by

instrumental reason in the form of the principle of selflove),

which upholds her case before the judge,

before the prosector,
(LE:132;

DV:439n),

reason, and

the moral law in all its purity

we see that it is easy--human,

all too

human--to give a more careful ear to the defender than to
the prosecutor.

As Kant puts

it:

"Except on the death-bed,

1 2 It is a bewildering
fact that in the Doctr ine
of V i r t u e .
Kant calls an erring
conscience "an absurdity" (DV:401), whereas
in the Lectures on
E t h i c s . he considers a corrupt
conscience to
be even more common than a just one (LE:132).
In the Doctr ine of
V i r t u e . Kant seems
to forget
his earlier and
wiser claim
that
one's conscience
can be
corrupted, holding the
more simplistic
position
that although one can be mistaken about what one's duty
is, one can
never be mistaken about whether
one has
submitted
one's
action
to the
judgment
of
one's conscience,
which
he
equates,
without
further
question,
with
practical
reason
(DV:401).
In the latter claim, he seems to be
presupposing that
the
judgment of conscience will
be not only veridical but also
just.
But as we shall see, this is not always the case.
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when they listen more eagerly to the accuser,
readier ear to their defender"
herself

(LE:132).

men lend a

Anyone imagining

in a real court of law would probably agree with

this claim, as would anyone--and that includes most of us-who has suffered the pangs of a guilty conscience.
defender,

The

who is after all a part of the court of law which

constitutes conscience,

gets the better hearing and we

conclude that the prosecutor

is being too hard.

deception is often the result:
about our own powers,

Self-

either we deceive ourselves

thinking we have lived up to the

standards of the moral law when in fact we h a v e n ’t (in which
case we are guilty of self-conceit,

the belief that we can

actually live up to the absolute purity of the moral law;
LE:128),

or else we judge by a false standard, a garbled

substitute

for the moral law

self-love,

of making ourselves an exception to the rule;

LE:132,
which

137).

(in which case we are guilty of

By expounding a false law--an a priori

is to our own advantage or an empirical

false to the facts of human nature

law

law which is

(in particular,

to human

frailty)--we corrupt our conscience.
Thus begins the form of self-deception which is called
self-flattery.

But there

is another

to which conscience is prone,

form of self-deception

embodied in what Kant calls a

"tyrannical" or "melancholy" conscience.
flattering conscience

While the self-

is underactive--insufficiently

meticulous about the difficulty of living up to the moral
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law--the tyrannical conscience

is overactive,

blaming the

agent for having failed to do her duty even when she has
done everything that could rationally be expected of her.
Such a conscience becomes a tormentor:
If a person
sins,

is capable of reproaching himself for his

his conscience

other hand,
of evil

is said to be alive;

but on the

if a man searches needlessly for evidences

in his conduct,

his conscience

is melancholy.

Conscience should not lord it over us like

a tyrant;

do no hurt to our conscience by proceeding

on our way

cheerfully;

we

tormenting consciences in the long run

become dulled and ultimately cease to function

(LE:134-

5) .
In a sense, a tyrannical conscience
an underactive conscience.
conscience

is more dangerous than

For even though the uncritical

is corrupt in that it employs a distorted

conception of the agent's powers and of the moral law,

it is

still capable of being purified because it is still work i n a .
A tyrannical conscience,
destroying itself:
like

by contrast,

is capable of

by being too active,

a worn-out spring,

it dulls

itself and,

"ultimately ceases £2. f u n c t i o n ."

1SA conscience is also overactive
when it is
employed "to
resolve
problems
of a
quibbling
nature"
<LE:134).
Such a
conscience,
which
Kant
calls
"micrological,"
should
be
distingushed from the
tyrannical conscience
because the
latter
compares our actions
with the moral law,
while the micrological
conscience
quibbles about issues
which are
morally irrelevant.
e.g., "whether
it is right
to tell
a lie in
order to
make an
April fool of a person,
or whether a rite or ceremony
should be
performed in this or that manner" (LE:134).
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Striving to be moral can thus become a harmful obsession.
But how can we avoid

it?

tyrannical conscience

The danger of acquiring a

is alive

with a sense of honor.

in anyone who strives to live

For how does one know whether one is

searching "needlessly" for evidences of evil
conduct?

in one's

The duty to know ourselves tells us to examine

ourselves scrupulously;
conduct are needful

hence all efforts to examine our

(DV:441-2; LE:128).

To keep our conscience

from becoming a tormentor,

seems we have to restrain it.

it

But it is hard to see how it

is even possible to restrain it, since conscience

is an

"instinct" which passes judgment on us "against our will"
(LE:129; cf.69,

131).

This means that conscience will

condemn us, quite beyond our control,
immorally,

not only for acting

but also for failing to act on the right motives.

A tyrannical conscience seizes onto such signs of moral
failure and haunts us, creating a weary,
disposition.

melancholy

Since acting on morally inappropriate ways and

on inappropriate motives
virtue of being human,

is something we are all prone to by

how do we avoid chronic d e p r e s s i on ? 1-4

14Barbara
Herman's "Rules
of
Moral
Salience," which
are
designed to
help us determine
which features of
situations are
morally salient and
so call
for moral judgment,
do not
really
help
here.
Although
they
help
prevent
what
Kant
calls
a
"micrological" conscience
(one which
sees its path
strewn with
duties even
in morally
irrelevant situations),
they are
of no
help in morally salient situations, in which it is up
to us to
judge when we
have done enough of what duty called
for.
It is
precisely here that the threat of a tyrannical conscience arises.
See Herman, "The Practice of Moral Judgment."
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It might be thought that since Kant characterizes the
tyrannical conscience as one which "searches needlessly for
evidences of evil
emphasis),

in (a man's] c o n d u c t " (LE:134,

my

it is primarily concerned with actions and not

with motives,

and that the way to avoid such a conscience

is

simply to stop acting against the law and stop fretting
about our motives.

If we fulfill this minimum of what can

reasonably be expected of a finite agent who adopts morality
as an end--if we avoid lying, cultivate some of our talents,
help others sometimes,

and treat them with respect--then

surely conscience would stay out of the main part of our
day-to-day business.
But this handy solution miscarries when tested against
the facts of human n a t u r e — in particular, against facts
about the ways

in which we acquire a bad conscience.

Most

of us have emotional ties to other people, and some of those
ties are stronger than others.

It is with respect to these

strong emotional ties that the need to attend to our motives
becomes especially pressing.
find faults

We all have a propensity to

in others--including our friends.

Now while

is impertinent to point out a friend's faults to her,

it

since

she needs only examine herself to become aware of them on
her own

(LE:232),

we still cannot help noticing them.

And

it is the very fact that we not ice her faults that raises a
problem about our motives.

Consider a somewhat neurotic

friend who is often complaining about how others victimize
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her.

We feel like telling her to stop seeing herself as a

victim or to stop being servile;

but as friends,

we do the

friendly thing and lend a sympathetic ear, showing we
respect her feelings.
particular
regard.

But in fact we neither respect these

feelings nor have sympathy for her

in this

We are merely feigning love and respect,

and this

false display of affection gives us a bad conscience.
Conscience

is here condemning us not for our actions but for

our motives: we feel guilty for not feeling respect and
sympathy for her.

One can imagine how a tyrannical

conscience might develop in response to situations like
this--situations

in which there is a dissonance between what

we feel and what we do.
The

indeterminate nature of imperfect duties also opens

up contexts in which a tyrannical conscience might develop.
In these contexts,

conscience blames us not so much for our

motives as for our failure to act
first,

in certain ways.

Take,

the duty to promote the happiness of others.

Morality tells us that as long as we have the basic maxim to
help other people s o m e t i m e s . we will not incur guilt for
failing to promote the ends of others on a particular
occasion.1 ®

But the fact is that many of us

guilty when we decline a request

feel

for help--especially when

19For a helpful discussion of the nature of imperfect duties
and their relation to merit and demerit in Kant, see Thomas Hill,
Jr.'s "Kant
on Imperfect
Duty and Supererogation,"
Dignity and
Pract ical Reason (Cornell UP, 1992 ), p p . 145-175, esp. p p . 160-168.
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we do not have to go out of our way to help the other party.
That we have the intention to help others sometimes does not
make things better,

since repeated

failure to help makes us

doubt whether we have the intention at all.

Isolated

helping actions begin to seem like token gestures designed
to keep our conscience at bay. But the tyrannical conscience
does not let itself be so easily fooled.
conscience
morality,

Although such a

is misinformed about the requirements of
it still remains tyrannical, and it is not clear

what we can do to allay it.
Similarly,

feeling that we are not complying with the

imperfect duty to increase our natural perfection— our
mental,

physical and pragmatic c apacities— can lead to a

tyrannical conscience.

Kant stresses that deciding which

particular talents to develop is left for man himself to
choose

"in accordance with his own rational reflection about

what sort of life he would like to lead and whether he has
the powers necessary for it (e.g., whether it should be
trade, commerce,

or a learned profession)"

findinq out what those talents are
and embarrassing process.
training in anything
for this.

But

is often a painstaking

Anyone who has undergone formal

(music, sports, academics)

Sometimes we cultivate

actually have,

(DV:445).

can vouch

"talents" we don't

and the fear of going through further

embarrassments of this sort can keep us from cultivating the
talents we do have.

Finally,

even when we do have a talent
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for something,

the process of cultivating it requires the

courage to risk

failure and rejection by going to auditions,

applying for competitive

jobs, etc.

keep us from challenging ourselves
self-condemnation which arises

The fear of failure can
in these ways, and the

in response to such inaction

sows the seeds of a tyrannical conscience.
How, given these facts about how we get a bad
conscience,

do we keep our conscience

from becoming

tyrannical when it is at bottom an "instinct" which passes
judgment on us "against our will"
Kant has no ready answer,

(LE:129; cf.69,

131)?

and I don't think there is. a

completely satisfactory solution available to him, but I
will offer a few suggestions of my own, drawing on what Kant
has to say about the "operative" conscience--the conscience
which has the strength and authority to translate
verdicts

into redemptive action.

its guilty

The verdict of the

operative conscience "has validity if it is felt and
e n f o r c e d ."

A guilty verdict

repentance;

it is enforced

is felt if it issues in moral

if it leads to "action in

accordance with the judicial verdict"

(LE:131, my emphases).

In order to act on the guilty verdict,
to the valid judgment," a conscience
command respect"

i.e.,

"must be strong and

(LE:132, my emphasis).

feeling of guilt and moral repentance

"to give effect

That

is, the

incurred through moral

failure must be strong enough to translate itself into a
preparedness to a c t . and to act in a way which demonstrates
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that one is no longer choosing to act
conscience condemned at the outset.
guilty of lying,
future.

in on the maxim that
For

instance,

if one is

one has to refrain from lying in the

By refraining from repeating one's offenses,

one

clears one's conscience step by step.
In the case of redeeming ourselves
wrong maxims,
lying,

for acting on the

what we need to do is clear:

if guilty of

fail to lie in the future, and so on.

But what do we

do when our conscience condemns us for having the wrong
mo t i v e s --that is, for being unable to act on respect for the
moral

law?

Readers

familiar with Kant's doctrine of the

inscrutability of motives must be scratching their heads.
For I've been speaking of maxims and motives as if they are
transparent to the agent--as

if they are fully expressed in

the conscious thought processes that issue in and accompany
our actions.

But Kant does not believe that our maxims are

that clear to us.

At least our motives,

order components of our m a x i m s , a r e

which are second-

hidden from us; so

even if we can formulate the rest of our maxim
the means through which we intend to realize
clearly, we are still missing a crucial part,
motive

(our end and

it) fairly
namely,

our

for intending to act that way:

1*See
footnote 15 for a defense of my
interpretation of a
motive as a second-order clause
of the agent's maxim, and for
a
rejection of the commoly held view that a motive an be thought of
as the epd of an action, signified by the (first-order) purposive
clause of a maxim.
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For a man cannot see

into the depths of his heart so as

to be quite certain,

in even a s inale action,

purity of his moral
disposition,

of the

intention and the sincerity of his

even when he has no doubt about the

legality of his action.

(DV:392; see also DV:447 and

G: 406-8)
Kant's thesis of the inscrutability of motives, and his
own motivation for holding

it, has led to some puzzlement.

It is frequently linked to his
eyes of many,

(equally puzzling and,

wildly implausible) doctrine of transcendental

freedom of the will

(W i l l k u r ) which is the capacity of the

human will to be a first cause

(also called

"spontaneity").

The reason why many link these two doctrines together
that they both involve claims to unknowabi1 i t y .
of transcendental

freedom,

unknowable noumenal world,
world;

in the

consequently,

the free will exists

is

In the case
in the

not in the knowable phenomenal

we can have no theoretical or

speculative knowledge of the operation of our will and our
noumenal choices.

Similarly,

the inscrutability thesis

implies that we cannot know our real motives or maxims.
But since searching one's heart
than a theoretical
theoretical

is a practical rather

inquiry and spontaneity is barred from

inquiry (while from a practical point of view,

it is a necessary part of our conception of ourseves as
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rational agents;
that Kant saw the

see G:448;

CPrR :28-29 ), 1-7 it is unlikely

inscrutability of our motives as a result

of his transcendental

idealism.

The

inscrutability thesis

is meant to spur us along the road to self-knowledge and so
plays a distinctively moral role.
The doctrine of the inscrutability of motives,

though

certainly undergirded by the doctrine of transcendental
freedom,

is not just the upshot of a bewildering

metaphysical requirement.

It is designed to remind us of

the ever-present possibility of self-deception and of the
fact that virtue and its first command, self-knowledge,
difficult for finite beings such as ourselves.

are

Because of

1-7In this sense, searching one's heart is a practical rather
than a theoretical inquiry, and the command "Know thyself!" urges
us to know oneself
in a practical rather than
theoretical sense
(to have Wissen as
opposed to Erkenntnis of oneself).
But what
is practical
knowledge with regard
to oneself if
we experience
our
individual
selves only
in space
and
time and
hence only
empirically?
How can we
come to know
our empirical selves--in
which,
after
all, most
of
our
motives originate--other
than
theoretically?
Kant does speak of
practical knowledge (W i s s e n )
in the
Cr itiaue
Practical Reason, where he says that the fact
of reason, i.e., our
awareness of the moral
lav, enables us
to
"know fw i s s e n 1 something of
(the intelligible world],
namely a
law"
(CPrR:43, my emphasis and
inserts.
For
other mentions of
practical k n o w l e d g e . embodied
in our awareness of
the moral law
and the
Ideas of reason, see
CPrR:29, 31, and 137).
Since our
inquiry into
our own
motives uses the
moral law as
a standard
according to which
we evaluate ourselves (DV:436) and
the moral
law is an object of practical knowledge, it may seem appropriate,
after
all, to speak of practical
knowledge of our motives.
But
knowledge is a matter of
certainty, and certainty attaches
only
to items
of pure
reason
(that is
why the
moral
law and
its
necessity are objects of practical knowledge).
Since we have no
certainty
about our
own
motives, even
though
they are
often
empirically based, I think it
is more appropriate
to speak
of
practical inquiry
into our motives--inquiry guided
by the eve r 
present
standard
of the
moral
law--rather
than of
practical
knowledge of them.
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the devilish ways in which self-interest hides

its tracks,

there always exists a possibility that we are deceiving
ourselves about our true motives.
certain about our motives,
or dejected

if we could be

we would grow either complacent

(complacent if they were always pure; dejected

if they were
The

Moreover,

impure--most likely,

inscrutability thesis

of course,

the latter).

is designed to underscore the

difficulty of knowing ourselves yet to encourage us in our
struggle

for moral

improvement.1*

The Greeks spoke of fate

in this context.

In his

P o e t i c s . Aristotle observes that tragedy has a moral
relevance,
by fate,

namely,

to remind us that our lives are affected

by accidental circumstance.

doctrine of predestination;

This is not a harsh

it is rather a salubrious

reminder that even if we are enjoying happiness at the
present moment,
consequently,
well-being,

circumstances may change; and that

we must not contentedly gloat in our present

but should keep a sharp eye--sharpened judgment

of the sort embodied

in the Aristotelian virtue of practical

wisdom (p h r o n e s i s )--on our condition,

so as to be able to

take every possible measure to steer away from misfortune
(including vice--a signficant component of unhappiness,
Aristotle's eyes).

in

Aristotle's lesson in the Poet ics can

thus be captured by the following motto:

"Do what you can to

1BSee Book
1 of
the R e l i g i o n . esp.R:32-4
for an
discussion of how self-interest leads to self-deception.
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in-depth

avoid all obstacles to happiness."
doctrine of predestination,

A far cry from a

A r i s t o t l e ’s thought

Poetics enjoins us to do whatever

in the

is in our power to achieve

and maintain happiness.
Kant, dissatisfied with the ambiguity of the Greek term
"happiness"

(eudai m o n i a . which can mean physical,

well as moral well-being),
"virtue"

replaces

mental, as

"happiness" with

in Aristotle's motto, and the result is his

doctrine of the

inscrutability of motives.

Instead of

reminding us of the power of fate, Kant's doctrine reminds
us of the power of opposing inclinations:
may be that we have acted morally,
completely certain,
maxim of self-love

however sure we

we can never be

since we may in fact have acted on a
(DV:392-3).

What is interesting here is not so much the attitude
itself as the course of action
Aristotle's doctrine

it brings about.

Like

in the Poet i c s . which does not ask us

to give up in the face of fate but prompts us to do what we
can to avoid situations that could bring unhappiness,
doctrine of the

Kant's

inscrutability of motives does not call

for

an abject surrender to forces too powerful to overcome,

but

asks us to use what is. in our reach to find out, as best we
can, what our true motives are, and to strive with all our
might to make the thought of duty our motivating thought
every action

(DV:393).

The fact that we cannot be

absolutely sure of our motives does not entail that we
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in

cannot

increase the likelihood that our motives will be

virtuous or at least compatible with virtue.
work, but

This takes

it is not an impossible tas k . 1*

Paying unfailing heed to the judgments of our
conscience

is perhaps the most powerful way to combat our

tendency to deceive ourselves.
having a peaceful conscience

As Kant himself observes,

is not necessarily the same as

being virtuous: people whose actions conformed to duty
externally might have a peaceful conscience as a result,
even though they "did not take the law into their counsel"
and merely happened upon the right action by luck

(R :33).

The virtuous person is not satisfied with mere legality;

she

is concerned about the morality of her actions and wants to
act for the right r e a s o n s .

As I have already observed,

she

has a bad conscience not only when she suspects that in
helping someone perhaps she didn't act from benevolence but
from self-interested vanity

(a love of being loved),

but

1*My
claim
that
the
inscrutability
thesis
is
intended
primarily
as a reminder of the strength of non-moral motives --a
reminder
designed to
prompt
us to
strive
for purity
in
our
motives--finds support in Kant's explicit and repeated connection
of
human frailty (our tendency to act on non-moral motives) with
our inability ever to
know whether
we have
acted from a pure
motive (DV:392-3, 446-7).
Were our motives transparent to us, we
might easily be lulled into self-flattery and moral complacency-vices
which
Kant
repeatedly warns us
against
(DV:430,
436;
CPrR:85).
But because our motives are inscrutable to us, we are
instead set on the course to continually strive to make ourselves
morally
better.
It
is
for
this
reason
that
I take
the
inscrutability
thesis to
be
essentially linked
up with
human
frailty--with
the fact that we are always tempted
to break the
law--and to be
designed primarily
to make us
strive for
moral
im p r o v e m e n t .
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also when she fails to have the right feelings toward
someone.

The morally concerned agent

the voice of her conscience,

which

is acutely aware of

is perhaps only rarely

peaceful.
Searching one's conscience

involves asking oneself

questions of the following sort:

"Did I publically reveal a

shameful secret about this person because
reckless,

I was drunk and

or did I do it out of an illegitimate sense of

moral superiority which I have cultivated through demeaning
people

in the past?";

unhappiness,
else,

"Did I leave this man,

causing his

because I am in the grip of passion for someone

or did I really try to make

it work, but we simply

aren't suited for one anot h e r — and is this a moral matter at
all?";

"Is it a moral failure on my part not to practice my

painting more,

or is it a permissible negligence because I

am cultivating other talents at this time?
then why do I still have a bad conscience
more--is

If the latter,
for not painting

it because I am setting the goal of my own

perfection too high or because I am really robbing myself of
an occasion for self-realization?
for the latter be, anyway:
so on.
(e.g.,

Sometimes,

And what would the motive

vanity or self-perfection?";

and

both candidate motives can be vicious

in the case of drunkenly betraying someone's

confidence,

in which excessive drunkenness and betrayal of

confidence are both vices);
other times,

neither.

other times,

only one is; still

It is important to try to pinpoint
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the operative motive(s)
then do we know which
changed.

inclinations,

if any,

need to be

Conscience can thus guide us in determining

whether a given
moral

as exactly as possible because only

inclination or character-trait reflects a

failure.
As regards our emotions--which are after all our

deepest and strongest motives for acting or failing to act-we need to show ourselves--the primary judges of what goes
on inside us--that we are taking steps to fight the emotions
which prohibit us from satisfying the demands of morality.
To do this, we need to prove to ourselves that we are
strengthening the feelings which might be able to counteract
those which our conscience condemns.

In the case of the

fear of failure or embarrassment which prevents us from
cultivating certain talents,
cultivate courage.

for example,

we need to

Building courage in one context helps us

act courageously in others, and even though we might be
unable to summon courage
afraid,

say,

in one context--we might be too

to audition for a band or play even when we

think we have the requisite talent--we could build on our
predispositions to courage

(fearlessness

risk) I n other contexts --sav.
social

in the face of

by being more daring in our

lives--to help us face embarrassment

in the former

context.
But how, exactly, do we "build on" or "cultivate" our
predispositions on the side of feeling?
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I now turn to this

question,

paying particular attention to what

is to .

cultivate our feelings according to the idea of our d i g n i t y .

S.e c t LttP IV:

Cult iv a tin g

F e e l i n g : & Definition

Although Kant often speaks of the need to our feelings
according to moral
the process

ideas,

involves.

he never actually explains what

Accordingly,

I will give a definition

of my own with which I believe Kant would be sympathetic.
To cultivate a feeling according to the idea of one's own
dignity and the dignity of others,

I suggest,

is a bipartite

process the first part of which involves sharpening one's
judgment about the feeling;
itself.

the second,

refining the feeling

One sharpens one's judgment about the feeling for

two purposes:

first, so that one can make responsible and

authentic decisions about whether to act on the feeling;
and,

second,

so that when one does choose to act on it, one

can do so in a way which is dignified and which harmonizes
with one's sense of moral

integrity.

One refines the

feeling for the purpose of bringing it closer to one's moral
feelings--that is, to one's
one's conscience,
what follows,

love of man,

one's self-respect,

and one's respect for the moral law.

In

I will clarify each part of this definition.

The first part of my definition of cultivating feeling-the part about sharpening our judgment about
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(and

perception of) our feelings and the way they figure in our
character--may strike the reader as an odd component
definition of cultivating f e e l i n a .

For

isn't it judgment

and not feeling that we are talking about here?
theory of action,

On Kant's

it is natural to assign a task to judgment

whenever one speaks of changing oneself
Kant, all human action,
by judgment.

in a

in some way.

including self-change,

Acting on a particular feeling,

For

is mediated
on this

theory,

is equivalent to acting on the judgment that this

feeling

is suitable

morally)

(suitable in some sense--not necessarily

to act on in this situation.

Although we may feel ^ 5. if. we are acting directly on
our feelings, we implicitly take responsibility for acting
in this manner by intending, however unself-consciously,

to

act on the feeling and so being prepared to justify our
actions

(or at least explain them)

if needed.

approve of the way in which we are acting;

We need not

nevertheless,

we

implicitly take responsibility for acting that way through
our choice to act on that particular feeling.

This decision

and simultaneous assumption of responsibility is an act of
judgment,

reflected

which we act.

in the maxim or personal principle on

Acting on a feeling is thus always

accompanied by an awareness of choos ina to act on it and
also being prepared to defend or explain one's action.
When we are acting with a view to changing ourselves-in this case, with a view to moral

177

improvement--the judgment

we make with regard to a particular
special form.

We must not only take responsibility for

acting on the feeling,
which

feeling must take a

but must also endorse

is morally beneficial.

it as a feeling

Whether a given feeling is

morally beneficial or not depends on the way it figures in
our own particular character.
to be overly sentimental;
choleric;

Some people have a propensity

others a propensity to be

others to be overly fearful,

to feel attacked by

or afraid of certain individuals and to let this dominate
their consciousness and behavior.
benefit from a dose of sympathy;
dose of pride.

A gruff sea captain may
a bleeding heart from a

If one knows one's own weaknesses

of acting on feelings--that

is,

in terms

if one knows which feelings

tend to overtake one's personality and to affect one's
behavior

in a morally harmful way

or to one's own d i g n i t y )--one

(whether harmful to others

is better able to curb them

and to cultivate feelings which can "compensate" for those
weaknesses.
A feeling is bad for oneself to act on when it
undermines or fails to contribute to one's own perfection,
moral worth,
For instance,

or social grace— in short, to one's d i g n i t y .
people who are sentimental can express their

sentimentality in appealing ways,
But an

given the right situation.

inappropriate display of sentimentality--when one

displays sentimentality simply because one has a tendency to
do so and not because

it is the r ight t ime to do so--is
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always morally harmful because
moral superiority.

it reveals a presumption to

In times of mourning,

display of pure grief may be legitimate,

for instance,

a

but never a

prolonged, dripping reminiscence of the late one, which
betrays pity and therefore disrespect for the latter,

since

pity is "the kind of benevolence one has toward someone
unworthy"

(DV:457).

Another feeling that can be morally harmful
h u m i 1 ity--even when it is genuine,

is

not false humility.

A

humble person can be self-effacing to the degree of losing
her own self-respect,

even when her humility does not

necessarily involve the feeling that her own worth is lower
than that of others

(the latter would be false h u m i l i t y ) .

Such a person needs to curb her humility by cultivating her
pride, and she can do so in a number of ways.
given a compliment she deserves,
humble

impulse to say,

she should not act on her

it's nothing,

really," but

should instead smile and say "Thank you."

This simple

expression of pride

"Oh,

In being

in her accomplishment brings with it a

greater sense of self-worth, and so cultivates pride and
self-respect.
Being able to judge whether a given feeling is good or
bad for us to act on thus requires self-knowledge and selfcontrol.

Through judgment,

we modify our actions by

refraining from acting on feelings which are negative to our
moral personality and acting on those which are positive.
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But VS. ffiUS-t a.l5 0 affect the feelings t h e m s e l v e s , for vhat we
are concerned with,

after all,

is changing our c h a r a c t e r :

and when it comes to changing our feelings, what we are
interested

in cultivating are not just episodic emotions,

nor just our long-standing dispositions to feel, but the

3gd

aualitv

depth & £ the feelings t h e m s e l v e s . so that we can

be proud of having these particular
traits.

As we gain insight

particular

feelings as character-

into the dangers or virtues of a

feeling and, more broadly,

in our character,

into the role

we develop and att itude toward

either approve or disapprove of it.

occasions.

By either

it: we

Our attitude about the

feeling affects our disposition to take pleasure
so changes our propensity to indulge

it plays

in it, and

in it on specific

indulging in it ("riding out" the

train of thoughts and emotions which accompany it) or
refraining from indulging in it (thinking about something
else),

we either

increase or decrease our likelihood to

express the emotion

in word or deed.

By reflecting on and

adopting a certain attitude toward a given feeling,
change our disposition to feel
act on it.

it and hence our proneness to

How this helps deepen the feeling itself

something I will consider

we

is

in Chapters 4 and 5.

A person whose judgment

is sensitive to her feelings

not only able to decide whether to act on a given feeling,
but is also able,
feeling,

when she does decide to act on the

to choose a course of action which
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is dignified,

is

authentic,
Judgment,

and harmonizes with her sense of moral
in this capacity,

integrity.

is employed to find an

appropriate way of expressing the feeling through words,
bodily gestures and facial expressions.

Kant has the

following to say about facial expressions:
Expression is the facial features put into play, and
this play results

from an emotional agitation of more

or less strength,

the tendency to which is one of a

man's characteristic traits.

It is hard not to betray

the stamp of an affect by any expression.

It betrays

itself by the very pains we take to repress

it in our

manner and tone; and if a man is too weak to master his
affects,

the play of his expressions will unmask

(against his reason's wishes)

what is going on within

him, which he would like to hide and withdraw from the
eyes of others.

But men who are masters of this art,

if once detected,

are not considered the best sort of

men, men with whom we can deal
especially true

in confidence.

if they are practiced

it clear here that

is

in affecting

expressions that contradict what they do
Kant makes

This

(A:164-5).

it is morally preferable to

show one's struggle with one's emotions than to hide

it:

people who are able to hide this struggle are not considered
trustworthy.

It is fairly clear why this

is so: concealing

one's emotions or one's struggle with them is a mark of
dishonesty--a trait which will eventually become known the
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world through an inconsistency between one's actions and
one's expressions.

So it is better to reveal what one

feeling than to hide it, even if what one
something one

is not very proud of.

one is heeding

integrity.

But Kant also makes it clear,
quoted,

is feeling is

In giving expression to

the emotional turbulence within oneself,
one's sense of honesty and moral

in the paragraph just

that the inability to master one's passions

sign of weakness.

It would seem,

is

is a

then, that the most

desirable state to attain with regard to one's emotions

is a

state

in which one does not need to struggle against them--a

state

in which one is the master of one's emotions.

This is

certainly suggested in the following passage, already
familiar from Chapter 1:
Since virtue

is based on inner freedom,

positive command to man,

it contains a

namely to bring all his

capacities and inclinations under his

(reason's)

control and so to rule over himself, which goes beyond
forbidding him to let himself be governed by his
feelings and

inclinations

(the duty of a p a t h y ): for

unless reason holds the reins of government in its own
hands, man's feelings and
over him
As I stressed

inclinations play the master

(DV:408).
in Chapter 1, for reason to be master over

one's feelings and inclinations is for reason to govern them
without playing the tyrant

(see also DV:407).
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Because not

all emotions are hostile to reason's moral ends,
emotions must be fought or suppressed.

not all

Only those emotions

which are opposed to moral ends must be fought; emotions
which are favorable to moral ends are not,
themselves,
to be good

bad;

quite on the contrary,

in and of

Kant considers them

(R:51).

All this suggests that mastery over one's emotions

is

necessary only with regard to those emotions which are
morally harmful.

The upshot

is that we do not need to

struggle against all our emotions,

but only against those

opposed to moral ends; and, moreover,
engaged such a struggle,
Since success

we should not try to hide it.

in this struggle

is a strength of will, as

measured by the magnitude of obstacles
(DV:394)--it

that when we are

it can overcome

is nothing we should try to hide,

instead be proud of.

but should

But Kant also stresses that "men

should not make a display of their worthiness to be happy"
(DV:457),

which suggests that

it would be morally

distasteful to advertise the successful outcome of one's
private moral battles.
emotions,

A struggle against recalcitrant

however, does not presume a successful outcome.

Giving honest expression to the struggle itself

is not in

bad moral taste;

it is only advertising one's success that

is distasteful.

Take the person who has an unduly strong

sense of humility.

If her facial expressions were to reveal

her struggle to take a compliment
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in proud fashion--say,

her

saying "Thank you" with a modest smile and averted eyes--we
wouldn't take this to be in bad taste.

But if she were to

tell ail her acquaintances about how much better she feels
since she regained her self-respect,

we would not only find

her pathetic but would also come to doubt whether she had
actually gained any self-esteem at all

(a person sure of her

successes does not need to advertise them).
Emotions

favorable to moral ends need not be fought,

but we do need to ensure that they receive proper expression
so that they do not degenerate into emotions which are
morally harmful.

Proper pride in one's unconditional worth,

for example, can degenerate
from others a respect

into arrogance,

it denies them"

degeneration can take place

which "demands

(DV:465).

in a number of ways,

This
but a

prominent one involves expressing one's proper pride in a
way which is inappropriate--especially when others, due to
their politeness,

do not let it be shown that this

expression is inappropriate.
abstract,

Since this is somewhat

I will make it more concrete--first by considering

how Kant himself contrasts proper pride with arrogance, and
then by drawing some conclusions of my own concerning the
process by which pride might degenerate

into arrogance.

This will also provide an occasion to discuss the important
dignity-feeling of proper pride.
Proper or "noble" pride,
often calls

it, consists

or love of h o n o r . as Kant

in "self-esteem;
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man must not

appear unworthy in his own eyes; his actions must be
keeping with humanity itself

if he is to appear

eyes worthy of inner respect"

(LE:125).

in

in his own

In the Lectures on

E t h i c s , he goes so far as to say that love of honor should
motivate us in all our actions

(LE:191).

Since this

motivating capacity is merely n e g a t i v e i t

is dictated

merely by our desire not to become a object of contempt"
(LE:187)--it

is not surprising to see Kant,

in the Doctr ine

of V i r t u e . assigning love of honor the role of helping us
avoid the indignities brought upon us by violating our
perfect duties to ourselves
nature, by lying,

(e.g., by selling our physical

by being servile,

would seem that love of honor alone

etc.)

(DV:420).

But it

is not sufficient to

make us carry out our imperfect duties, which leave it up to
us to decide when and how to fulfill them.

Refraining from

helping someone at a particular occasion does not bring any
great

indignity upon us as long as we have the basic maxim

to help some people somet i m e s . 20

We seem therefore to

need something more than a

desire not to become an object of

contempt to motivate us to

carry out our imperfect

duties.

In the G r o u n d w o r k . perhaps for this reason, motivation by
love of honor

is supplanted by motivation by respect for the

2°Effeetively carrying out our duties of love toward others,
in particular, might require more than sheer love of honor, even
when the latter is
taken as a positively motivating
feeling: it
might require love of man and not love of honor.
In Chapter 4, I
will show
that love of man is indeed part of the motive of duty:
itis
the way that respect for
the moral law manifests itself in
the morally mature agent as she carries out her duties of love.
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law.

But even as late as 1797

af. Virtue was published),

(the year that the Doctrine

love of honor retains the

negatively motivating role that Kant originally assigned
Love of honor

it.

is in effect what ensures that we do not

compromise our dignity;

that we maintain self-respect in our

own eyes and do not give up our dignity in comparison with
others

(D V :46 5).

But love of honor

is not only an internal stance.

It

is always concerned with one's character before the world at
large.

Honor,

appears.

says Kant,

is "the goodness of conduct as. it

It is not enough that our conduct should be good:

it must appear as good before the eyes of others"
my emphasis).
our duties

(LE:190,

It is therefore not enough merely to fulfill

in order to maintain our self-respect;

also do so in a way which others can approve of.
by making ourselves an example for others:

we must
We do so

"each of us must

see to it, not merely that our actions provide a negative
example by containing nothing evil, but that they set a
positive example by the presence of some real good
Our actions must not only be good;
examples before the eyes of others"

in them.

they must also be set as
(LE:191).

The question immediately arises as to what Kant means
by

claiming that our actions must not only contain no evil,

but also "some real good."
moral worth,

On Kant's mature conception of

the "real good" which our actions must contain

is motivation by duty.

But how can we let others know that
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our actions are motivated by duty when we cannot show others
our motives and they are opaque even to us?

The most

obvious way to indicate that our actions have moral worth,
suggest

(and defend more closely in Section IV),

out of our way to fulfill our duties.

I

is by going

Helping others

in

situations where this constitutes an inconvenience for us is
one way of showing purity of motive--or at least that we
have the right maxim and are prepared to act on it.
way to indicate purity of motive
duties--refraining from lying,
contempt,

Another

is to heed our perfect

from treating others with

etc.--in especially noble ways, e.g, by making a

difficult confession or by forgiving an enemy whom we would
rather treat with contempt.

These,

then, are ways of making

ourselves an example for others.
We are now in a position to consider how a morally
valuable emotion can degenerate

into a morally harmful one

if it does not receive the proper expression.
can degenerate

into lust for honor

wrong way--in particular,

Love of honor

if we express

it in the

if we seek to compel the approval

of others instead of trusting in our own merits and allowing
others to judge them freely (LE:188).
the difference between love of honor
for honor

Kant characterizes
(pride proper) and lust

(arrogance) as follows:

The lust for honor
noticed.

implies an arrogant demand to be

We never object to the love of honor,

the lust for honor we do object.
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but to

The love of honor

is

modest,

never becoming a lust;

it is anxious for the

respect of all and to escape contempt.
lust,

Changed to a

it demands uncommon and inordinate honor.

gain the preference of others,

To

the ambitious man sets

out to force the judgments of his fellows to his own
opinion.

But since the judgments of others with

respect to ourselves are free, the grounds

for

respecting us must be such that the judgments of others
follow necessarily from them.

A man who lusts after

honor seeks to compel the judgment of others, by
demanding their esteem,
himself ridiculous.

and

He encroaches upon our rights and

drives us to resist him.
sole desire

in doing so he makes

But the man of honor whose

is to be respected by his fellows, and not

to be held in contempt,

gains our respect; and the more

worthy he is of it and the less arrogant,
eager we are to respect
There

the more

him (LE:188).

is a fine line between

the proper demand to

make

oneself an example and the arrogant demand to be noticed.
Our eagerness to gain the respect of others must never
overtake a respect
judgments about us.

for the right of others to form free
The love of honor demands that we make

an example of ourselves,

but

if we do so in the wrong way,

we are flirting with arrogance.
people who are

interested

in

If,

for example,

we tell

our accomplishments (e.g., our

relatives) about them, we may be
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living up to our

proper

pride,

but if we brag about them to everyone, we allow our

pride to degenerate

into arrogance.

It is easy for our love

of honor to exceed healthy bounds because others are usually
too polite to inform us that we are bragging or that we seem
to have too high an opinion of ourselves.
To prevent our love of honor from degenerating into
arrogance,
respect

we have to express our desire to gain others'

in the right way.

for our feelings

Finding appropriate expression

is thus one way in which judgment helps us

cultivate them and keep them within their proper bounds.
I hope,

in this section,

to have shed some light on

Kant's view of what it is to cultivate one's feelings
accordance with the idea of one's dignity.
first,

in

To do so is,

to develop an appropriate attitude about the feeling,

given one's temperament and one's moral strengths and
weaknesses.

This

involves attuning one's judgement to the

workings of the feeling and to how it figures in one's
particular character,
which it sways one.

being especially attentive to ways in
It also involves finding appropriate

express ion for feelings which can be put to a moral use.
The latter is not merely a matter of training our judgment
and attuning our perception;

it is a matter of refining the

feeling itself through engaging in society and in culture.
In the next and final section,

I will consider two

character types sketched by Kant himself,
different strengths and weaknesses,
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each with

and will

illustrate how

the moral

improvement of each character might unfold.

These

studies will bring home the intensely personal nature of the
process of cultivating our feelings with an eye to moral
ends.

I will also suggest

(with a moral-psychological story

here and with more detailed textual evidence

in Chapter

4)

that although the necessity with which duty binds us is
always stern and uncompromising,
always experienced this way.
morally mature agents,

The way in which we, as

fulfill our duties towards ourselves

in a morally worthy way (i.e.,
differs

the motive of duty is not

from the motive of duty)

from the way in which we would do so as moral

novices--that

is, as newly converted sinners or as morally

inexperienced

individuals

(e.g.,

teenagers)

who are just

embarking on road to self-improvement and who must therefore
struggle extensively with their sensible natures.
morally mature

individual

fulfills her duties toward herself

from the reason-based feelings of proper pride,
respect, and love of honor.
ways

The

self-

Since these feelings are the

in which the motive of duty man!fests itself in the

morally experienced

individual, acting from these reason-

based feelings has moral worth.
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Xya Studies ol. Cultivating

For my studies,

I will use two of the four character

types which Kant discusses
Temperament"

in the section titled

in the A n t h r o p o l o g y .

I have chosen the

sanguine and the melancholy temperaments
study;

in Chapter

temperaments.

"On

for this particular

4, I discuss the choleric and phlegmatic

Although moral

improvement in the latter two

temperaments also involves cultivating feeling,

the stories

I will tell about them are more relevant to our duties
toward others than to those toward ourselves; and since the
focus of this chapter has been on dignity-feelings
are helpful primarily,

though not exclusively,

fulfilling our duties toward ourselves),

(which

for

I have chosen the

two temperaments which need most acutely to cultivate their
dignity-feelings,

namely,

the sanguine and the melancholy.

Kant adopts his classification of temperaments
ancients,

but gives them new descriptions.

think of these temperaments?
human possibilities,

from the

How are we to

Do they exhaust the range of

or are there others as well?

Kant

seems to think they represent the only four empirical
character types there are,

since he claims that "there is no

such thing as a composite temperament" and that "if someone
claims a mixed one,
(A:156/291).

we do not know what to make of him"

But I think many of us will recognize aspects

of ourselves in all of them.

Kant may be right about others
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not knowing what to make of us in such a case--after all, we
often don't know what to make of ourselves!
It is important to note that Kant

intends to describe

only the sensible aspects of a person's character,
their moral

implications;

and that

whatever

it is possible for each

of these temperaments to develop a moral character
154).

As we will see,

however,

person's character have moral

(A:151,

the sensible aspects of a

implications:

Kant takes a

person's way of sensing to Include her attitude toward her
moral strengths and flaws.
Since Kant's descriptions of the temperaments are rich
in dramatic value,

I quote them in full.

considering the sanguine temperament,

I begin by

which Kant describes

as follows:
Tiia Sanguine Temperament a i the Volatile Man
A sanguine person manifests his way of sensing, and can
be recognized,

by the following traits:

and full of hope;

he attaches great

thing for the moment,
it another thought.

he is carefree

importance to each

and the next moment may not give
He makes promises

is all honesty,

but fails to keep his word because he has not reflected
deeply enough beforehand whether he will be ale to keep
it.

He is good-natured enough to help others,

is a bad debtor and always asks for extensions.
a good companion,

jocular and high-spirited,

reluctant to take anything seriously (Vive
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la

but he
He is

who is

b a g a t e l l e ! ) and all men are his friends.
rule,

not a bad fellow;

convert,

but he is a sinner and hard to

who regrets something very much indeed,

soon forgets this regret
affliction).
himself

but

(which never becomes an

Business wears him out, and yet he busies

indefatigably with mere play;

change and perseverance
The sanguine character

is not

something "very much

for play involves

in his line

(A:153-4).

is obviously not the kind to fall

prey to a tyrannical conscience,

a f f l i c t i o n ."

He is, as a

for although he may regret

indeed," his regret "never becomes an

A study of this character type

is thus not

likely to illustrate the struggle with a tyrannical
conscience--but we shall have an abundance of that struggle
in our next character type.
sanguine character
is not evil,

What is most notable

in the

is his utter disregard for principle.

He

but he fails to see how his earnest ways,

juxtaposed with his failure to keep his promises,

make

others think of him as an unreliable charlatan of low moral
fiber.

His ways make people lose their respect

for him.

When this person finally notices he has lost the
respect of others--when he find himself suddenly and
inexplicably alone--he will certainly be puzzled by how this
came to be.

For he does, after all,

have the morally

beneficial traits of sociability and beneficence.

Even if

it is only through his sense of humor that he pleases
people,

he still knows he makes them happy.
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But why do they

consider him a disposable entertainer?

He slowly comes to

realize that loving people or their company is not enough to
gain their respect:
of honor.

one's deeds must testify to one's love

What this person needs

sense of dignity.

is a sense of pride, a

If he had pride,

he would take greater

pains to stand by his word, and people would respect him-take him seriously instead of thinking of him as a goodnatured charlatan.

By cultivating his sense of pride,

he

comes to understand what it means to live up to the demands
of morality:

that it is not only something one does because

a universal law demands

it, but also something one does to

preserve one's own dignity.
Since it is unlikely that the sanguine man will be able
to bring himself to act from principle right away--his
nature

isn't that way;

the moment--the
word not because

he is too swayed by the feeling of

feeling of pride will make him stand by his
it is his duty to do so but because

it

marks the dignity and unity of character which wins the
respect of others.

Through pride,

accordance with principle.
cultivate his pride,

he comes to act in

But once he has begun to

he has already set himself on the

course to morally worthy action.

For the mode of thought

which accompanies pride is conducive to cultivating the
motive of duty.

In what follows,

his moral strengths

(notably,

I will show that by using

his love of others)
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in

combination with his newly won pride,

the sanguine person

cultivates the duty-motive.
Clearly not all forms of pride are compatible with the
duty motive: arrogance,
because

for instance,

leads to immorality

it involves thinking of oneself as more worthy than

others--as someone who has the right to make herself an
exception to the rule.

Proper pride,

by contrast,

involves

feeling one's own unconditional worth and seeing that others
also have this worth.
at the outset,
of mind.

Since the sanguine person lacks pride

he is not likely to develop an arrogant frame

But how does even a sense of proper pride help him

cultivate the motive of duty?

Proper pride

primarily an attitude toward oneself,
involves respect for the moral
agents.

is after all

while the duty motive

law and for all other moral

I suggest that by combining his newly won pride

with his natural sociability,

the sanguine person begins to

cultivate his respect for the moral
him think of himself as an end

law.

in himself.

His pride makes
His

inclination

to love others prepares him to put himself in their position
and so to think of them,

too, as ends

in themselves.

The

result is a strengthened respect for the source of
humanity's unconditional worth--for the moral

law itself.

By thus exploiting his dispositions of feeling,
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the sanguine

person increases the likelihood that he will act from the
motive of d u t y . 21
I now turn to the melancholy character,

which Kant

describes as follows:

Tilfi. M e l a n c h o l y Temperament Q.L the Grave Man
A man disposed
melancholia,

melancholy

(not one afflicted with

which is a state and not merely a tendency

toward a state) attaches great
that has to do with himself.

importance to everything
He finds grounds for

apprehension everywhere and directs his attention first
to the difficulties

[an undertaking involves],

the sanguine temperament,

on the other hand,

of success as its starting point.

just as

takes hope

So the melancholy

temperament thinks deeply, as the sanguine thinks only
superficially.

Such a man is slow to make promises,

for keeping his word

is dear to him but he is doubtful

whether he can do it.

Not that all this takes place

from moral grounds

(for we are speaking here of

sensuous incentives).

It is rather that the opposite

inconveniences him, and just because of this makes him
apprehensive,

suspicious and doubtful, and thereby also

insusceptible to gaiety.

--Moreover,

this cast of mind,

21 It should be understood
that actions from mixed moti ve s—
say, from both a
feeling of sympathy and
respect for the
moral
law--are morally
worthy, since
the thought
of duty
is present
among
the
motivating
influences.
By strengthening
feelings
compatible
with the
duty motive, we
train ourselves
to think
along
the lines
of duty and so
make it more likely
that the
latter will accompany actions from those feelings.

196

if it is habitual,

conflicts at least in its impulse

with a philanthropic disposition,
lot of the sanguine temperament;
himseIf do without joy will
begrudge

it to others

which is rather the
for a man who must

find it hard not to

(A:154).

In contrast to the sanguine character, who is courageous to
the point of rashness,
which he later

jumping

into situations and promises

fails to live up to, the melancholy person

lacks the courage required to be generous and to make
promises.

The effort

involved in keeping a promise

"inconveniences" him; and since he is at bottom an
unsociable character,

he would prefer to stay out of

dealings with other people altogether.
He has certain dispositions which can be developed
moral strengths.
his own powers,

into

One is his innate apprehensiveness about
which makes it easy for him--once he has

adopted the basic intention to be moral--to reflect on the
severity of moral requirements and on the difficulty of
living up to them.

His problem,

the courage and even the desire
other people)

of course,

is that he lacks

(because of his dislike for

to put any of his reflection into action.

is plagued by "the s e l f - t o r t u r e r 's torment"

He

(A:156), which

locks him up in himself and keep him from enjoying the
pleasure of other people.

He is paralyzed not just by se l f 

doubt but also by a general apathy towards other people.
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This man needs courage
to begin to take pleasure

in order to trust himself enough

in life through action and through

learning to like other people.

It is because he fails to

enjoy himself that he begrudges others their pleasure and to
feels no responsibility toward them.

His failure to enjoy

himself probably stems from a combination of fear and a
tyrannical conscience.

His conscience may be corrupt,

judging by false moral principles

(e.g., on the standard of

whether something constitutes an inconvenience to him),
its main feature

is that

it is overactive,

brood too much and act too little.

but

causing him to

His fear of public

exposure not only makes him neglect his duties toward
others,

but probably also makes him neglect his talents,

depriving himself of the challenges which constitute one of
the greatest pleasures

in life

(LE:175).

As we saw in Part III, the way to combat a tyrannical
conscience
act

is to cultivate the feelings which dispose you to

in ways which redeem the actions

which you incurred your guilt.

through

The feeling which the

melancholy person needs to cultivate
courage to enter society,

(or inaction)

is courage.

Had he the

he would learn to like people and

would thus strengthen his love of man.

He would also

overcome the fear of failure which prevents him from
exercising his sense of honor
because

(which is present

in him

"keeping his word is dear to him") and from

cultivating his talents.

There are many ways to cultivate
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courage,

but the main one

embarrassment.

This

is simply learning to face

is certainly a great inconvenience, and

it is therefore unlikely that the melancholy man will choose
this course of action.
inconvenience,

But self-torture

is also an

and the catalyst to self-change

in the

melancholy man will be his throwing off his self-imposed
misery.
In order to embark on the road of moral

improvement,

the melancholy man must first recognize his self-doubt and
lack of concern for others as moral

f ai li ng s .

He can do so

only by adopting the basic intention to be virtuous.
he has formed the basic intention to be moral,

Once

he can begin

to identify the character traits he needs to combat within
himself.

Given the tyrannical nature of his own conscience

(whether corrupt or not),

he will readily come to recognize

his weaknesses--for which he already condemns himself,
whether
But

for the right reasons or not--as moral weaknesses.

intention does not amount to action; and the motive of

duty in this newly converted "ex-sinner" may not yet be
strong enough to actually move him,
situations,

to action.

That

in particular

is, the motive of duty may not

yet be influential enough within his character

for him to

choose to act on it rather than on his moral failings.

His

moral failings--for example, his unfriendly disposition-will

lead him to stray from his intention to be virtuous,

will lead him to nonbeneficence and neglect of his talents.
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Since he already has the power to reflect on his
actions and their

implications,

for him a fairly easy task.

assessing his character

is

A respect for the moral law and

an awareness of the difficulty of living up to it are
already present
his intentions

in him; what he lacks is the power to put
into act i o n .

By using his moral strength--

his deep reflective capacities--the melancholy man can
become more attentive to ways

in which he can take an

interest in other people and so cultivate a genuine concern
for others,

a love of man.

friendship and in socirty.

He might do so by engaging in
If he is painfully shy, he might

have to cultivate his courage, and he might do so by
engaging in sports
since

(personally,

I started Tae Kwon Do).

I've felt more courageous
As I will show

in Chapters 4

and 5, friendships and social contexts provide the setting
within which we reflect on and begin to cultivate our
morally beneficial feelings.

Conclus ion

The overarching theme of this chapter was the sense of
dignity required
exclusively,

for us to carry out, primarily though not

our duties toward ourselves.

feelings I have discussed are proper pride,
and courage.
these

The main dignitylove of honor,

I have tried to show how cultivating each of

feelings strengthens our sense of dignity and the
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motive of duty itself as
toward ourselves.

it manifests

itself in our duties

I have also suggested that these "moral"

feelings are powerful tools for cultivating other emotions
in accordance with the idea of our dignity:

that by

combining a given feeling with any of the three dignityfeelings,

we cultivate that particular

feeling in such a way

that it stays within morally proper bounds.
I also discussed the workings of conscience and the
problems which arise from the ever-present possibility of
developing a tyrannical,

overactive conscience.

a solution to the problem:

I proposed

cultivating feelings which

counteract the dispositions of which we disapprove helps
clear the guilty conscience,

insofar as these feelings help

us act in ways which rectify the original vice and also
insofar as these feelings are accompanied by attitudes which
are morally informed.
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Chapter 4_l
Feelings Associated with Qur Duties Toward others

In this chapter, I focus on the feelings associated
with our duties toward others.

Kant divides these duties

into two categories: duties of love (beneficence, gratitude
and sympathy) and duties of respect (avoiding arrogance,
defamation and ridicule).

The chief difference between them

is that "no one is wronged if duties of love are neglected;
but a failure in the duty of respect infringes upon a man's
lawful claim" (DV:464).

Putting aside for now the question

of why "no one is wronged" when we fail to help, to be
grateful or to be sympathetic, I want to consider what,
exactly, man's "lawful claim" is.
Seeing others as less worthy than ourselves, defaming
them, and ridiculing them are ways of violating the dignity
that each person is entitled to— ways of denying them the
unconditional worth man is "authorized to put upon himself"
as a bearer of humanity (DV:449).1 That is why a duty of
respect is "a duty that is owed" (DV:448): fulfilling it is
something we owe other people qua ends-in-themselves.

Since

a duty of respect is a duty of not encroaching on another
person's "lawful claim," it is "analogous to the duty of
Right not to encroach upon what belongs to anyone" (DV:449-

1For an explanation of why humanity is an end-in-itself, see
Chapter 4, opening pages.
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50); the difference between our duties toward others in the
Doctrine of virtue and those in the Doctrine of Right is
that the latter can be externally enforced, while fulfilling
our duties of respect (all duties of virtue) is largely a
matter of developing the proper attitude toward them— an
attitude of "not exalting oneself above others" (DV:449).
I will argue that developing a respectful attitude
toward others involves cultivating not only feelings of
respect toward them but also feelings of love.
Kant claims that love and respect toward others "are
the feelings that accompany the carrying out" of our duties
toward others (DV:448).

Since he divides these duties into

duties of love and duties of respect, one might think that
love is needed to fulfill our duties of love but not our
duties of respect, and respect is needed to fulfill our
duties of respect but not our duties of love.

However, it

becomes clear that Kant thinks love and respect have to work
in tandem for us adequately to fulfill these duties.

He

says, for instance, that we need to "throw the veil of love
of man" over people's faults in order to soften our
judgments of them and so to avoid the temptation to defame
them when it might arise (DV:465).

Love and respect, in

other words, "accompany" the fulfillment of all our duties
toward others.
This claim— that love and respect "accompany" the
fulfillment of our duties of love and respect toward others203

-can be interpreted in two ways.

We can interpret love and

respect as feelings which are instrumental to the
performance of these duties.

This harmonizes with the

account of morally beneficial feelings I've given so far,
and Kant clearly does believe that we will be better
prepared to fulfill our duties towards others if we
cultivate feelings of love and respect toward them.

But I

shall also show that Kant considers love and respect to be
indispensable to the adequate fulfillment of these duties
because they enable the duty-motive (reverence for the moral
law) to express itself in a direct and heartfelt concern for
the dignity and well-being of others.

Love and respect, I

shall argue, are the ways in which the duty-motive manifests
itself in the morally mature agent— the individual who has
had the time and occasion to cultivate the proper attitudes
toward others through developing her social graces, engaging
in culture, etc.

Ll. Ben e f icence;

How

Related t c Benevolence?

Kant is quick to point out that since we cannot be put
under obligation to have feelings, we have no duty to feel
love toward others (DV:449).

Nevertheless, we have a duty

to cultivate feelings of love and sympathy toward others
because these feelings help us more effectively carry out
204

our duties of love (DV:402, 456).

The love of mankind which

morality requires of us from the outset, however, is not a
feeling of love or a pleasure in other people, but rather
"the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results in
benificence" (DV:449, first emphasis mine).

Morality

requires that we take an interest in others' ends and be
willing to help them whenever we are able.
Kant is actually somewhat misleading in claiming that
there can be a maxim of benevolence. since maxims are
"subjective principles of action" (G:422n) and benevolence
is more an inner attitude of well-wishing than an intention
to act in certain ways (that is why he contrasts benevolence
with beneficence in the first place). When we are
benevolent, we take an interest in another person's ends,
though not necessarily an active one: it is well for us when
things go well for others, even if we are not directly
responsible for their well-being (DV:450, cf. 452, 460).
While benevolence can issue in beneficence— in actively
promoting the ends of the other (DV:450)— it is also
possible, from a sense of duty, to do someone a favor whom
we neither like nor wish well (DV:402).

In other words, it

is possible to be beneficent without being benevolent.
What, then, is morally required of us— benevolence,
beneficence or both?
Beneficence— actively promoting the ends of others,
provided these ends are morally permissible— is a duty
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(DV:450, 452).

In adopting a maxim of beneficence, we

resolve to help others through action.

But what about

benevolence, the attitude of sincerely wishing that it go
well for others?
stance?

Are we required to adopt this inner

Kant suggests we are when he says that "benevolence

always remains a duty, even toward a misanthropist, whom one
cannot love but to whom onecan still do good" (DV:402).
But here he is not claiming that it is our duty to wish
others well whom we do not like; he is only claiming that

it

is our duty to dQ them goodeven when we cannot love them.
So what Kant means by "benevolence" here is actually
beneficence or active benevolence.

He suggests that the

latter is all that morality can require of us when he says
that our duties of love involve an "active, practical
benevolence (beneficence), making the well-being and
happiness of others my end" (DV:452).

Since ends are what

we adopt as goals of action, it seems that acting
benevolently, and not necessarily developing a particular
attitude toward people, is all that morality requires of us.
But in his discussion of our other duties of love and
of the vices directly opposed to the love of mankind, Kant
does suggest that in addition to helping others, we are also
required to adopt a benevolent attitude as well as loving
feelings toward them.

To wish others well, and if this

should prove impossible (which, we shall see, would involve
a moral failure), then at least to actively promote their
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ends, is what morality asks of us from the outset: to use
our inner sensible dispositions to cultivate an attitude of
wishing them well is what morality asks of us in the long
run.

This will become clear in my discussion of some of the

aforementioned duties and vices.

But first let us consider

what morality requires of us from the crude and possibly
unfriendly outset: benificent action.

II. The Duty of Beneficence

This is the duty "to promote according to one's means
the happiness of others in need, without hoping for
something in return" (DV:453).

Why do we have this duty and

to whom, exactly, does it extend— to those whom we think of
as "the needy" or to anyone who needs a favor or a friendly
gesture?
In the Dostfine of Virtue as well as in the Groundwork.
Kant suggests that we have a duty to help only those who are
in relatively dire need— that we need only be prepared to
satisfy people's ends of dignified survival but need not
promote whatever morally permissible ends they might have.
This interpretation is suggested by Kant's repeated emphasis
on the needy (Menschen in Noten) in his examples and
derivations of the duty of beneficence (see DV:453, G:398,
423).

This suggests that Kant is referring primarily to
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people who are suffering, financially needy, or physically
or mentally impaired.

Such people are in need of fairly

radical sorts of helping action.

If this is the case, then

the duty of beneficence could require me to be charitable—
for instance, to take a financially strapped friend out for
a meal once in a while— but not to support the same friend
in whatever morally permissible projects he might have (I
would not, for instance, be required to encourage or support
him in his fledgling attempts at musical expression).
Onora O'Neill has interpreted the duty of beneficence
more broadly, as asking us not only to promote people's
basic ends of dignified survival but also to help them in
whatever morally permissible projects they might need our
help in completing.

At least she suggests this much in her

reconstruction of Kant's derivation of the duty, which I
here paraphrase.

As agents— that is, as setters and

realizers of ends— we necessarily will the fulfillment of
all our ends.

But if we rationally intend an end, then we

also intend to pursue the means by which we can realize it.
As finite beings, however, we are not completely selfsufficient.

Since, at some point in our lives, we will need

the help of others to realize some of our ends (just as each
of us has, in the past, already relied on the help and care
of others), we cannot coherently will that others not help
us.

(Indeed, without such help from others we wouldn't even

be here.)

But the maxim of relying on the help of others is
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not universalizable unless we are also prepared to help
them.

We must, in other words, be prepared not only to

receive the help and support of others, but also to help and
support them when needed.

Thus we have a duty to help

others.3
O'Neill's reading suggests that we have a duty to
promote whatever permissible ends others need help in
achieving.

The actions required under the duty thus

interpreted would clearly extend beyond helping the
suffering; they would also include helping whomever might
need our help in pursuing the projects which are important
to them.

At first sight, O'Neill seems to be stretching

Kant's intended use of "needs."

Recall that Kant's own

discussion of the duty of beneficence suggests that he is
referring primarily to the needs of the needy— the
suffering, the financially strapped, or the physically or
mentally impaired.

If so, then O'Neill is overextending

Kant's use of "needs" to include needs which are less basic
than those which Kant himself intended.

Kant seems to have

intended only those needs which must be secured for
dignified survival; O'Neill, by contrast, seems to include
more "luxurious" needs such as emotional needs and the need
for support in one's personal development.3

aO'Neill, Constructions of Reason (hereafter referred to in
the text as "O'Neill, CR"), pp.100-1, 114-15, 140-41.
3A least she suggests this much at CR, p.39, footnote 13.
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A duty to enable the needy to survive in a dignified
way can be seen as deriving from the requirement that we
respect their status as ends in themselves— as rational
beings possessing an inherent dignity.
promote people's ends

But a duty to

such, provided they are morally

permissible, seems to require that we value their happiness
and not just their rationality.

What sort of reasoning lies

behind the apparent logical leap from the duty to respect
others as ends in themselves to the duty to promote their
happiness?

O'Neill offers the following passage from Kant:

Now humanity could no doubt subsist if everybody
contributed nothing to the happiness of others but at
the same time refrained from deliberately impairing
their happiness.

This is, however, merely to agree

negatively and not positively with humanity as an end
in itself unless everyone endeavors also, so far as in
him lies, to further the ends of others (G:430; I use
O'Neill's translation from CR, p.140).
Kant is here suggesting that we would fail to respect
people's status as ends-in-themselves if we merely refrained
from interfering with their ends; that in addition to
tolerating their ends, we must also promote them by adopting
them as our own.

He offers nothing by way of argument to

support this conclusion.

Indeed, the conclusion seems

entirely unwarranted given Kant's characterization of what
it is to be an end-in-itself. An end-in-itself, he says, is
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"an end which should never be acted against and therefore
one which in all willing must never be regarded merely as a
means but must always be esteemed at the same time as an
end" (G:437).4 The requirement that we always treat people
as ends and never merely as means is here treated as
equivalent to the requirement that we never act against
people's status as ends in themselves.

The obvious

interpretation of this requirement as it bears on other
people's ends is that we treat people as ends-in-themseIves
by esteeming or respecting their ends.

It does not

obviously follow, however, that respecting someone's ends
involves adopting and promoting them.
O'Neill tries to use the notion of finite rational
agency to connect the requirement of treating humanity as an
end-in-itself with that of promoting other people's ends.
Finite rational agency, she says, is vulnerable and must
above all be preserved (that much is clearly required by the
formula of the end-in-itself).

She goes on to argue:

'On Kant's view, people are ends in themselves because they
are the potential vessels of a good will. The good or moral will
is the only thing in the world which is unconditionally valuable or
good (G :393—4). Since the good will is instantiated in all willing
that is moral and not merely legal, the good will effectively wills
itself and therefore also its own condition of possibility,
rational nature (distinguished from the rest of nature by its
capacity to set itself an end).
Humanity is rational nature;
therefore, humanity is an end in itself (G:437).
Since moral
willing is characterized by respect for the moral law and for our
capacity to legislate it, the good will constitutes "the proper
object of respect" and humanity, insofar as it embodies a will that
is potentially good, possesses an inherent dignity (G:440).
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Simple restraint from using other finite beings as mere
means may not be enough to secure their agency. If
vulnerable sorts of agency are to be developed and kept
intact, the bearers of such fragile capacities for
action may also need help in achieving certain
subjective ends....Only by making the ends of others to
some extent our own do we recognize others' agency
fully, and acknowledge that they are initiators of
their own projects as well as responders to our
projects, and moreover vulnerable and non-self
sufficient initiators of projects.

That (I think) is

the point of the idea that we should agree "positively"
with humanity as an end-in-itself. (O'Neill, CR, p.140)
The idea here is that we could effectively undermine
people's agency by failing to support their projects.
O'Neill's assumption is that people's very capacity for
agency depends on things going well for them; that "when
things go badly their very capacity for agency fails" (CR,
p.139, footnote 13).

If this is true, then respecting

people's humanity does indeed entail promoting their ends.
But is it true?

A person's ability to set ends is

clearly not affected by how things are going for him— the
most miserable pauper, despite his condition, is still able
to set ends for himself.

His ability to realize his ends,

however, in so far as he does not possess the requisite
financial or physical means to do so, is clearly affected by
212

his condition.

Even a person who is psychologically in a

bad way (say, in a period of self-doubt or mourning) might
find his capacity to realize ends detrimentally affected by
his psychological state— he might find that the projects
which were once important to him now seem meaningless.

Such

persons are clearly in need of help in pursuing their
projects.
needy.

But those persons are physically or mentally

It is not immediately apparent that we could help

undermine a healthy person's capacity for agency if we
failed to support her in her various projects.5 There is
nothing in O'Neill's argument, in other words, that implies
that we have a duty to help those who are not in a bad way.6
5What about an individual who is extremely sensitive to the
opinions which others hold of her projects?
Would not such a
person's capacity for agency be undermined if we failed to support
her in her projects? It seems that this is the sort of "healthy"
person O'Neill has in mind when she says that people's very
capacity for agency depends on things going well for them; that
"when things go badly their very capacity for agency fails" (CR,
p.139, footnote 13). I am not sure, however, that Kant would hold
that we have a duty to pamper sensitive souls.
His ethics is,
after all, a hardy ethics, a doctrine that characterizes the
healthy individual as someone who is able "te put up with the
misfortunes of life" (DV:484). Meeting with misunderstanding or
disapproval of even our morally permissible projects is a common
occurrence, a "misfortune" that each of us must get used to. All
we have a right to demand from others is that they refrain from
actively undermining our agency, that is, that they not interfere
with our projects; we have no right to demand that they also
approve of them and promote them. That is why we can refrain from
helping others without accruing moral demerit (see DV:448, 450).
6In "Universal Law, Rational Being and the Kingdom of Ends: A
Reading of Groundwork II" (unpublished), Paul Guyer interprets the
Formula of the End-In-Itself as providing a positive requirement to
promote rational nature in ourselves and in others. The arguments
he offers in favor of his interpretation are suggestive but to my
mind not quite convincing, since they are all based on Kant's
discussion of duties toward ourselves and not toward others (see
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Kant's own argument in the Doctrine of Virtue for
promoting the happiness of others actually takes needs and
not ends as placing a special moral claim on us.

He says,

"every man who finds himself in need wishes to be helped by
others" (DV:453, ray emphasis) and then goes on to use this
supposedly universal wish to derive the general duty of
beneficence, construed as a duty to help the needy: "But if
he lets his maxim of being unwilling to assist others in
turn when they are in need become public, that is, makes
this a universal permissive law, then everyone would
likewise deny him assistance when he himself is in need, or
at least would be authorized to deny it.

Hence the maxim of

self-interest would conflict with itself if it were made a
universal law" (DV:453).

This argument makes no appeal to

the dignity of rational nature, but rather to the assumption
that everyone who is in need wishes to be helped by others.
I take this assumption to be dubious; Kant is appealing to a
wish that most of us may have but which can by no means be
assumed to be universal (one can easily imagine a proud
libertarian who would rather be self-sufficient than
esp. pp.27-31). Kant argues that we are required to develop our
own rational nature (our capacity for choosing and realizing ends)
because, as rational beings, we necessarily will the realization of
our present and future ends: "as a rational being, man necessarily
wills that all capacities in him be developed, since they can be
useful and are given
to him for all sorts of possible ends"
(G:423). Kant's arguments for promoting the happiness of others.
however, make no appeal to the necessary features of rational
nature but rather to the assumption that everyone who finds himself
in need wishes to be helped by others— an assumption which I find
unfounded.
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humiliated by the help of others).

If, however, the

principle behind this argument is the dignity of rational
nature and the need to preserve it, the argument gains more
plausibility: we are required to help the needy because,
like ouselves when we are needy, they are suffering the
indignity of being stunted in the exercise of their rational
capacities.

Out of respect for these capacities, we are

requied to help them back to a healthy state.
Kant therefore has an argument for why we have a duty
to help the needy survive in a dignified way: since their
very capacity for agency is reduced by their condition, we
need to help them back to a state in which they are able
again to pursue their ends on their own (a state in which
they most strongly feel their dignity).

But to make

"healthy" people's ends our own is something we cannot be
held to by the moral law, since, as we have seen, it only
requires that we respect people's ends and not, in addition,
that we promote them.

In the next section, I shall consider

quite a different reason for why we have a duty to promote
other people's happiness.

But before I do so, I want to

consider why Kant claims that beneficence produces love of
man.
Kant claims that we have a duty to cultivate
benevolence because it helps us combat the harmful
disposition of hatred of man, a disposition which "is always
hateful. even when it takes the form merely of completely
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avoiding men" (DV:402).’ One way to combat this
disposition is to help people.

For Kant thinks that even

when we do not love a person from the outset, we can come to
love him by helping him:
So the saying "you ought to love your neighbor as
yourself" does not mean that you ought immediately
(first) love him and (afterwards) by means of this love
do good to him.

It means, rather, dfi good to your

fellow man, and your beneficence will produce love of
man in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to
beneficence in general) (DV:402).
Kant's assumption is that by doing good to others, we will
come to love them.

This is of course a tenuous assumption,

given that we seem equally prone to develop feelings of
disdain or even disgust toward the people we help.

However,

on Kant's theory of agency, we have the capacity to curb
such negative feelings and to cultivate the loving feelings
which can, on Kant's assumption, equally well be produced
through beneficent action.

Kant never explains how

beneficence is supposed to produce love of man, but his idea

7Kant's claim that hatred of man is wrong not because of its
consequences but simply because it is "hateful" should alert us to
how much of his discussion of our duties is driven by a certain
vision of the good life, some elements of which follow from the
categorical imperative, while other are present because of their
intrinsic aesthetic appeal.
Some of the duties which morality
imposes on us can be fully justified only by appeal to these
aesthetic elements.
I shall show, in Section II, that for this
reason we need to take these "ornamental" elements just as
seriously as we take the categorical imperative itself.
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seems to be that our interaction with the person we help
will give us familiarity with her, will perhaps even provide
an occasion for exchanging pleasantries, and that tl* 2
patient's sense of decency (assuming she has any!) will
prompt her to show gratitude toward us.

On the whole, the

experience is likely to be amiable, and so will produce in
us some affection for the patient, will make us "love" her.
The pleasant social dimensions of the experience will
make us more disposed toward beneficence in the future; but
this natural feeling of love, even when broadened to
encompass more individuals, is not what Kant means by the
rationally based "love of man: it is simply a pleasure in
another person without a genuine concern for or willingness
to take part in her ends, including a curiosity about them
or interest in them.

I think we all know the difference

between casually uttering, "How are you doing?" (usually
pronounced, "Howya doin'?") and sincerely being curious
about the other person's condition (say, being genuiely
interested in how a difficult exam went for her, etc.).

The

latter attitude the point at which natural love becomes
tempered by a rationally based love of man ("practical
love," humanitas practical. which involves a genuine wellwishing and sincere interest in her ends— and a willingness
to promote them (DV:456).
We can also offer a more "technical" account of how
beneficence produces benevolence, understood as both a
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feeling and a disposition of wishing people well.

In order

to be beneficent, we need to make another person's ends our
own (DV:450).

In acting beneficently, therefore, we satisfy

another persons's ends as. well as our own.

Since "the

attainment of every aim rAbsicht1 is coupled with a feeling
of pleasure" (CJ:187), beneficence will by its very nature
be pleasant for us.*

But can this pleasurable result of

beneficent action really be what Kant means by a benevolent
attitude?

It can, if Kant thinks the feeling of pleasure in

question is coupled with an interest in the other person's
well-being.

We can offer the following Kantian reasons for

concluding that the pleasure produced by beneficent action
actually involves a benevolent attitude in the subject.
Through beneficence, we contribute to another person's
perfection— to her happiness, in so far as it is compatible
with morality.

Now, love of man, understood as a feeling,

is simply pleasure in another person's perfection (DV:449).
Beneficence thus produces love of man, or pleasure in
another person's perfection.

But it would seem that the

pleasure produced by beneficence must also involve a
benevolent attitude.

For we cannot take pleasure in seeing

somebody thrive whom we do not at the same time wish well;
in order to feel love toward the patient, we must also wish

•The quote I offer from the Critique q£ Judgment has "Absicht"
(purpose or intention) rather than "Zweck." which Kant normally
uses in reference to ends of action.
But the point should hold
also in regard to ends of action.
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her well.

In this sense, beneficence produces benevolence.

Whether or not this is what Kant actually had in mind for
how beneficence produces a heartfelt interest in other
people's well-being, it is at least a story which harmonizes
with his own suggestions.
In the next two sections, I will consider why morality
requires us to cultivate a loving disposition and how we can
do it.

IILi

Why Benevolence

is

Required

Us

If it is difficult to derive the duty of beneficence
from the categorical imperative, we might expect it to be at
least as difficult to derive a duty to cultivate benevolent
feelings and attitudes, given that the latter seem valuable
primarily as means to beneficent action.

At least Kant says

things which suggest that we are required to cultivate
benevolence primarily for the purpose of using it to promote
other people's happiness— either as a motive which
cooperates with the duty-motive or as a feeling which alerts
us to other people's need for help when thoughts of duty are
not present in us.’ He says, for instance, that we should
cultivate compassion because it is one of "the impulses that
’Barbara Herman suggests the former in "On the Value of
Acting from the Motive of Duty," p.15; Paul Guyer suggests the
latter in Kant and the Experience of Freedom. Ch.10, pp.389-90. I
think Kant has both in mind, as well as a third alternative which
I will suggest shortly.
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nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of
duty alone could not accomplish" (DV:457), which suggests
that compassion is valuable as a motive for beneficent
action in cases where the motive of duty somehow fails us.
He also points out that if we ask not only what a person
should do, but what he will do, love is an invaluable motive
because "what a person does unwillingly he does so poorly,
even resorting to sophistic subterfuges to evade the precept
of duty, that this latter may not be relied on very much as
a motive without the participation of love" (OH:338).10
Again, Kant is stressing the power of love to move us to
beneficence when the motive of duty should fail us.
However, as we saw in Part I— something which is also
clear from Kant's example of the unsympathetic yet
beneficent individual in Groundwork I— it is also possible
to help people without loving them.

Love is thus a

sufficient but not a necessary motive for beneficent action.
Since benevolent feelings are merely inessential means
toward beneficent action, it would seem that a duty to
cultivate such feelings is on even thinner justificatory
ground than the duty of beneficence itself.
But Kant does not view benevolent dispositions as mere
means toward beneficent action.

He also sees benevolence as

10Kant, "The End of All Things," from Kant on History, trans.
L.W. Beck, p.82 (page reference in text is to Akademie edition).
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something intrinsically valuable, something which has a
justification independent of beneficent results.

He says:

Would it not be better for the well-being of the world
generally if human morality were limited to duties of
Right, fulfilled with the utmost conscientiousness, and
benevolence were considered morally indifferent?

It is

not so easy to see what effect this would have on man's
happiness.

But at least a great moral adornment, love

of man, would then be missing from the world.

Love of

man is, accordingly, required by itself, in order to
present the world as a beautiful moral whole in its
full perfection, even if no account is taken of
advantages (of happiness) (DV:458).
Love of man, or benevolence, is not required here as a means
to promoting the happiness of others, but is required "by
itself."

Without love of man, the world would seem less

perfect, would lack "a great moral adornment."

The

difference between an aesthetic and a moral adornment is
unclear; Kant could equally well have said that the world
would lack a great adornment if it lacked love of man.

His

point is simply that love of man has an intrinsic value
which is most aptly characterized as aesthetic: it is needed
to "present the world as a beautiful moral whole in its full
perfection."

Since this passage appears at the end of

Kant's discussion of the three duties of love toward others,
which are here being contrasted with juridical duties, we
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can infer that it is also meant to apply to the duty of
beneficence; and that promoting the happiness of others—
including those who are not suffering or needy— is something
which, like benevolence, is required for its intrinsic
beauty and nobility.
What sorts of considerations might have led Kant to
claim that love of man is required (presumably as a duty)
even though it is only an aesthetic desideratum?

I think we

need here to curb our impulse to deduce everything from the
categorical imperative and, for a moment, appreciate how
much of Kant's discussion of our duties of love is driven by
a certain vision of the good life, an integral part of which
involves the desire to see people wishing each other well
and cultivating appropriate feelings toward one another.11
Although central elements of this vision follow from the
categorical imperative, other elements are present because
of their intrinsic aesthetic appeal— because of their
capacity to beautify human nature.
In his discussions of why morality requires us to
further the beauty of human nature, Kant's romantic impulse
joins with his youthful British sentimentalist streak to
produce some of the most aestheticized passages in his moral
philosophy.

He insists that a cultivated moral character

must be beautiful as well as principled, and that although
it is not our duty to possess feelings of benevolence from
“ I am grateful to Curtis Bowman for pointing this out to me.
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the outset, we are required to cultivate them because they
beautify human nature by beautifying the moral disposition
itself.

Since beauty, for Kant, inspires primarily with a

feeling of love— beauty "prepares us to love something, even
nature, apart from any interest" (CJ:267)— human nature at
its most beautiful must, for Kant, be lovely.

Benevolence

beautifies a moral character by adding to the uprightness of
a dutiful disposition a direct feeling for others which one
naturally comes to express in one's demeanor.

Through its

outward effects and expressions, it gives a beautiful glow
to virtuous action which inspires others to virtue
itself.13
That Kant locates the value of kindly dispositions
partly in their capacity to beautify a moral character will
become clear in the next section, where I discuss the
connection of benevolence to the social graces.

IV. Luxury , Social Grace and the Beautiful Character

The person who fails to recognize the importance of
beauty as well as uprightness in a moral character might be
compared to someone who fails to appreciate the capacity of
her palate for tasting subtle flavors and, when served a
meal, mixes up the meat, the vegetables and the sauce
12The latter point, which is stressed in Kant's discussion of
the social graces (which I turn to next) is strongly neo-Platonic,
and Shaftesbury might have been an influence here.
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"because it all ends up in the stomach anyway."

Like the

unrefined eater, the person who denies grace a role in
morality expresses an attitude too base and pragmatic for
man, given the capacity in human nature for refinement and
beauty.

Developing one's benevolence— the disposition of

wishing people well as well as loving and respecting them—
is the primary means for beautifying one's moral character.
The following passages on luxury are helpful in placing
the value of benevolence as an inner disposition, for its
beautifying power is much like that of luxury:
Riotous extravagance is active; [the] extravagance of
self-indulgence is indolent.

The former has its uses;

it adds vitality and vigor to life; horse-riding, for
instance, is a luxury.

But all kinds of indolent

effeminacy are very harmful; they sap the vital powers
of man; tippling, wearing silk, driving in carriages
are examples of this tendency.

The man who is inclined

to riotous extravagance preserves his own energy, as
well as that of others, but he who indulges in the
refinements of indolent comfort, though he maintains
the energy of others, discourages his own.

The former

is, therefore, preferable to the latter (LE:173).

[Luxury] promotes the arts and sciences and develops
man's talents; it thus seems to be the condition on
which humanity is designed.
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It refines morality; for

in morality both uprightness and refinement are to be
looked for; the one implies ungrudging observance, the
other adds charm to this, as, for instance, in
hospitality.

Thus luxury tends to develop to the

utmost the beauty of human nature.
confound it with self-indulgence.

We must not
Luxury consists in

variety; self-indulgence in quantity.
a sign of lack of taste.

Intemperance is

A wealthy miser who

entertains once in a while piles up the food on his
guests' plate, but gives no thought to variety.

But

luxury requires good taste, and is found only with
people who possess that quality; by its variety it
clarifies man's judgment, gives occupation to many
people and vitalizes the entire social structure.

From

this point of view, therefore, there can be no moral
objection to luxury, provided it is managed so as to
keep it within the bounds of what we can afford and
continue to afford (LE:175-6).
Even though luxuries like horse-riding develop the beauty of
human nature and vitalize society, Kant's last sentence
makes it clear that there is no special duty to be luxurious
or to cultivate the good taste required for it.
simply permissible.

Luxury is

Nevertheless, since "in morality both

uprightness and refinement are to be looked for," we do need
to take steps to add charm to our moral demeanor; and being
luxurious (when one can afford it) is one way of doing so.
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It is clear from the first passage that the refinement which
Kant is seeking is not a self-indulgent refinement, but
rather one which has a vitalizing influence on the subject
and on society as a whole.

Just as luxury vitalizes subject

and society, benevolence vitalizes a moral character by
enabling her to use her feelings to heed the call of duty
itself.
To be able to use one's feelings as guides to moral
action, one has to cultivate them.

Benevolence, respect,

and love of man are the feelings we develop through the
social graces.

Through hospitality, courtesy,

conversational ease, humor, and so forth, we naturally
develop kindly dispositions toward others— feelings which
enliven us to the world, alerting us to people's thoughts
and needs.

In other words, we cultivate our feelings in

such a way that they align themselves with moral principles,
making us more attuned to the call of duty itself.
Kant has the following to say about the power of the
social graces to add charm to the uprightness of a moral
cast of mind:
It is a duty to oneself as well as others not to
isolate oneself...but to use one's moral perfections in
social intercourse.... While making oneself a fixed
center of one's principles, one ought to regard this
circle drawn around one as also forming part of an allinclusive circle of those who, in their disposition,
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are citizens of the world— not exactly in order to
promote as the end what is best for the world but only
to cultivate what leads indirectly to this end: to
cultivate a disposition of reciprocity— agreeableness,
tolerance, mutual love and respect (affableness and
propriety, humanitas aesthetica et decorum). and so to
associate the graces with virtue.

To bring this about

is itself a duty of virtue (DV:473).
Although it is our duty to cultivate a graceful cast of
mind, Kant is quick to point out that such charming
qualities as affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality
and gentleness (in disagreeing without quarreling) are "only
externals or by-products

( parerqua)

[of virtue]" in that

they must never form the basis of virtue, which always
consists in respect for the moral law.

Nevertheless,

socially graceful behavior resembles action from a moral
disposition, beautifully carried out: the social graces
"give a beautiful illusion rpgpmhijng virtue that is also
not deceptive since everyone knows how it must be taken"
(DV:473, my emphasis).

The social graces, in other words,

give us a picture of how virtue can most beautifully be
expressed.

Indeed, they provide us with numerous occasions

for cultivating and refining our emotional dispositions to a
level at which they conform to and even become part of a
moral cast of mind.
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The normative rules governing hospitality, courtesy,
and so on are of course not purely moral rules— indeed, many
of them are not even a priori.

They are rules of social

intercourse, some of which are conditioned by the fashions
of the times butsome of
as rules of taste.

which also have a priori grounding

By providing pleasing examples of

principle-guided behavior, the social graces present a
beautiful appearance of virtue which draws people in, giving
them a "feeling" for virtue:
[The social graces]

are, indeed, only tokens, yet they

promote thefeeling

for virtue itself by a striving to

bring this illusion as near as possible to the truth.
By all of these, which are merely the manners one is
obliged to show in social intercourse, one binds others
too; and so they still promote a virtuous disposition
by at least making virtue fashionable (DV:473-4).
Even though they exemplify merely legal action (action
conforming to the moral law but not done from the motive of
duty), the graces are supposed to make virtue "fashionable"
by giving

beautiful and pleasing instances of action which

is in some sense obligatory.

Kant seems to be suggesting

that the mutual obligation involved in, say, hospitality
(the obligation on the part of the host to serve his guests;
on the part of the guests to express admiration or
appreciativeness) gives us the dynamics of virtue in a
pleasant packaging: the graces "sell" virtue, showing us
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that it can be both beautiful to behold and pleasing to
execute.
How can an illusion promote the real thing?

Kant tells

us that the social graces help us "cultivate a disposition
of reciprocity— agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and
respect (affableness and propriety, humanitas aesthetica
decorum)" (DV:473).

The question is whether such a

disposition is compatible with the motive of duty and can
join with it in a reasonably natural way.

If Kant is able

to provide a natural bridge from the disposition of
reciprocity involved in socially graceful behavior to the
virtuous disposition, he will have shown that the illusion
can indeed promote the real thing— that the graces help us
develop a virtuous disposition from which we carry out our
duties toward others both from feelings of love and in a
morally worthy way.

If this is possible, then the social

graces are indeed a training ground for virtue: they provide
a context of mutual obligation which strengthens and
develops our feelings of love and respect toward others,
producing a disposition in which a sense of obligation
combines with appropriate feelings towards others.

In Part

V, I shall show that it is indeed possible for the motive of
duty to express itself as a genuine concern others (as love
of man).

First, however, let us consider how the social

graces provide a "training ground" for virtue.
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The dynamics of mutual obligation instantiated by the
social graces correspond most clearly to those which
accompany the carrying out of our duties of love toward
others.

We might expect, then, that the disposition of

reciprocity cultivated by the social graces is relevant
primarily to our duties of love toward others.

For since

respect is something we simply owe others, carrying out our
duties of respect toward others imposes no obligation on
them; and in this sense, there is no mutual obligation
involved in our duties of respect.

Nevertheless, as we

shall see, the graces do provide instances of respectful
behavior and are in this sense conducive also to carrying
out our duties of respect towards others.
Kant stresses that in carrying out the duty of
beneficence, we need to show respect as well as love toward
the patient, for only this will truly promote her happiness.
We need to show genuine good-will without appearing
patronizing and without making the patient feel obligated
toward us (even though technically speaking, she does incur
a debt of gratitude toward us).

We need, in other words, to

give her the sweets of happiness without the bitters of
indebtedness.

We show respect for the patient's dignity by

downplaying whatever sacrifices the act might involve for us
(DV:453) and by making sure we help her according to her
conception of happiness rather than our own (DV:454).
Without feelings of love and respect toward others, we would
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have to decide how to do this according to principles alone-not just the moral law but also a cumbersome array of
empirical generalizations concerning human reactions and
preferences.

Although it is possible to decide how to act

from principles alone, feelings tell us immediately. without
extensive deliberation, how to act in a loving and
respectful way: to do so, we simply express the love and
respect we feel toward the person at the moment.13
Feelings of love and respect can help us decide not only
when to act on moral requirements (as the case of compassion
suggests) but also how to do it.
Through the social graces, we are trained to express
our feelings of love and respect toward others in a graceful
way.

Take, for instance, the case of making a joke in order

to ease the tension in a social gathering.

Even though the

“Analogously, Paul Guyer argues that according to Kant,
feelings of closeness toward others "can be used to delimit the
sphere of otherwise infinite, and therefore impractical, imperfect
duties," i.e., to bring the total sum of occasions for beneficence
to a humanly manageable quantity (Kant and the Experience of
Freedom. Ch.10, p.390). Although I agree that feelings can be used
to this end, I believe Guyer is stretching the evidence he cites
from the Critique of. Judgment in support of his claim. At CJ:169,
Kant
is attempting to
characterize
the
principle
which
distinguishes the faculty of judgment from other faculties and
makes it autonomous.
He says this principle must be a rule of
reflection and not a concept for determinant judgment because for
the latter, "another faculty of judgment would again be required to
enable us to decide whether the case was one for the application of
the rule or not." Kant is here envisioning a regress of faculties
of judgment which can be avoided only by assigning a principle of
reflection to the faculty of judgment itself.
It is thus a
principle and not a feeling which is supposed to put and end to the
regress. Although this passage might suggest something about the
role of judgment in moral deliberation, I don't think it implies
anything about the role of feeling in moral life.
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art of making jokes has "no seriousness in its presentation"
and thus belongs to agreeable rather than to fine art— and
should be estimated accordingly, i.e., not according to
rules of taste, which demand seriousness of presentation,
but according to principles of gratification, which do not
(CJ:336)— jokes still have the aim of pleasing others and
do, in so far as pleasure is an end of others, promote the
happiness of others.

In making the joke, the agent might be

moved by sympathy for the uncomfortable and tongue-tied
condition of those who are present.

But it would be

insulting to express this sympathy as sympathy: it would
underscore the embarrassing aspects of the situation and
would thus constitute a violation of social etiquette.
Through respect for the others present, the agent chooses to
express her sympathy by means of a joke, relieving the
tension in a way which appears effortless and hence imposes
no sense of obligation on the others.

Those who are present

are relieved by the joke without at the same time feeling
indebted toward the agent.

The social occasion for making a

joke thus illustrates the way in which feelings can show us
how to be beneficent without appearing patronizing.
By providing a setting in which we express our feelings
in response to a sense of obligation, the social graces
train us to execute our moral requirements in a graceful and
heartfelt way.
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V. Love of Man and the Good Will

But have we really done anything more than show that
the social graces help us conform to moral requirements?
still need toshow that the graceful

We

and aesthetic aspects

of social life are conducive to a virtuous disposition or a
good will, and hence to action which not only conforms to
moral requirements but which is also morally worthy.

We

need, in other words, to show that the disposition of
reciprocity cultivated through the social graces can become
part of the virtuous disposition itself.

In order for this

to be possible, kindly dispositions must be able to "merge"
with the motive of duty (or reverence for the moral law),
not simply bepresent along with it,
the motive of duty itself.

and even become part of

This, I shall argue, is indeed

possible, given a certain view of the motive of duty as it
manifests itself in the morally mature individual.
s morally mature agents, we fulfill our duties towards
ourselves in a morally worthy way (i.e., from the motive of
duty) differs from the way in which we do so as moral
novices— that is, as newly converted sinners or as morally
inexperienced individuals (e.g., teenagers) who are just
embarking on road to self-improvement.

In order to fulfill

our duties towards ourselves in a morally worthy a way, the
motive of duty must be effective in the sense that if
cooperating natural motives were absent, we would still have
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acted that way by the force of duty alone.

The force of

duty is certainly stern and uncompromising; but the motive
of duty, I shall show, is not.
The motive of duty is captured at its most basic level
(in moral novices) by reverence or respect for the moral
law— a feeling of constraint in the face of moral
obligations, accompanied by an awareness of the rightness
and reasonability in fulfilling them as well as by a
knowledge that we is not exempt from them because we are
able to fulfill them (See Chapter 2 for a detailed
discussion of respect for the moral law). As we strive to
become better individuals, however, our moral perception
improves in such a way that the motive of duty— a direct
concern for the rightness of our actions— can directly
manifest itself in terms of feelings other than respect for
the moral law (though a basic regard for principle and use
of it as a limiting condition is never abandoned).

In the

case of fulfilling our duties toward ourselves in a morally
worthy way, the motive of duty manifests itself in reasonbased feelings such as proper pride, self-respect and love
of honor.
The morally mature agent is someone who has not only
adopted the end of moral perfection but has also had the
time to reflect on her moral requirements and the occasion
to cultivate her feelings to conform to them.

She is able

to appreciate the structural analogies between natural
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feelings which are morally beneficial and "moral" feelings
which arise from her awareness of the moral law.

Because

she has strengthened her moral feelings by refining their
natural counterparts and vice versa, she is able to express
a direct concern for the morality of her actions in such a
way that it manifests itself in different feelings in
different situations (i.e., she fulfills her duties toward
others from love of man— from a genuine interest in others
and in their well-being— while she fulfills her duties
toward herself from a sense of proper pride).

In Chapter 3,

I suggested that this "staggered" conception of the motive
of duty (as enriching itself through a person's moral life)
fits Kant's general model of moral improvement; here, I
shall show that he must have had something like what I am
suggesting in mind.
In the following passage from the Lectures on Ethics.
Kant claims that all cultivation of feeling— he is
discussing specifically its refinement through literature—
helps us feel the "driving force of virtuous principles":
Even though [books] may overdo the charms and passions
of which they treat, yet they refine our sentiments, by
turning the object of animal inclination into an object
of refined inclination.

They awaken a capacity to be

moved by kindly impulses, and render the indirect
service of making us more civilized, through the
training of inclination.

The more we refine the crude
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elements in our nature, the more we improve our
humanity and the more capable it grows of feeling the
driving force of virtuous principles (LE:237).
If cultivated feelings make us more capable of "feeling the
driving force of virtuous principles," then they must be
part and parcel of a responsiveness to principle itself— at
least part and parcel of the sense of duty as it manifests
itself in the morally mature agent, who has had the time and
the occasion to cultivate her feelings in this way.

On this

view, which I accept and which I believe Kant also accepted
throughout his ethical writings, feelings which help us
carry out our duties can be cultivated in such a way that
they become part of the motive of duty itself.14
The Kant of Groundwork X can of course be taken to have
changed his mind about this.

In his examples of morally

worthy action, he sharply contrasts the motive of duty with
other motives, including sympathy, which he himself later
claimed to be conducive to the execution of our duties
(DV:457).

In particular, his sketches of the two beneficent

characters— one who is naturally sympathetic but, when
suddenly deadened emotionally by his own troubles, still
helps others from a sense of duty; the other who is not
naturally sympathetic but helps others because it is his
duty to do so— seem to suggest that when our concern is

14I am grateful to Cynthia Schossberger for helping me settle
on this conception of the motive of duty in the mature moral agent.
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moral worth, kindly feelings, however valuable, are
irrelevant; and that even though such feelings may accompany
the motive of duty in the performance of a morally worthy
action, they are idle in determining the action's moral
worth and the goodness of the agent's will.

This certainly

suggests that sympathetic feelings can never be part of the
motive of duty itself, let alone be relevant to the goodness
of an agent's will.
In the Groundwork and throughout his mature ethical
theory, Kant clearly holds that actions have moral worth
only when the motive of duty is effective.

But the fact

that helping actions can have moral worth even when kindly
feelings are absent does not imply that such feelings cannot
become part of the motive of duty itself.18 In his
discussion of gratitude in the Doctrine of Virtue. Kant says
that benevolent dispositions are present "in one's thought
of duty" (DV:456, my emphasis), thus clearly suggesting that
kindly feelings can— and possibly even must— be present in
the motive of duty itself.

This passage appears in the

context of a discussion of the obligation on the part of the
recipient to repay beneficence with an equivalent favor to
the benefactor or to someone else.

Kant observes that even

“Barbara Herman suggests that this is impossible when she says
that in order for an action to have moral worth, the motive of duty
must be the "primary" motive and kindly feelings, if present, must
be present as "secondary motives" ("On the Value of Acting from the
Motive of Duty," The Practice q £ Moral Judgment, p.***). Herman
thus seems to believe that feelings can never become part of the
motive of duty itself. As I will show, they can.
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though a debt of gratitude can never be fully repaid, it
must be accepted not as a burden but "as a moral kindness,
that is, as an opportunity given one to unite the virtue of
gratitude with love of man, to combine the cordiality of a
benevolent disposition with sensitivity to benevolence
(attentiveness to the smallest degree of this disposition in
one's thought of duty), and so to cultivate one's love of
man" (DV:456, last emphasis mine).
This is a dense and obscure passage, and I think it is
best interpreted in light of what Kant says about love of
man in his introduction to the Doctrine to Virtue. There,
he classifies love of man among the "subjective conditions
of receptiveness to the concept of duty," which he
characterizes as follows:
All of them are natural predispositions of the mind
(praedispositio) for being affected by concepts of
duty, antecedent predispositions on the side of feeling
raestetischl.

To have these predispositions cannot be

considered a duty; rather, every man has them, and it
is by virtue of them that he can be put under
obligation at all.

Consciousness of them is not of

empirical origin; it can, instead, only follow from
consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on
the mind (DV:399).
Love of man is an effect of our consciousness of the moral
law only if it is part of our responsiveness to duty itself.
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This clarifies our obscure passage to some degree: at least
we know that a benevolent disposition is present "in one's
thought of duty" as a natural predisposition enabling us to
be affected by thoughts of duty.
the feelings that "accompany"

Since love and respect are

(beqleiten)

the carrying out

of our duties toward others (DV:448), love and respect are
the ways in which reverence for the moral law manifests
itself in the case of our duties toward others: they are the
ways in which we feel the call of our duties toward
others.16 To cultivate benevolence, as love and respect
for others, is in this sense to cultivate the motive of duty
itself.
I have claimed that love of man is a predisposition
"for being affected by concepts of duty" in the sense that
it enables reverence for the moral law to express itself in
a direct concern for the dignity and well-being of others.
But didn't the examples from Groundwork I imply that the
motive of duty is in principle independent of benevolent
dispositions?

If so, how can love of man be a condition of

16Note Kant's distinction between respect for persons and
reverence for the moral law at DV:467-8. There, he claims that
although reverence for the moral law (Achtuna vor dem Gesetz
uberhaupt) is our duty, it is not our duty to revere other men in
general (anflere Menschen uberhaupt Z U verehren). but only to
respect them. However, he also says that "to revere the law...is
man's universal and unconditional duty toward others, which each of
them can require as the respect originally owed others" (DV:468),
which clearly suggests that respect for the moral law, in our
awareness of our duties of respect toward others, expresses itself
as a feeling of respect for others. We can infer that the same
holds for love in the case of our awareness of our duties of love
toward others.
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possibility of our very responsiveness to duty?

For that is

what Kant suggests it is when he says that it is in virtue
of love of man (among other subjective preconditions on the
part of feelings) that we "can be put under obligation at
all" (DV:399).
Let us remind ourselves, first, that love of man as a
precondition for acting on duty is "not of empirical origin"
at all, but follows instead from our consciousness of the
moral law.

Love of man must therefore be distinguished from

the natural endowment of a sympathetic character with which
Kant contrasts the motive of duty in Groundwork I. What
Kant argues in the Groundwork is that action from motives of
natural origin— that is, from motives which are not part of
a responsiveness to the moral law— has no moral worth.

But

if certain feelings are produced by our awareness of the
moral law, then they are part of the motive ofduty itself,
and action from them has moral worth.
Love and respect for others are such feelings.

Even

though it is possible to love someone apart from any moral
considerations, the structure of love as a natural feeling
is such that it can

combine

with the love of man which,

however weakly felt, is part of every person's moral
consciousness.

That is why Kant says that sexual love,

even

though it is sui generis. can still "enter into close union"
with moral love once it is placed under the limiting
conditions of practical reason (DV:426).
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Natural feelings

of love can, in other words, "combine" with the love of man
which is of moral origin.
This "combination" can take place in two ways: natural
feelings can be deepened through thoughts of duty, or the
motive of duty can itself be deepened by comparing it to
structurally analogous natural feelings.
feelings deepened by thoughts of duty?

How are natural
A love which we

initially enter into from desire matures, with time and
through reflection and self-criticism, into a rational love-a love involving a genuine interest in the ends of the
other person as well as a sense of responsibility toward the
beloved.

This mature love is characterized by a sense of

humility (tempering one's pride), patience (not being so
quick to react defensively) and an acceptance of the other
person even on his less glorious days.

These qualities—

which are all aspects of the motive of duty itself, as it
manifests itself in that particular relationship— deepen the
love itself.

Principles are thus not only factors which

condition our emotions— they also change and deepen them.
This claim, that acting from duty towards a loved one
deepens our love, can be considered a corollary to Kant's
claim that practicing beneficence towards someone we do not
necessarily love produces love in us toward the recipient
(DV:402).

Acting on principle not only brings to life

certain latent emotions, but also deepens and stabilizes
existing ones.

It is because of the fact that they are
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judgment-infused that cultivated emotions are morally worthy
motives.

Acting from a mature love— a love cultivated

through judgment and reflection— involves an awareness of
the rightness in so acting— a matter moral conviction as
well as of emotion.

A sense of duty is thus intrinsic to

acting from reflectively cultivated emotions.

Since

cultivated emotions themselves involve a sense of duty,
acting from such emotions has moral worth.17
17My account of how moral worth can attach to certain
emotionally motivated actions differs from Paul Guyer's account in
Kant and the Experience q £ Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and
Morality. Chapter 10, pp.380-1. Guyer uses the idea of different
levels of motivation to explain how an agent can act from emotion
while still being morally worthy in his intentions.
Since the
motive of duty, according to Guyer, is a wsecond-order intention
governing one's conduct rather than...a specific or first-order
intention in every action" (p.380), an agent can be considered
morally worthy for intending to do what duty requires even when
acting from feeling on specific occasions.
If the motive of
sympathy should be more effective on a given occasion, the agent
can allow himself to be motivated by it and still be considered
morally worthy because he has the general (second-order) intention
to do what duty requires of him. Although I find Guyer's idea of
levels of motivation attractive, I do not take it to be a plausible
explanation of how moral worth attaches to emotionally motivated
actions. If the motive of duty is not even strong enough to move
the agent to action on a given occasion, how can the agent be
considered to be sincere in his dutiful intention?
A closer
connection between duty and feeling is required. I have tried to
supply that connection through my claim that cultivated feelings
themselves involve a sense of duty, and that the duty-feelings can
be strengthened through reflection on and refinement of their
natural counterparts.
On my account, cultivated feelings are
themselves morally worthy motives because a sense of duty is, as it
were, built into them.
Guyer, by contrast, sees feeling as "a
fallback for those situations in which one knows that as a human
rather than holy will one might not be able to act out of the
thought of duty alone" (p.381). This claim not only rests on a
misinterpretation of Kant's idea of a holy will, which, because it
always acts on the moral law, does not experience the law as
constraining and so has no sense of duty (DV:396-7, 405, CPrR:32,
83-4), but also leaves us wondering how an agent can be said to be
sincere in his dutiful intention when he needs an emotional
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Secondly, the motive of duty can itself be deepened by
aligning it with natural feelings.

But why, first of all,

do we need to deepen our sense of duty if the motive of duty
is ubiquitous?

The motive of duty is ubiquitous in the

sense that it is always available as a motive for us to act
on, regardless

our emotional state.

Insofar as love of

man is a subjective precondition for being responsive to
moral requirements, it too is ubiquitous in this sense.

As

I showed in Chapter 1, however, Kant knows that even though
we may have adopted the basic intention to be moral, we are
often tempted to neglect and even violate our moral
requirements and are, moreover prone to deceive ourselves
about our real motives.

In order to counteract these

tendencies, we must take steps to make our awareness of duty
as compelling and heartfelt as possible so that, when

"fallback'* to carry out his duty. Only if the emotions themselves
admit of a sense of duty, and so, can be elevated to play a nobler
and purer role than being mere "fallbacks," can we explain how
moral worth can attach to emotionally motivated actions. I also
wish to supplement Guyer's account of why moral perfection (purity
of motive) is a wide or imperfect duty. Guyer attributes it to our
moral frailty, claiming that "complete moral purity is unobtainable
for us" because we do not have holy wills (p.381), and so, that
moral perfection can only remain an unattainable ideal for us. But
Kant does not deny us the possibility becoming morally pure. He
only denies that we could know that we are morally pure (see DV:447
for his claim that we could be "complete" in our virtues though we
could ever know that we were). Since we cannot be under duty to do
something of which we are incapable, we cannot have a duty to know
ourselves completely, but only to submit ourselves to relentless
scrutiny and to strive for purity in our motives (DV:392-3).
Kant's classification of the duty to moral perfection (selfknowledge and self-perfection) among imperfect duties thus rests on
the thesis of the inscrutability of our motives at least as much as
it rests on the idea of human frailty.
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presented with a temptation to stray, we will see our sense
of duty as so intimately bound up with our cultivated
sensuous character that acting immorally would be contrary
to our very identity.
It is here that natural feelings enter the picture.
Under the guidance of practical reason, we align our natural
dispositions with feelings which have their basis in the
moral law (e.g., love of man).

Given their a priori origin,

these "moral" feelings are likely to be less vibrant or
heartfelt than feelings which have a natural origin (e.g.,
sexual love). But because of their analogous structure to
that of certain kinds of natural feelings, moral feelings
can be strengthened by means of refining their natural
counterparts.

Since moral feelings are part of our very

responsiveness to moral requirements, strengthening them
amounts to strengthening the motive of duty itself.

We

strengthen the motive of duty by cultivating moral feelings,
and we do so by refining their natural counterparts under
the guidance of practical reason.

In the final section, I

will consider the choleric temperament to show how this
might take place (TO BE FILLED OUT IN FINAL VERSION].
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V I . Cultivating Moral Feelings

I begin with Kant's sketch of the choleric person.
The Choleric Temperament

ol

the Hot-Blooded Man

We say of the choleric man: he is fiery burns up
quickly like straw-fire, and can be readily appeased if
others give in to him; there is no hatred in his anger,
and in fact he loves someone all the more for promptly
giving in to him. — His activity is swift, but not
persistent. — He is active, but reluctant to undertake
business just because he is not persistent in it; so he
likes to be the chief who merely presides over it, but
does not want to carry it out himself.

So his ruling

passion is ambition: he likes to take part in public
affairs and wants to be loudly praised.

Accordingly he

loves the show and pomp of ceremony: he gladly takes
others under his wing and seems to be generous— not
from love, however, but from pride, since he loves
himself most of all. — He lays stress upon good order
and so seems to be more clever than he really is.

He

is acquisitive so that he need not be stingy; he is
courteous but ceremonious, stiff and stilted in social
relationships; he likes to have some flatterer at hand
to be the butt of his wit.

When someone stands up to

his proud pretensions he suffers even more than a miser
who meets with opposition to his avaricious claims; for
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a little caustic wit quite blows away the nimbus of his
importance, whereas the miser is compensated for his by
what he gains. — In short, the choleric is the least
fortunate of all the temperaments, since it is the one
that arouses most opposition to itself (A:154-5).
The moral strength of this character is his pride.

Since it

does not amount to "proper" pride (love of honor) but rather
to arrogance or lust for honor— manifest in his need to have
people praise and flatter him— it is clearly a strength that
has been turned into a vice.

Nevertheless, given a morsel

of humility, he would have little difficulty converting his
arrogance into an attitude of "proper" pride or selfrespect, since pride is already a highly developed
disposition in him.

He might do so by reflecting on the

moral law and realizing that it, not his wealth or social
standing, is what gives him his unconditional worth.

The

respect he will feel for the moral law will humble him, and
that will help tone down his arrogance into a proper pride.

The main moral weaknesses in this character, however,
is his inability to balance his love of others with respect
for them.

He certainly loves people, even though he does so

for the wrong reasons— for loving him— but he can hardly be
said to respect them at all, since he sees himself as being
more important than they.

How can he change this?

He is

not even fully aware of the viciousness of his disrespect
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for others unless he has already adopted the basic intention
to be moral, which alerts him to the vice and makes him
strive to avoid it in the future.

He therefore begins by

adopting a negative attitude toward his disrespect— knowing
it is a vicious tendency— and must continue by attending to
the ways in which his disrespect crops up in his treatment
of other people.
Given his flair for pomp and celebration, he is likely
to be active in society; however, his disrespect for others
makes him fail in the social graces.

He hosts dinners not

in order to entertain but to glorify himself, and he is
likely to dominate the discussion and ridicule other
people's views.

Simply engaging in society will therefore

not change him unless he attends to the ways in which the
rules of social etiquette require respectful behavior— e.g.,
disagreeing without quarreling and being grateful toward
one's hosts (for gratitude, as Kant sees it, is primarily a
stance of respect rather than love toward the benefactor;
DV:454).ia Attending to and improving his manners is one
way of cultivating his respect toward others.
He can also use his choleric temperament in favor of
morality.

Because his activity is swift (though not

persistent), he is more likely than, say, the melancholy man
to have the power to act on his moral resolutions.

He can

iaI thus disagree with Paul Guyer's claim that gratitude is a
stance of love toward the benefactor; see Guyer's discussion of
gratitude in Ch.10, Kant and the Experience of Freedom.
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use his swiftness to help others when he feels the call of
duty.

But given his lack of respect for others, he is

likely to be patronizing in carrying out his duty of
beneficence, and he is likely to fail to fulfill his duties
of respect toward others altogether.

To combat these

tendencies, he might develop feelings of respect for others
by using his active powers elsewhere (in situations in which
moral concerns are the not primary concern).

He might, for

example, engage in martial arts— which require both
swiftness and respect for one's opponent— to align his
undeveloped moral predisposition to respect others (a
disposition which exists in him through his awareness of
humanity as an end in itself) with natural feelings of
respect for his instructors and opponents.

With time, these

natural feelings will strengthen his moral feeling of
respect for others to extend to humanity in general.
Moral progress, for this person, will be difficult in
the beginning.

Because he is a moral novice, the moral law

will from the outset strike him as a stern requirement; and
the motive of duty, since it is undeveloped in him, will
from the outset be felt as purely constraining. However, as
he begins to change his ways— to be sure a difficult
process— his feelings will begin to fall in line with the
motive of duty in the ways I have described above, and he
will begin to enjoy doing his duty.

The sensible aspects of

the motive of duty itself— its "subjective preconditions"
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such as love of man— will become more developed and will
eventually allow the duty-motive to express itself in a
heartfelt disposition: a genuine love and respect for
mankind.

Sanglusion

I have attempted to show that in the morally mature
agent who has had time and occasion to cultivate her
emotions for moral ends, the motive of duty in regard to
other people expresses itself in a direct and heartfelt
concern for the dignity and well-being of others, i.e., in
love and respect for mankind.

The motive of duty can

express itself in this way because it incorporates the moral
feelings which in turn can be strengthened by cultivating
their natural analogues.

Actions which are undertaken from

cultivated feelings thus have moral worth not because of the
overarching intention to be moral— for intention does not
amount to action; and even if the act of cultivating the
emotions for moral ends has moral worth, acting from such
emotions can have no moral worth unless those emotions are
themselves part of the motive of duty— but rather because
the cultivated feelings have been incorporated into the
motive of duty itself, enabling it to express itself in a
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direct and heartfelt concern for the morality of our
actions.19
We are finally in a position to understand Kant's claim
in the Religion that the temperament or "aesthetic
character" of virtue is not "fear-ridden and dejected" but
rather "courageous and hence joyous" (R:l9n)— a claim that
at first glance strikes the reader as overly optimistic,
given the feeling of constraint involved in the thought of
duty.

A person with a developed virtuous disposition will

not experience the constraint involved in the thought of
duty as oppressive, but will have cultivated the feelings
which attend it and will therefore take pleasure not only in
fulfilling her duties but also in acting from the motive of
duty itself.
Kant therefore sells himself short when he says,
earlier in the same passage, that "by the very reason of the
dignity of the idea of duty I am unable to associate grace
iaWhile I am basically sympathetic with Paul Guyer's attempt
to show that acting from cultivated feelings has moral worth, I
differ from him when I claim that the motive of duty incorporates
cultivated feelings.
Guyer's account of duty as a second-order
intention directing us to cultivate feelings and to use them in
particular situations "when the motive of duty fails us" (Guyer,
Ch.10, my emphasis) can only explain how the cultivation of feeling
takes on moral worth.
It obviously does not explain how acting
from cultivated feelings on particular occasions can have moral
worth, since Guyer himself describes those situations as cases in
which the motive of duty "fails us." Since I believe that Kant's
account of good willing in the Groundwork commits him to a case-bycase conception of good willing— a conception of moral worth as
something which is instantiated in particular actions— it is not
enough to derive moral worth from a basic intention to act morally.
(I here differ from Barbara Herman in "Integrity and Impartiality,"
footnote??, The Practice of Moral Judgment).
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with it.

For the idea of duty involves absolute necessity,

to which grace stands in direct contradiction" (R:19n).

He

goes on to say that the graces do indeed have a place in the
moral life— beneficence, for instance, has beautiful results
and can thus accompany the thought of duty in the developed
virtuous disposition, but only as attendants and not as part
of the thought of duty itself:
Virtue. also, i.e.. the firmly grounded disposition to
fulfil our duty, is also beneficent in its results,
beyond all that nature and art can accomplish in the
world; and the august picture of humanity, as portrayed
in this character, does indeed allow the attendance of
the graces.

But when duty alone is the theme, they

keep a respectful distance.
Kant seems here to forget about the moral feelings of his
Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue. These feelings, we
have seen, provide the bridge between dignity and grace:
cultivating them enables the motive of duty to express
itself in a heartfelt concern for both the morality of our
actions and for the dignity and well-being of other people—
a stance which is possible only if the motive of duty admits
of the graces themselves.
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Chapter 5_L
Kant fin Personal Attachments

Kant has often been criticized for failing to appreciate the
importance of personal commitments in moral decision-making.

The

criticism is aimed primarily at Kant's conception of moral
judgments and actions as impartial. as reflecting maxims or
principles to which any other rational agent could assent.

When

I make a moral judgment, on Kant's view, I am supposed to
abstract from my personal biases and attachments, since these
factors might otherwise color my judgment, making it reflect my
own idiosyncratic conception of the good rather than a principle
to which any rational agent could assent.

This requirement of

impartiality, the criticism goes, disregards the fact that in
order to the right thing, we often need to be sensitive to the
special demands of the relationships in which we find ourselves.
Kant seems to be asking us to disregard personal ties in our
moral decisions; but since morality often demands responses
tailored to just those types of relations, Kantian ethics blinds
us to a— perhaps even the— key aspect of moral life.1 I want to

'See, for instance, Stuart Hampshire, "Public and Private
Morality," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978), p.40; and Bernard Williams,
"Persons, Character, and Morality," Moral Luck (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1981), pp.18-19.
See Williams, "Morality and the
Emotions," Problems
The Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), pp.209-29 for criticisms aimed at Kant's purported
neglect of the emotions and for a sanguine presentation of the
claim that sensitivity to the emotions is in fact the key to moral
perception and judgment.
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show that Kantian morality is not in fact blind to the
requirements of the personal.

The moral law is, to be sure,

impartially conceived, but personal attachments give rise to
special claims and duties even within that impartial frame.
Moral concerns manifest themselves in a specific way within
our personal relations: we are either aware of or concerned about
the rightness of our actions and the appropriateness of our
feelings to that particular relationship.

Interpersonal

relations such as love and friendship thus have moral dimensions-specific duties and attitudes appropriate to hold toward the
loved one— which define what it is to be a good friend,
girlfriend, wife, etc. in the first place.

To disregard these

moral dimensions is to fail to appreciate what true love and
friendship are.

Good performance within the personal realm, I

want to show, is defined by essentially moral considerations.
Those who associate the Kantian concept of duty with
basically impersonal considerations will be skeptical about my
claim that there are special duties toward special persons.

For

if acting from duty involves taking up a standpoint which any
rational agent could in principle adopt, how can duty penetrate
into the subtleties of personal relations?
To answer this question, I will first show that moral
decision-making, as Kant conceives of it, can at least
accommodate personal considerations.

I then move on to the

question of the types of personal considerations duty can
accommodate in order to determine whether they are subtle enough
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to satisfy Kant's critics.

In particular, I consider the extent

to which duty is a desirable motive for the actions we undertake
in our personal relationships, and ask how it relates to other
motives (e.g., love) which are also desirable within those
relations.

I then consider three criticisms which Williams

levels against various claims that Kant makes about the emotions.
I show that these claims do not in fact have the consequences for
Kantian morality that Williams takes them to have.

I conclude

with a discussion of friendship, which for Kant sets an emotional
paradigm toward which we should strive in all moral relations.
This explains why we have a duty to form and to cultivate
friendships.

i*. Bhy it is permissible

fayor friends

I begin by showing that moral decision-making, as Kant
thinks of it, can at least accommodate personal considerations.
Before we make any moral decision, on Kant's view, we need to
identify the maxim which our proposed course of action will
reflect (G:399-400).

Even though the maxim is formed in response

to the situation at hand, it also embodies a personal policy
which describes more generally how we are prepared to act in
situations of that sort.

In order to be morally permissible, our

maxim or "subjective principle of action" (G:422n) must conform
to an objective (universally valid) principle of action— the
categorical imperative: "So act that the maxim of your action
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could become a universal law" (DV:389, G:421).2 In testing our
maxim against the requirements of the categorical imperative, we
impose a formal condition on our maxim, namely, that it be a
policy to which every other rational agent could in principle
consent.

To determine whether our maxim meets this condition, we

ask ourselves what the world would be like if everybody acted on
the maxim, taking into account the empirical conditions which
would have to obtain in this world for everybody to realize the
maxim.3 If I could act on my maxim in such a world, the maxim
is morally permissible.4
2The categorical imperative is distinguished from the moral
law by its form. The moral law is a description of all rational
willing; the categorical imperative is a command. Because human
beings do not by nature conform to the moral law (G:413), reason
presents it to us not as a description of the way we £fi act (as it
does to God), but rather as a command for how we should act.
3The clause, "in this world" is important.
Only with a
background of empirical facts are our intentions determinate enough
for us to work out whether there exist feasible means for executing
our intentions and what the predictable results of this would be.
See Onora O'Neill, (then Onora Nell), Acting on Principle, pp.6277. Her account of what it is to rationally intend an end also
shows how the categorical imperative test can require an
explication of the empirical means necessary for realizing and end
as well as a consideration of the results of doing so while
entailing neither empiricism nor consequentialism.
4There are actually two types of maxims— permissible and
obligatory— which satisfy the condition that we be able to act on
the maxim in a world in which everybody acted on it.
The
difference between permissible maxims (e.g., "I will always eat
white rather than red meat") and obligatory ones (e.g., "I will
strive to cultivate my talents") lies in the formal implications of
their negations.
The negations of obligatory maxims yield
contradictions when universalized; those of permissible maxims do
not.
There are two types of obligatory maxims: maxims
instantiating perfect duties (duties which one must under no
circumstances refrain from adhering to) and maxims instantiating
imperfect duties (duties which require the basic intention to
fulfill them but which leave us some latitude in deciding when to
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This universality test is eminently impartial in that it
requires us to test our maxims against common human reason.

But

this does not prevent personal considerations from figuring in
our maxims.

Since we form them in response to the particulars of

a situation, our maxims can accommodate whatever considerations
we take to be morally relevant in that situation, including ties
of loyalty to particular persons.

The fact that our maxims must

then pass the universalizability test does not entail that
morality leaves no room for personal considerations, as long as
those considerations are morally permissible.8
Does this mean that it permissible to choose to help a
friend rather than a stranger?
a duty to help others at all.

Let us first consider why we have
As agents— that is, as setters and

do so). The negation of a maxim instantiating a perfect duty
contradicts its universalized counterpart in the sense that it
would be impossible to carry out the maxim in a world reflecting
the latter. For instance, I could not make a false promise in a
world in which everyone knows promises to be false, since no one
would believe me (G:422). The negation of a maxim instantiating an
imperfect duty contradicts not its universalized counterpart as
such, but the means necessary for carrying out the maxim.
For
instance, I cannot will a maxim of non-beneficence because I am not
self-sufficient, and will therefore need the help of others to
carry out some of my ends. In a world in which everyone acted on
a maxim of non-beneficence, the means toward the fulfillment of
some of my ends would be unavailable; but as an agent, I
necessarily will the fulfillment of all my ends.
Since I will
sometimes depend on others to help me realize my ends, I cannot
coherently will that I not help others and that others not help me.
For a helpful discussion of these examples and, in general, of the
nature of universalizability in Kant, see Onora O'Neill (then Onora
Nell), Acting on Principle. Chapter 5.
For Kant's own
characterization of the difference between permissible, obligatory
and forbidden maxims, see MM:221-8.
“See Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist (2),
1983, pp.247-8 for a clear statement of this point.
256

realizers of ends— we necessarily will the fulfillment of all our
ends.

But if we rationally intend an end, then we also intend to

pursue the means by which we can realize it.6 As finite beings,
however, we are not completely self-sufficient.

Since, at some

point in our lives, we will need the help of others to realize
some of our ends, we cannot coherently will that others not help
us.

But the maxim of relying on the help of others is not

universalizable unless we are also prepared to let others rely on
our help.

We must, in other words, be prepared not only to

receive the help of others, but also to help them when needed.
Thus we have a duty to help others.7
Now Kant makes it clear that we have a considerable latitude
in deciding whom to help and when.

This latitude is the mark of

ail imperfect duties, including our duties of love toward others
(DV:390).

Kant stresses that even though our duties of love

extend to the ends of others in general, we are most likely to
carry them out with regard to our loved ones: "in wishing I can
be equally benevolent to everyone, whereas in acting I can,
without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree
greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one

6In this paragraph,
I am following Onora O'Neill's
interpretation of Kant's reasoning behind our duty to help others.
See Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason. pp.114-15, 140-1.
7I am here disregarding the problems I raised with this
argument in Part II, Chapter 4.
Since I am, at this point,
undecided about whether humanity as an end in itself imposes on us
a positive requirement to promote the ends of others, I am here
assuming that it does and that Kant's argument for the duty to
promote other people's happiness is sound.
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of whom concerns me more closely than another)" (DV:452).

As

long as we have the basic intention to help other people
sometimes, we are permitted to favor friends over strangers in
realizing this intention.

The maxim of favoring friends, in

other words, is itself fully universalizable.

If we were faced

with the choice of helping a friend or helping a stranger, the
stranger could consent to our maxim of favoring our friends
because the stranger realizes not only that it is humanly
impossible to help everyone, but also that, as finite beings, we
are not self-sufficient and will therefore need the help of our
nearest and dearest in carrying out some of our projects.

There

is nothing morally wrong, then, in giving primacy to our friends
in carrying out our duties of love.

As imperfect duties, they

give us just the degree of flexibility we need in order
effectively to promote other people's happiness.
Moral decision-making, as Kant conceives of it, can thus at
least

accommodate

personal considerations.

I now move on to the

question of the types of personal considerations duty can
accommodate in order to determine whether these considerations
are subtle enough to satisfy Kant's critics.

II, Williams' first objection
There is at least one critic who would not be satisfied with
the response we have given so far, and that is Bernard Williams.
We have shown that according to the categorical imperative test,
maxims paying special heed to the needs of our loved ones are
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permissible.

But Williams complains that the very requirement

that we test our maxims against the categorical imperative
compromises our personal integrity and our commitment to the
relationships in which we are involved.

In his adaptation of

Charles Fried's example of the shipwrecked couple, he identifies
a case of right action which he believes can neither be justified
nor properly motivated by the considerations inherent in the
categorical imperative test.
In the example, a man is facing a shipwreck in which several
people are drowning, including his wife.

Williams objects to the

idea that morality should not allow the agent to act directly out
of love for his wife and save her without second thought; that it
should require him first to determine whether it is permissible
to save her rather than someone else.

Says Williams,

...this construction provides the agent with one thought too
many: it might have been hoped (for instance, by his wife)
that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the
thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and
that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save
one's wife.*
If the agent sets aside his feelings for his wife and decides to
save her according to the impartial procedure prescribed by the
moral law, he acts not from affection for her but from the
thought that it is permissible to save someone he is attached to.
For Williams, this motive involves "one thought too many," since
‘Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," p.18.
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it "signals a willingness not to save her if that were morally
necessary."9 In asking the agent to disregard his immediate
inclination to save his wife, Kantian morality denies the agent
any direct expression of his deepest emotional attachments.

This

alienates the agent from those attachments and thereby
compromises his personal integrity.
It is important to appreciate the force of this objection.
Williams is claiming that if morality is to make any legitimate
claims on us at all, then those claims must be compatible from
the outset with the requirements of the personal.

Kantian

morality fails in this regard because it misconstrues the
personal commitments on which we must be prepared to act.

To be

committed to a relationship is to be prepared to treat the other
person in special ways; but Kant, apparently overlooking the
emotional basis of such commitments, gets their structure wrong.
For Kant, the ultimate sanction for acting on personal
commitments must come from the categorical imperative.

But since

our personal commitments have grown out of feelings for the other
person and not from universalistic concerns, the categorical
imperative test distorts our motives for acting on those
commitments.

For Kant, the shipwrecked husband's motivating

thought, in order to be morally acceptable, has to be "She is my
wife, and in situations of this kind it is permissible to save
one's wife."

But according to Williams, the only truly proper

’Barbara Herman, paraphrasing Williams
Impartiality," p.245 (emphasis mine).
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in

"Integrity

and

motive in the scenario in question is "She is my wife, and
therefore I will save her."

Whether or not it is accompanied by

actual feelings of love, this thought signifies a commitment
which gives the agent a direct reason to act without introducing
any need for impartial considerations.

To allow the thought of

duty to intrude on our personal lives alienates us from our
commitments by forcing us to disregard the natural motives to
which those commitments give rise.
Now there is certainly something deep and important in the
idea that preserving our personal integrity involves letting
ourselves be "swept up" by the feelings our relationships
engender, and that an acceptable morality must allow us to act on
those feelings.

However, our moral convictions sometimes run

against the tide of our feelings.

Imagine the shipwrecked

husband tempted to throw an infant overboard in order to reach
his drowning wife,10 or a situation in which the other person's
end is morally unacceptable— say, the case of deciding whether to
help a friend who is planning to rob a bank.

In cases like this,

it would be wrong to neglect to ask whether the proposed action
is permissible before undertaking it.

A moral agent knows this,

and will therefore see her personal commitments as constrained by
the requirements of the moral law.

As we saw in Part I, this

does not mean that she must disregard her personal commitments in
deciding what to do.

It only means that she must see them as

“Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," p.246. See pp.247-8
for her version of the response I give in this paragraph.
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conditioned by a respect for humanity.

Since it is the mark of a

morally responsible person to know whether it is right or wrong,
in a given situation, to act on her immediate inclinations, it is
only reasonable that morality should require us to check our
maxims for their permissibility.
Is the Kantian agent alienated from her attachments?

Does

her regard for the moral law distort her immediate inclination to
help her loved ones?

Williams thinks so because he believes that

the only motive which is morally acceptable to the Kantian agent
is the thought that it is morally permissible to help one's loved
ones.

In what follows, I hope to show that Kantian morality in

fact gives her other motives to act on.

This will also involve

distancing myself from the conventional Kantian line of response
to Williams which I have been pursuing so far.

The conventional

line, perhaps most famously made by Barbara Herman, is to stress
that it is not unreasonable— not one thought too many— to have
morality place limiting conditions on our immediate inclinations.
That's fine as far as it goes, but I want to develop the stronger
position that morality actually generates specific duties toward
our loved ones.

These duties require us to cultivate feelings

which can help preserve the relationship and which yield motives
more desirable within the relationship than sheer respect for the
moral law.

In Section IV, I will ask whether Kant's conception

of special commitments allows for the specific motivational
structure sought by Williams.

But first I want to show that
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according to Kant it is not only permissible but also obligatory
to treat special persons in special ways.

IXLj. Why personal ties give rise tfi special duties
It is somewhat ironic that Williams should illustrate his
criticism of Kant with a case in which an agent faces a conflict
between the demands

ofmarriage and the claims which other human

beings have on him.Marriage is one of

Kant's favorite examples

of how entering into close relationships imposes special duties
on us.

I will use the case of marriage to illustrate how special

claims can grow out

of emotional bonds, but my illustration holds

for any type of committed relationship.
As early as 1764, in the Observations

q

£

the Feeling at the

Beautiful and suhlime. Kant notes that the virtuous husband does
not merely say, "I love and treasure my wife, for she is
beautiful, affectionate, and clever," since old age and
familiarity will surely alter that image of her; he says,
instead, "I will treat this person lovingly and with respect, for
she is my wife."

In the latter attitude, Kant says, "the noble

ground remains and is not so much subject to the inconstancy of
external things" (OBS:65).“

When the initial passion fades,

only the latter attitude can preserve the relationship.

Kant

expresses the same view in the Lectures on Ethics. where he says
that "a man may act kindly towards his wife from love, but if his
“Nothing in Kant's discussion precludes the virtuous husband
from holding both attitudes towards his wife, as long as the former
is subordinated to the latter.
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inclination has evaporated he ought to do so from obligation"
(LE:193).

Love must be tempered by principles lest it turn

fickle and insubstantial.13 Kant thus seems to hold that
personal relations— at least those which are characterized by
some sort of commitment— have a special value which imposes
duties on us to keep them going even in the face of hardships.
Before I explain why Kant takes personal relations to have a
special value, I want to turn to the question of how natural
emotional ties can give rise to a set of special duties which is
most aptly characterized as moral.
We usually seek to enter into a relationship because we like
or desire the other person.

When these feelings are mutual,

natural ties develop and the relationship is underway.

It is

important to note, however, that even in this early stage, the
relationship is characterized not only by natural feelings but
also by mutual consent: we do not form emotional bonds with
people for whom we have no affection.

If we decide, again by

mutual consent, to continue the relationship to the point where
we become dependent on each other— sometimes even indispensable
to each other— and therefore vulnerable to the actions of the
other, we have effectively entered into a mutual nmrnnitmant to
preserve the relationship.

Because this commitment is implicitly

“Paul Guyer makes essentially this point with regard to
Williams' drowning scenario, and concludes: "Not only in friendship
but in marriage and every other personal relation our feelings are
fragile and liable to interruption, and must always be governed as
well as cultivated in accordance with principle" See Guyer, Kant
and the Experience q £ Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality.
Chapter 10, p.393.
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moral in nature, it gives rise to special duties toward the other
person.

These duties include not committing breaches of trust,

actively promoting the ends of the other, and cultivating the
emotions needed to preserve the relationship (see DV:452, 470-2).
The increased mutual dependence of persons involved in a
relationship thus gives rise to certain expectations regarding
how they should act toward one another, and these expectations
form the basis for special claims which are moral in nature.
The special claims which relationships impose on us are of
course defeasible in nature.

Relationships impose on us neither

unconditional not permanent obligations: their requirements can
be waived if the friend or lover turns our to place unreasonable
or even immoral demands on us, or if, by mutual agreement, the
relationship is broken off.

Nevertheless, when the relationship

is something that both parties want to preserve, it creates a
unique set of ends. ends which can only be promoted by the friend
or lover and not by anyone else.

This unique set of ends makes

it easier to violate the demands of the relationship than it is
to violate the claims which a stranger may have on us.

Because

the claims which a loved one has on us can be satisfied only by
how

treat him or her, it is easier for us to undermine the

ends of a friend or lover than it is to undermine those of a
stranger.

It is easier for us, in other words, to contribute

actively to the friend's unhappiness by misbehaving or by simply
neglecting the special claims which that person has on us.
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In the drowning scenario, the primary end which the agent
can undermine, through inaction, is the survival of the drowners.
Since this end is held in common by all the drowners, it does not
give the agent a criterion for deciding whom to help.

But the

agent holds a special relation to his wife— a relation which
imposes special duties on him.

In helping a stranger rather than

his wife, the agent would violate the demands of loyalty and
commitment which marriage imposes on him.

He would, in other

words, undermine ends which only he could satisfy.

The death of

someone cannot be prevented, but in allowing his wife to die, the
agent would undermine not only her end of survival, but also her
hope of loyalty and support from her husband.

The latter is an

end which the wife, but not the strangers, has in relation to the
agent.

Because the moral law requires first and foremost that we

avoid violating our duties and avoid undermining other people's
ends (G:437; D:384), it directs the agent to save his wife rather
than a stranger, since, in a situation where undermining some
ends is inevitable, it is best to promote those ends which are
also bound up with other obligations.13

“Note also that Kantian morality leaves room for an agent who
is prepared, from a sense of duty, to help another person, to defer
the helping action to someone who is prepared to help the agent
because he has certain feelings for the patient.
For a more
detailed discussion of this sort of scenario, see Barbara Herman,
"Integrity and Impartiality," pp.239-40.
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IYj. Motivation within personal commitments
Having shown how emotional bonds can give rise to special
obligations, I now turn to the question of whether acting on such
obligations can satisfy the specific motivational requirements
that relationships impose on us.

In particular, does it satisfy

the need of our nearest and dearest to sometimes see us
expressing our love for them without thinking of duty?

My

discussion of the preceding section might seem to have gotten me
into deeper trouble with Williams in this regard.

Williams, we

recall, wants to avoid moralizing the personal by bringing duty
into it.

Unlike Barbara Herman and others who suggest that

morality merely constrains us in our personal relations, I have
argued that morality actually imposes special duties on us within
those relations.

If Williams thinks it one thought too many to

help a loved one because it is morally permissible, then he
certainly thinks it two thoughts too many to do so because it is
not just permissible but actually required.
Acting from a sense of obligation, in Williams' eyes, is
always less desirable from the patient's point of view than
acting from love or some equivalent emotion.

He asks,

is it certain that one who receives good treatment from
another more appreciates it, thinks the better of the giver,
if he knows it to be the result of the application of
principle, rather than the product of an emotional response?
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He may have needed, not the benefits of universal law, but
some human gesture.1'
When the agent and the patient are involved in a close
relationship, the desire for an emotional response becomes
especially urgent.

Persons involved in such relationships place

special demands on each other, a significant one being the
expectation of emotional support.

It is natural, especially when

one is in a weak or insecure state, to expect one's friends to
act from feelings of solidarity or support and not from a sense
of obligation.

The shipwrecked wife, Williams is right to point

out, would clear prefer that her husband save her from love
rather than from a sense of personal obligation.
The question then becomes: Do the special duties we have
toward our loved ones leave us any scope for choosing motives
other than a sense of obligation— for instance, feelings of love-to motivate us as we carry out these duties?
do.

Kant thinks they

Being committed to a relationship involves making the other

person's happiness an end (DV:469).

Since the relationship

itself is an end which the other person has, we are required to
pursue the means necessary for preserving the relationship.

This

includes cultivating and acting on emotions which help keep the
relationship alive.

Love— the original, natural basis for the

relationship— is an especially important emotion in this regard.
Since the other person's happiness depends, to a great extent, on

“Williams, "Morality and the Emotions," Problems of the Self
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973), p.227.
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our love for him or her, we are obligated to cultivate those
feelings of love and to strive to act on them (DV:470-472).
So rather than preventing us from acting on our feelings of
love, Kantian morality actually encourages us to do so:
cultivating and acting on feelings which help keep the
relationship alive is one of the special duties which personal
ties impose on us.

In acting from love for his wife, the

shipwrecked husband is fulfilling one of the special claims his
wife has on him.

Insofar as the feelings of love from which he

acts carry the motive of duty along with them (as an awareness of
the rightness and appropriateness of acting from emotion within
this particular relationship), acting from these feelings— which
are, after all, partly rationally based— has moral worth.
Williams would surely object here that on Kant's view of
moral motivation, love can never serve as a direct motive because
we are always required to ask whether our maxim is morally
permissible, and this procedure distorts the motive of love
itself.

But this not only underestimates the moral perceiver

(who knows when actions are morally right and when they are
morally irrelevant though permissible), but also conflates maxims
and motives.

The maxim-directed categorical imperative test does

not necessarily affect our motives.

The same maxim of helping

someone we are committed to can be carried out from a number of
different motives— say, from love or from a sense of obligation.
Maxims, in other words, are distinct and separable from motives.
Testing our maxims against the categorical imperative test does
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not necessarily distort the motives from which we choose to act.
A pure and devoted love can serve as our motive for acting even
when our maxim has been tested against the categorical
imperative, should we need to do so.

Of course, on Kant's view

neither love nor any other motive can directly move us in the way
Williams is envisioning, simply because Kant has a different view
of moral motivation than Williams.

On Williams' view, we act

directly on rationally conditioned dispositions or character
traits.

On Kant's view, we act on a motive only after having

incorporated it into our maxim (R:19), that is, after having
endorsed a given policy.

Because we choose our motive after

making our judgment, moral motivation will always be conditioned
by moral judgment.

This, however, does not entail that our moral

judgments distort our motives.
So far, I have been claiming that our special duties given
us room for acting on love.

But how is love, on Kant's view,

related to the duty-motive which is also present in committed
relationships?

What, in other words, is the relation is between

the motive to act from a special duty toward a loved one and more
natural motives such as love or sympathy?

To answer this

question, we need to get clearer on the nature of the duty-motive
as it manifests itself in personal relations.
To be committed to another person is to have a sense of
obligation toward that person: a preparedness to act for the sake
of that person even when we do not feel like it.

Even though the

other person prefers that we act from our feelings of love, this
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is not always possible.

This has perhaps most clearly been

illustrated by Paul Guyer, who shows that a slight variation on
the shipwreck example would make duty a highly desirable motive
for the wife to expect from her husband.

Consider the husband

faced with the choice of saving his aging wife or the young,
beautiful woman he had been eyeing throughout the cruise.

The

wife might realize that, given the circumstances, it would be
unreasonable of her to expect her husband to save her out of
love. Surely she would prefer to have her husband save her from
duty rather than letting her drown!15
Because the motive of duty arises in response to our
principles and commitments, the duty-motive will always be
available for us to act on even when we are not immediately
inclined to honor our commitments.

This does not mean that we

always have to adopt it as our motive.

The motive of love has a

legitimate place within Kant's framework and need not always
defer to the duty-motive.

It is in situations of the sort Guyer

considers that it becomes necessary to act from the duty-motive
simply because natural feelings of love are not available.

This

does not mean that personally committed agents will need frequent
use of the duty-motive.

The committed agent will recognize the

importance of acting from love within a relationship: love is
valuable because it preserves the relationship itself and is the
motive preferred by the patient.

Recognizing this, he will have

lsSee Guyer, Kant and the Experience q£ Freedom: Essays an
Aesthetics and Morality. Chapter 10, p.393.
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cultivated his feelings of love toward his wife, and the feeling
will therefore be available for him to act on on given occasions.
Insofar as the particular actions he undertakes from love
stem from natrual love alone— that is, without any awareness of
his commtment to the other person— his actions will not have any
moral worth. since moral worth attaches only to actions done from
duty (G:396-401).

But he will still gain in moral perfection

because he is more effectively carrying out his duty to promote
the happiness of his wife.

Moral perfection has two components—

fulfilling all our duties and striving to do so from respect for
the moral law (D:446)— and an agent increases his moral
perfection whenever he fulfills a duty, even if he is not acting
from a sense of duty.

Natural love at least helps him

effectively promote her happiness, and this increases his moral
perfection if not his moral worth.

Vx. On the special value of. personal relations

I conclude by considering why personal relations have a
special value within Kant's moral scheme.

Although Kant himself

does not explain why personal relations have a special value, or
what that value consists in, we can venture an educated guess.
clue is provided in a somewhat obscure passage from Kant's
interleaved notes on the Observations of the Feeling of the
Beautiful and SuhlimR:
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A

A married man acquires and deserves more respect than a
bachelor or a man who will have nothing to do with women.16
A woman1’ [is] more than a girl.
than a girl.

A widow [is] also more

The reason for this is that the purpose is

fulfilled at that moment, and also that the other people
appear needy, that is, a girl wants to have a man (without
any trouble), but a woman never wants to be a girl.
Furthermore, an encounter with a woman is regarded as
[having] double [worth], and at the same time [an encounter]
with a man, by the same token.1*
Kant says that a married man or woman deserves more respect than
a bachelor or young girl because "the purpose is fulfilled" in
the case of the former but not in case of the latter.

People

involved in committed relationships have more worth in the sense
of having more completely fulfilled a human purpose.
sort of purpose?

But what

The purpose of which Kant is speaking can of

16The German word for the last type of man is "Haaestoltze."
which can also mean "misogynist."
^Throughout the passage, I translate "Frau" as "woman," but
"wife" (in proper German, "Ehefrau" ) may be more fitting, since
Kant draws a direct comparison between the married man and the
woman, attributing more worth to them than to those who have not
entered into committed relationships.
By "woman," therefore, I
take Kant to mean someone who has entered into a long-term relation
with a man.
iaThe passage is my translation from Marie Rischmuller's
edition of Kant's interleaved notes on his Observations of the
Feeling
the Beautiful and Sublime. See Rischmuller, Benerkungen
in den "Beobachtunaen ber das Gefuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen"
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1991), p.106. Rischmuller's reference is
the following: page inserted after B 86, [113] front page, II 245,
15-30.
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course be interpreted as a natural purpose— the purpose of
perpetuating the species, which is at least potentially furthered
by entering into relations with the other sex.
think Kant has a natural purpose in mind.

However, I do not

If he did, the girl

who enters into a relation with a man without wanting any of the
trouble which at some time or other inevitably arises in long
term relationships would also hold a special value, but Kant
clearly implies that she has less worth than a woman.
Instead, I suggest, Kant has a moral or rational purpose in
mind.

The reason why people who have entered into committed

relationships deserve more respect than those who live a life
without commitments is that they have more fully developed their
rational and emotional natures than the uncommitted.

The process

of learning to trust another person by having the courage to
reveal our innermost thoughts and feelings to him or her, for
example, helps us overcome the barriers which we sometimes
unnecessarily erect against other people.

Friendship is "an aid

in overcoming the constraint and the distrust man feels in his
intercourse with others, by revealing himself to them without
reserve" (LE:206).

This trustful attitude has a moral value

because it helps us form an ever-widening circle of friends and
so, to become a "friend of man” who is engaged with the world
(see DV:472-4).

Such a person is more likely to carry out her

duties not only toward friends but toward others in general.
In taking the ends of another as their own, people who are
involved in committed relationships show a maturity and
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responsibility lacking in those who live only for themselves.

In

cultivating the emotions required to keep the relationship alive,
they strive for greater moral keenness and deeper emotional
resonance than those who do not at any point in their lives risk
emotional attachment.

And those who strive to be more keenly

seeing and more deeply feeling— in short, those who strive to
perfect themselves in morally relevant ways— have greater moral
worth and so deserve more respect than those who do not.1*
Entering into personal relations, then, is valuable because it
makes us strive to be morally better beings.

VI. xtl£ Moral Structure

Friendship

Lm. Why the moral is not impersonal

On a careless reading of a crucial passage in Kant's
Lectures on Ethics. Kant appears to equate the moral standpoint

l*Kant's claim that those who engage in committed personal
relations have more worth than those who do not is of course
difficult to reconcile with his claim that humanity is an end in
itself, and so, that everyone has equal and absolute value (G:4289). The two claims are compatible, however, if we distinguish, as
Kant does, between a person's humanity and a person's moral stature
(LE:196—7, 214-15, 227). Everyone has, in virtue of his ability to
set and to realize ends, an absolute value which prohibits others
from treating him as a mere means. But he also has, in virtue of
the same capacity, various duties the fulfillment of which
increases his moral worth and/or his moral perfection (the latter
of which is also increased by the execution of his duties, not
necessarily from the motive of duty) and so makes him worthy of
happiness (see CPrR:61-2, 110-11). While persons cannot vary in
the former type of value, they can in the latter; and it is the
latter sort of value which acrues through engaging in friendships.
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with the impersonal.

He defines friendship as a relation

involving special ties, and constrasts it with the aim of the
civilized person— a "universal friendship" free of the
restrictions of special ties:
If men complain of the lack of friendship, it is becaue they
themselves have no friendly disposition and no friendly
heart.

They accuse others of being unfriendly, but it is

they themselves who, by demands and importunities, turn
their friends from them.

We shun those who, under the cloak

of friendship, make a convenience of us.

But to make a

general complaint about the lack of friends is like making a
general complaint about the lack of money.

The more

civilized man becomes, the broader his outlook and the less
room there is for special friendships; civilized man seeks
universal pleasures and a universal friendship, unrestricted
by special ties... (LE:207)
The passage might seem to suggest that the universal friendship
is the properly moral relation, and that the special friendship
is a mere matter of personal taste— not a genuinely moral
relation at all.

To dismiss the friendship of special ties as

morally irrelevant, however, is to disregard the remarks which
precede the contrast between personal and universal friendships.
In these remarks, Kant suggests that special friendships serve as
means toward broadening one's outlook with an eye to eventually
becoming a "friend of man": special friendships are like money in
that they serve as means toward obtaining something valuable.
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But if they serve as means toward realizing a moral relation,
then personal friendships must themselves contain at least some
of the elements of morality, if only in rudimentary form.
In fact, there is no reason to claim, on the basis of the
passage, that personal friendships are not themselves moral
relations.

In the passage, Kant groups neither the "universal"

nor the "special" friendship explicitly with the moral.

And

elsewhere, he clearly indicates that there is a common core of
morality running through both relations— a core which is
broadened as civilization progresses, but which does not alter
its basic structure (LE:201-3, 209).

If so, the difference

between the two is simply that the universal friendship is
directed at a greater number of individuals, not that it alone
contains a moral element.
In the Doctrine of Virtue. Kant defines the moral element
which both types of friendship instantiate as a relation of
"equal mutual love and respect" (DV:469).
is the essence of friendship.

This balanced relation

It is a relation of intimacy

tempered by respectful distance.

Love draws people closer;

respect keeps them at a dignified distance from each other
(DV:449, 470).

Love is attractive in the sense that it breaks

down the boundaries between individuals.

When I love someone, I

desire his happiness: I desire for him what he desires.

This is

neither a passionate, possessive sort of love nor the mere act of
wishing someone well, but rather an active sort of love which
consists of striving to realize the ends of the loved one: Kant
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thus defines love as taking the ends of another as one's own
(DV:449, 452).

Love breaks down boundaries between individuals

in the sense that it effaces the distinction between my desires
and yours; when I love you, your desires become mine.

Respect,

by contrast, preserves the boundaries between individuals.

Kant

defines respect as the principle of limiting one's self-esteem by
the dignity of humanity in another (DV:449-50).

Respect involves

the recognition that the other person has as much worth as I do;
that even when I do her a favor and she becomes indebted toward
me, her freedom and independence do not diminish.

Respect thus

requires that I make no claims on the loved one: that I avoid
seeing her as dependent on me; that I avoid expecting favors in
return for mine.

Since she remains free no matter how many

favors I do for her, the matter of how she should relate to me
must be left up to her own free choice (see LE:204).
Equal amounts of love and respect are important for a
friendship to survive.

If I love someone too much, I not only

compromise my own integrity in the sense that the other may lose
her respect for me (DV:450); I also put the other in a debt of
gratitude toward me, which forces her to consider herself a step
lower than me (DV:450).

Too much respect, by contrast, puts the

other in the cold, forfeiting the intimacy of the relation of
friendship altogether (DV:470).

An equal relation of mutual love

and respect, in which neither party is compromised and both
receive the comforts of love, is therefore necessary for the
friendship to survive.

Kant stresses that we can never tell
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whether such an equal relation obtains; that in reality, the
exchange of favors and the compromise of integrity that these
favors entail keeps the relation of love and respect in continual
flux (DV:450).

It is in this sense that the emotional structure

of friendship is an ideal which we strive to realize even though
we can never know whether we have actually succeeded (LE:202-3).
(Because it is inscrutable, friendship sets an ideal similar to
morally worthy motivation; see Part II of this chapter.)
Note, however, that Kant thinks that one type of friendship,
namely, the "moral" friendship (DV:471-3)— not to be confused
with the "ideal" friendship of equal mutual love and respect
discussed in the previous paragraph— has actually been realized
in the world.

In section I.ii, I consider his reasons for saying

this, and also for distinguishing between "ideal" and "moral"
friendship even though the former is also a moral relation.
First, however, I want to explain why "ideal" friendship is a
moral relation.
It is fairly easy to see why ideal friendship is a moral
relation.
respect.

It is defined as a relation of equal mutual love and
Now, respect is the central moral emotion, for Kant.

When I respect someone's humanity, I respect, most broadly, her
capacity to set and to realize ends and, more narrowly, her
ability to grasp the concept of duty and to act on it.”

It is

”Kant's various claims about humanity and why it exists as an
end in itself have been the source of much speculation. At G:428-9
and 437-9, Kant suggests that human beings are ends in themselves
because they are able to form universalizable maxims in response to
the concept of duty.
At DV:387 and 392, however, he thinks of
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these capacities which make her an end in herself and require me
to think of her as a free individual rather than a means to my
ends.

But duty imposes other requirements on us than merely

respecting each other.

Given that each of us desires our own

happiness, it is inconsistent with duty not to promote or desire
the happiness of others as well (G:399, 423; DV:387-8, 393-4;
451).

Friendship, as a relation in which we both respect another

person and love her in the sense of promoting her ends,
instantiates the two primary moral attitudes.
More importantly, friendship instantiates love and respect
in their ideal relation, since neither is allowed to take
precedence over the other.

This balance is desirable in all

moral relations, but is not so easy to attain.

For instance, in

doing someone— whether friend or not— a favor, one can show love
but not a sufficient degree of respect toward the recipient by
acting as if the favor is a great effort, or showing pride in
one's benevolence, rather than acting as if it is simply right

humanity more generally as the capacity to set and to pursue ends,
whether moral or not.
The two definitions are not strictly
incompatible— in order to act virtuously, one must, after all, be
able to set and pursue ends. Many commentators nevertheless see it
as necessary to come down on one side of the issue. Commentators
who see humanity as the general capacity to set and pursue ends are
the majority, and include Thomas Hill, Jr. in "Humanity as an End
in Itself," in Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory,
pp.38-57 (see especially pp.38-41 for a helpful discussion of
whether humanity refers to rational nature or more specifically to
human nature) and Onora O'Neill in "Between Consenting Adults," in
Constructions of. Reason. pp.105-25, (especially pp.114-15). For
a critical account which interprets humanity as the capacity for
distinctively moral action, see Pepita Haezrahi, "The Concept of
Man as an End-in-Himself," in Kant: A Collection
Critical
Essays, ed. Robert Paul Wolff, pp.291-313.
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and nothing meritorious.

Beneficent actions always put the

recipient in a debt of gratitude toward the benefactor (DV:450),
which wounds the recipient's pride (DV:456).

This can easily

tilt the balance of respect in favor of the benefactor unless the
recipient feels as if the action was his simple due (DV:473).
Now, if one makes the recipient feel indebted and humble, one
counteracts the original intent of the action, which was to
promote his happiness (DV:453); and so, one's action is
inconsistent with the intended end and hence impermissible.31
We have, then, a duty to promote the ends of strangers who are in
need (DV:453), and this can be carried out only by showing equal
love and respect.

By embodying just that balance of equal love

and respect, friendship constitutes the ideal for all moral
relations.
We see, then, that contrary to Herman and Williams's
assumption that Kantian morality is impersonal, and that the
moral and the personal must therefore define distinct spheres of
human relations, Kant actually sees the personal as setting a
standard for more broadly directed, "impersonal" relations.

The

personal relation of friendship is, for Kant, a paradigmatically
moral relation: it instantiates the balance of love and respect
which we should strive for in all moral relations.

Through

intimacy with another, we become better moral creatures.

Kantian

morality is thus by no means impersonal.

“See Onora O'Neill, CR, pp.91-2 for Kantian rationalityrequirements on means-end relations; especially the third one.
281

This still leaves a lingering worry about the motive for
entering into friendships.

If one engages in friendships out of

a desire for moral improvement, and not out of a desire to know
someone on her own account, does not this remove the personal
essence of friendship?

If this is the case, then Williams'

objection still holds.

For while we have found a place for the

personal within the moral, we have done so only at the cost of
reducing the personal to a mere means for moral improvement,
disowning it of any value it might have in itself.

And this,

Williams would surely say, is just the problem with an
"impersonally" conceived moral system.

We need, therefore, to

turn to this objection.

ii. A Motivational Dilemma

So far, we have considered the basic structure of friendship
without going into the motivation for entering into friendships.
In the Lectures on Ethics. Kant considers two conflicting motives
which exist in each of us: our concern for our own happiness, and
our concern for our own moral worth.

The former tells us to look

out for our own happiness first; the latter, to look out for that
of others first.

The solution to this dilemma, Kant claims, is

to engage in friendships, since in doing so, we fulfill our duty
to promote another person's happiness while at the same time
being guarantees that our own happiness will be promoted by our
friend.

Friendship thus satisfies both motives (LE:201-3).
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This solution, however, immediately raises the worry noted
at the end of Section I.i.

If my motive for engaging in

friendships is partly moral and partly selfish, does this not
threaten the authenticity of my friendships?

If I make friends

because it is my duty to do so, and also because I know it will
satisfy my self-love, does this not prevent me from being a real
friend— someone who appreciates the other person on her own
account and not for her capacity to help me thrive in both moral
and selfish terms?
I believe that Kant has an answer to this worry, though he
does not explicitly address it.

The answer is to distinguish

between the types of needs that are fulfilled through friendship.
The "friendship of need," in which friends are there to help one
another, is not a truly moral one because it always involves an
imbalance of love and respect owing to the indebtedness that is
- brought about through mutual aid (DV:472).

This does not,

however, mean that there exist no truly moral friendships in the
world.

There exists a "moral" type of friendship which

instantiates the basic structure of equal mutual love and
respect, but which is distinctive in that its love-aspect seeks
to satisfy not all of the other person's desires, but only her
need to confide in another person: "Moral friendship (as
distinguished from friendship based on feeling)," Kant says, "is
the complete confidence of two persons in revealing their secret
judgments and feelings to each other, as far as such disclosures
are consistent with mutual respect" (DV:471).
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When I fulfil my

need to confide in another, I do not become indebted to the other
person, since confiding in her was something I did myself. The
other person was simply a good listener; she did not perform a
special favor for which I am now indebted.

I fulfilled my own

need; she was simply there as a means to fulfilling it.

Unlike

the friendship of need, the "moral" friendship incurs no
debts.23
The question remains, however, regarding our motive for
engaging in moral friendships.

Is not my need to confide in

another person a selfish need, and if so, does not that reduce my
friend to a mere "ear," a mere means to my ends?

I think Kant

would grant that this self-interested element exists.

He takes a

skeptical attitude towards the idea that our motive for engaging
in friendships is utterly disinterested.

We do not stand back

and admire our friends in the way we admire objects of art.
friends fulfill real needs.

Our

To grant that we do seek to fulfill

a personal need when we engage in friendships, however, is not to
claim that the motive for friendship is selfish.

The need which

we fulfill at least in "moral" friendships is distinctively
social: it is a need to "communicate our whole self" (LE:206).
In its distinctively social capacity, the need for self

33In his otherwise helpful article on Kant's notion of
friendship, H.J. Paton neglects this difference between the
friendship of need and the moral friendship, and so remains unable
to explain why Kant denies that a truly moral friendship can
involve excessive concern with the ends of others (DV:472). See
Paton, "Kant on Friendship," Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy,
Proceeds O L the British Academy. Vol.XLII (1956), pp.45-66.
The
passage in question is on p.55.
284

revelation resembles the Hutchesonian and Humean basis for
morality, namely, sympathy backed a desire for others' approval,
which is similarly social in essence.33 Friendship can thus
fulfill a need which is both personal and social in character.
The social motive for moral friendship also explains how
Kant can claim that it is our duty to engage in friendships while
at the same time avoiding the repellent notion that we engage in
friendships out &£ a sense of duty.

When we confide in another

person, we demonstrate our trust in her.

This trust has a

distinctively moral role: it helps us cultivate a sense of trust
toward the world in general.

As Kant puts it, friendship is "an

aid in overcoming the constraint and the distrust man feels in
his intercourse with others, by revealing himself to them without
reserve" (LE:206).

The moral function of friendship is thus

indirectly played out: it is realized not in the direct promotion
of our friend's ends, but in our overcoming the barriers which we
sometimes unnecessarily erect against the world a large.

This

trustful attitude has a moral value because it helps us form an
ever-widening circle of friends, and so helps us along the path
of becoming a "friend of man” (see DV:472-4).

This final state

is the goal of civilization (LE:206-7), and forming particular
friendships is the best way to advance that goal.

We are thus

back at the passage with which we began Section I, the passage
33The difference between Kant and the two British philosophers
is, of course, that while Hutcheson and Hume base all moral
relations on feelings, Kant bases moral relations on the moral law
and allows feelings to motivate actions only on the condition that
their maxims are either permissible or obligatory (see Chapter 1).
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which contrasts special friendships with a universal friendship.
The continuity between the two should by now be clear: they both
contain a core of mutual confidence, which can be widened to
include an increasing number of persons.
In defining the moral core of friendship as a relation of
mutual trust, I am diverging from Kant's initial definition of
the love involved in friendship as an acceptance of the other
person's ends as one's own.

Granted, the latter form of love is

expressed in an ideal friendship.

But as soon as we try to

express it in the real world, we make the friend indebted to us,
and this in effect ruins the friendship.

Kant saw this: "A

friend who bears my losses becomes my benefactor and puts me in
his debt.

I feel shy in his presence and cannot look him boldly

in the face.

The true relationship is cancelled and friendship

ceases11 (LE:204-5, my emphasis).

Even when it is tempered by

respect, the friend's display of love still puts the other in
debt and so threatens to cancel the equality required for the
friendship to survive.

I believe it is for this reason that Kant

redefines the conception of love manifested in real-life "moral"
friendships as a love of mutual confidence rather than one of
beneficence.

It is possible to realize mutual confidence without

engendering debts; hence the friendship of mutual confidence can
survive.

The love expressed in the purest friendships, then,

removes barriers between individuals not in the sense of their
accepting each other's ends, but in the sense of their revealing
their innermost thoughts to each other.
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True friends do not

desire the same things; rather, they understand each another
because they gaze into each other's souls.
It is important to notice however, that the friendship of
mutual confidence, while more robust than the friendship of
mutual love, also contains a fragile element.

Kant puts it as

follows: "we have certain natural frailties which ought to be
concealed for the sake of decency, lest humanity be outraged.
Even to our best friend we must not reveal ourselves, in our
natural state as we know it ourselves.
loathsome" (LE:206).
friends.

To do so would be

Not everything should be shared among best

Each of us has wishes and tendencies which can only be

interpreted as vile or stupid, and to force them upon a friend
endangers the friendship, either by producing shock or disgust in
the friend, or, more likely, by making the friend despise one for
insisting on imparting unsavory trivialities.

In order to

deflect such damage, one must, out of pride in oneself and out of
respect for one's friend, refrain from imparting details which
could provoke these reactions.

The friend, in turn, has a duty

to try as far as possible to refrain from judging while listening
to what one needs to say.

All this is done for the sake of

preserving the friendship; and preserving one's friendships is a
duty because friendship is a paradigm toward which one should
strive in all moral relations: taking an interest in the ends of
others, respecting them, and confiding in them.
Even though both the moral and the ideal types of friendship
are fragile, a failure in friendship imparts valuable lessons.
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These are lessons in moral judgment? and it is for this reason, I
believe, that Kant makes friendship a duty even though part of
its motivation is selfish and even though friendships can fail.
For even when a friendship fails, one walks away as a better
moral perceiver.

Having failed in the friendship of mutual love

and respect, one learns, as the violating beneficiary, not to
appear patronizing— which helps one better to carry out one's
duties of love towards others in general— or, as the patient, not
to resent, not to interpret acts of good will as insults, and so,
to cultivate a less suspicious, more generous frame of mind,
which is essential to one's sense of dignity.

A failure in the

friendship of mutual confidence similarly hones one's practical
judgment: either one learns that one needs more discretion in
selecting what to reveal about oneself— one needs, so to speak,
to "tighten one's filter" out of respect for one's own dignity as
well as the listener's— or one learns that the friend was perhaps
not such a close friend after all (for if she were, she might not
have reacted so violently to the confidence), in which case one
learns to pick one's friends more carefully.

The latter

increases one's moral self-knowledge by helping one see, through
conflict and difference with another, what one's real character
is.
These considerations help us answer the Williamsesque
objection that Kantian friendship, because of its moral benefits,
is an impersonal relation in which we engage as good soldiers in
the army of duty rather than as creatures with specific tastes.
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loyalties and attachments.

The key is to deemphasize the motive

for engaging in friendships and to focus instead on its effects.
Friendship, or even failure in friendship, has morally beneficial
effects which need not be part of the motive from which we engage
friendships.

We can engage in friendships from various motives:

a need to confide in another, a desire to augment our happiness,
a desire to feel needed, or simply an interest in a specific
individual.

But as the friendship develops, situations arise

which give us occasion to reflect on the broader moral
implications of the friendship.

What prompts us to reflect is,

of course, our concern for the friend— but the friend's
expectations are at the same time an instance of the way people
In general expect or desire to be treated, and this becomes clear
once we compare the friendship with our other relations.

Indeed,

it is not uncommon that we treat our friends worse than we treat
mere acquaintances, taking friends for granted and burdening them
with worries, often unfounded, with we would not burden others;
and such comparisons make us better friends as well as more
sensitive moral creatures.

Reflection on our actions toward our

friends thus gives rise to reflection on the general claims of
humanity, which leads in turn to an increased sensitivity and
adeptness in dealing with people in general.

These effects come

naturally, in the same way feelings of love come naturally when
we perform beneficent acts towards those whom we do not love; for
the improvisation required in friendship is analogous to the
improvisation required in all moral relations.
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We see,then, that even though the motive for engaging in
friendships need not be that of duty, the care taken to preserve
the friendship is of a distinctively moral nature.

This does not

make the friendship "impersonal"; it only confirms the fact that
people are not wholly unlike in their desires.

Since to be loyal

toward our friends is to treat them in the way anyone would
expect to be treated in a similar

situation, the maxim of

loyalty towards our friends can be universalized without losing
its personal touch.

Far from being "impersonal," Kantian

friendship instantiates the way every human being wants to be
treated, and so increases our readiness to treat others as we
would our friends.

That this is perfectly compatible with

showing special care towards should by now be clear.

Section VII; Williams' Criticisms

Kant on the Emotions

ij. The emotions are capricious

Williams first considers Kant's observation that the
emotions are too capricious to provide, on their own, a stable
basis for moral response.

Paraphrasing Kant, he writes:

I may feel benevolent towards this man, not towards that,
for all sorts of causes or reasons, some lying in my own
changing moods.

To act in accordance with these promptings
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is to act irrationally and (possibly) unjustly; but moral
action is consistent action, done on principle (ME, 226).24
Williams levels two criticisms against Kant's claim that the
emotions are capricious.

First, he takes the claim to suggest

that "there is no way of adjusting one's emotional response in
the light of other considerations, of applying some sense of
proportion, without abandoning emotional motivation altogether"
(ME, 226).

This, he continues, is a crude view of the emotions,

since we obviously can and do distance ourselves from our
emotions and seek to comprehend them in all sorts of situations.
I have already traced, in Chapter 1, the development of Kant's
view that the emotions are too capricious to serve as a stable
foundation for moral principles.

In this chapter, we saw that

even though the emotions cannot found moral principles, they can
be tempered by principles— cultivated— and in this guise serve
various indispensable functions in the moral life.

To answer

Williams' first criticism, then, we need only note that Kant,
contrary to Williams' assumption, does believe that we are able
to apply a "sense of proportion" to our emotions, as his claim
that we can cultivate and so modify our emotional response
clearly implies.

Williams' first criticism therefore does not

apply to Kant.
In his second criticism of Kant's claim that the emotions
are too capricious to serve as a basis for consistent moral
“Here and hereafter, I use "ME" to refer to Williams
"Morality and the Emotions," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge
Cambridge UP, 1973), pp.207-29.
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action, Williams questions the value of consistency as a moral
guideline, associating Kant's regard for consistency with "the
Principle of Equal Unfairness," a principle which says that if
you cannot do good to everybody in a certain situation, you
should not do it to anybody.

He complains:

There are indeed human activities and relations in which
impartiality and consistency are very much the point.

But

to raise on these notions a model of all moral relations
is...to make each of us into a Supreme Legislator; a fantasy
which represents, not the moral ideal, but the deification
of man (ME, 226).”
This passage exemplifies two common misreadings of Kant.

The

first is that Kant's regard for consistency— for the
universalizability of our maxims— entails that he held something
like the Principle of Equal Unfairness.

In fact, Kant makes it

clear that we have a considerable latitude in deciding whom to
help and when; this latitude is the mark of all imperfect duties,
including our duties of love toward others (see DV:390).

I have

already shown that the impartial requirements of the categorical
imperative are fully compatible with personal commitments.
The second misreading of Kant is found in Williams'
contention that to raise a model of all moral relations on the
notions of impartiality and consistency is "to make each of us
into a Supreme Legislator; a fantasy which represents, not the

” See Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," Moral Luck.
p.18 for a similar objection.
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moral ideal, but the deification of man" (HE, 226).36

Setting

consistency-constraints on our actions, I take it, represents the
deification of man only if it places implausible demands on us,
such as the demand to be completely impartial in selecting whom
we ought to help and when.

But contrary to Williams' claim, the

moral law does not require strict impartiality in selecting the
objects of our actions; it only requires a consistency between
the maxim and its universalized counterpart, and between our ends
(e.g., the happiness of others) and the means through which we
propose to realize them.

We have just seen that it is possible

to universalize a maxim which selects specific recipients of our
favors.

A human regard for our nearest and dearest is thus

compatible with the demand for consistency which the moral law
sets on us.

Our identity as "Supreme Legislators" who are able

to form maxims which can at the same time serve as universal
laws, does not, then, impose inhuman or unattainable requirements
on us; it does not "deify" man.
It is fruitful to elaborate briefly on the reasons behind
this, since they are anchored in our finitude— in our
specifically human nature— to which Williams mistakenly takes
Kant to pay insufficient heed.

The moral law applies to us as

beings who are not purely, but finitely. rational: beings who are
^Williams' term "Supreme Legislators” is in any case a
misnomer, since most human beings being are only legislators in the
kingdom of ends, not sovereigns or "supreme legislators."
The
sovereign in the kingdom of ends, Kant says, is a legislator who is
"subject to the will of no other" (G:433). This, I take it, refers
either to God or to the benevolent monarch— in any case, not to
every human being.
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embodied, who have emotional needs, who engage in specific and
often socially defined relations, who live in a world of
scarcity, and who are unable to perform miracles.

These

conditions place specific rationality-requirements on us.
order to form universalizable maxims,

In

we must not only seek to

realize our ends through the means available £a us, but must also
heed the frailty of human agency by refraining from undermining
the projects of others.27 Since virtue requires first and
foremost that we not violate the moral law (DV:384), our first
concern in the case of other people's happiness is to ensure that
we do not actively promote their unhappiness by undermining their
projects.

When one is involved in a close relationship, it is

easy to undermine at least one project of the other person—
namely, the relationship itself— by failing to show the cares and
emotions which keep the relationship alive.

To preserve the

relationship, then, it is necessary to extrude emotions which
threaten it and to cultivate emotions which tend to preserve it.
The moral law can in this way be seen to prescribe that we
cultivate and act on emotions which keep our close relationships
alive.28 Far from devaluing emotional ties, our identity as

27For some illustrations of the frailty of human agency,
including examples of how human agency can be undermined, and the
specific rational ity-requirements which this frailty imposes on us,
see Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason. pp.101, 114-15, 118,
125, and 140-41; also Onora O'Neill (then Nell), Acting on
Principle. Chapter 6.
“This has been convincingly shown by Paul Guyer in Kant and
Freedom; Essavs on Aesthetics and Morality
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), Chapter 10.
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legislators of universal law imposes on us the duty to preserve
the relationships and commitments which we enter into as finite
rational beings.

ii» The emotions are passively experienced

Williams next criticizes Kant for claiming that the emotions
are passively experienced.

The dire consequence he takes this

claim to have for Kantian morality is that it excludes
emotionally motivated actions from having moral worth, when in
fact they do have a moral or at least "human" value.

He

attributes to Kant the claim that "moral worth can attach only to
what we freely do, to those respects in which we are rationally
active" (ME, 227).

Since, according to Kant, the emotions are

neither rationally nor actively willed, moral worth cannot,
Williams infers, attach to emotionally motivated actions, for
Kant.
Williams first makes what he considers to be a minor
objection, namely, that "emotionally motivated action can itself
be free" (ME, 227).

He takes Kant's claim that the emotions are

passively experienced to imply that acting from emotions is also
a passive, unfree affair.

This reveals a deep misunderstanding

of Kant's view of human agency.

The passivity of the emotions

does not entail, within Kant's system, that emotionally motivated
actions are not free.

All human actions are free, for Kant,

including those motivated by emotions.
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Freedom of the will

consists in the ability to form maxims— reasons for acting— which
are based on incentives, including emotions and desires, but not
determined by them.

As Kant famously puts it,

...freedom of the will is of a wholly unique nature in that
an incentive can determine the will to an action only so far
as the individual has incorporated it into his. maxim (has

made it the general rule in accordance with which he will
conduct himself); only thus can an incentive, whatever it
may be, co-exist with the absolute spontaneity of the will
(i.e., freedom) (R:19).
Human actions are not brute responses to incentives; they stem
instead from the freely formed intention to act on a given
incentive and in the way described by the maxim.

In order to act

from an emotion— say, love— one must first, then, form the maxim
that one will act from love in situations of that sort.

This

intention-forming process is what makes us rational agents:
without it, we would neither deliberate nor control ourselves; we
would simply act on— or react to— our strongest desire.

Since an

emotionally motivated action stems not directly from the emotion
itself, but from the freely formed maxim to act on the emotion at
hand, the action is Itself free.

Contrary to Williams'

assumption, emotionally motivated actions— like all human
actions— are free, for Kant.
The main thrust of Williams' criticism, however, concerns
not the freedom, but the moral value, of acting on emotions.
Williams takes Kant to hold that moral worth can never attach to
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emotionally motivated actions because emotions are passively
experienced, and moral worth can attach only to those respects in
which we are "rationally active."

Before going into the specific

criticisms which Williams levels against Kant on this issue, we
should note that Kant did not deny that some emotionally
motivated actions have moral worth.

As we saw earlier in this

chapter, moral worth can attach to emotionally motivated actions
in the following ways: actions motivated either by emotions which
have been cultivated out of a sense of duty or by emotions which
are recognized to be appropriate motives for fulfilling what duty
requires, da have moral worth, for Kant, since the motivating
emotions are in these cases not uncontrolled, but tempered by
principles.
Williams has two deep objections to the idea that moral
worth attaches only to what we actively do, to those respects in
which we act on freely adopted principles, and not to "passive"
emotional responses.

Since moral worth, for Kant, attaches to

emotionally motivated actions only if they are at the same time
governed by principles, these objections strike directly at Kant.
In his first objection, Williams questions the idea that
freely adopted principles can reflect one's sincere moral
convictions.

He points out an important resemblance between

moral and factual convictions: both are passively adopted in the
sense that they are impressed on us.

If an agent claims that he

has simply decided to adopt a moral principle, we have reason to
doubt the sincerity of his principle.
297

For moral convictions are

impressed on us; and a great degree of moral sincerity depends on
our acknowledgement of this passivity, on our awareness that our
moral convictions are not simply adopted at will.

As Williams

somewhat obscurely puts it:
We see a man's genuine convictions as coming from somewhere
deeper in him than that; and, by what is only an apparent
paradox, what we see as coming from deeper in him, he— that
is, the deciding 'he'— may see as coming from outside him.
So it is with the emotions (ME, 227).
Williams seems to be making the following argument.

Since we

experience the emotions as being impressed on us— as coming from
"outside" us— and since this passivity is essential to moral
sincerity, acting from emotions is a prime instance of moral
sincerity.

To claim, as Kant does, that moral worth can attach

only to what we freely decide to do, is to neglect the extent to
which passively experienced phenomena, e.g., emotions, determine
moral sincerity.
Now, there is certainly something deep and important in the
idea that moral sincerity is intimately connected with the sense
of being "swept up" by a situation and by the feelings it
engenders, and that acting on such feelings is one way of showing
moral sincerity.

However, our moral convictions often run

against the tide of our feelings.

It is altogether unclear how

Williams would characterize such conflicted situations.
they be examples of moral insincerity, for him?

Would

Since he seems

in the above passage to equate feelings with moral convictions.
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or at least to see moral convictions as being bound up with
feelings, he appears unable even to characterize situations in
which we know that we should not act on our emotions; in which we
know that it would be morally wrong to do so (think of a
situation in which the other person's end is morally
unacceptable, e.g., the case of deciding whether to help a friend
planning to rob a bank). Perhaps Williams would describe such
cases as involving a conflict of feelings, e.g., a conflict
between loyalty to a friend and the feeling that helping him
would be wrong in this situation.

But the awareness that an

action is morally wrong need not be bound up with any particular
feeling.

It is therefore misleading to characterize moral

conflict as conflict between feelings.

But that seems to be the

only description available to Williams.
In any case, there is more to moral sincerity than simply
doing what one is moved to do in a given situation.
sincerity requires also a

commitment

Moral

to one's convictions, a

readiness to act on one's principles even when one does not feel
like it; and that is precisely why Kant distinguishes between
feelings and principles.

Now, Williams might in fact concede

that feelings are not the same as principles, and that it is
possible (though he does not describe how) for a conflict to
arise between one's feelings and one's sincere moral convictions.
He would still, however, make the following objection to Kant's
construal of how we adopt our moral convictions.

Kant holds that

we freely adopt the maxims on which we act, but Williams thinks
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our principles are "impressed" on us, from outside, as it were.
What appears to others to come from deep within a man is
experienced by him, the moral subject, as coming from outside
him.

This is the element of passivity that Williams feels is so

important to moral sincerity, and which he takes Kant to
overlook.
But Kant would agree that we experience our moral
convictions as being, in a sense, impressed on us.

The moral

law, he says, is a "fact of reason," an inescapable principle
which "forces itself upon us" (Cprr:31).
structure of reason.

It belongs to the very

It is not something we can decide to adopt

as morally right, for it sets the standard of rightness itself.
As finite rational beings, we can surely choose to violate the
law.

But we can never ignore the fact that it sets the paradigm

for how we should act.

We

experience the moral law as being

impressed on us "from outside," to use Williams' terms, because
pure reason— with which we certainly identify, but which can
never completely characterize us, since we are capable of
violating its laws— imposes the moral law on us with a necessity
which precludes decisions about whether to accept the law as
morally right or not (Cprr:20).

Our awareness of the moral thus

has the "passive" element which Williams takes to characterize
our awareness of our sincerely held moral con^ ctions.
The "passive" phenomenology of our experience of the moral
law, however, does not prevent us from freely adopting our
maxims.

Maxims are

subjective

principles of reason, principles
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which describe how we propose to act in specific situations
(G:422n).

Since our maxims can either violate or conform to the

dictates of the moral law, they do not necessarily reflect our
sincere moral convictions, which, because of the inescapability
of pure reason, always conform to the moral law even if we should
deceive ourselves to think otherwise (R:33, 37).

Since Williams

fails to distinguish between freely chosen (and in this sense
contingent) maxims and the moral law, which imposes itself on us
with inescapable necessity, his complaint that we do not simply
decide to adopt our moral convictions is not only vague, but also
misplaced.

Kant can thus answer all of Williams' objections.

Conclusion

I have shown that far from asking us to sacrifice personal
commitments and enlist in an impersonal army of duty, Kant
recognizes that when we engage in friendships, we cultivate a
moral disposition by cultivating the moral feelings themselves
(in particular, mutual love and respect).

In this sense,

personal commitments serve as a paradigm for all moral relations.
Within intimate relationships, moral concerns manifest
themselves in a specific way.

The concern for (or awareness of)

the rightness of our actions characteristic of the motive of duty
formulates itself, in personal relations, in an especially urgent
command to tend to the appropriateness of our feelings within the
relationship— urgent because the relationship is based on natural
feelings of love and these need to be tended to secure the
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survival of the relationship.

There is usually a harmony between

our natural desires and the requirements of reason as they
manifest themselves within the relationship; nevertheless, every
day is not a sunny day, and we often consciously prepare for the
storms which eventually tear at the seams of the relationship.
This is an act of will and indeed a moral act, given Kant's
requirement that we actively engage in friendships in order to
learn how to attend to and care about the thoughts, needs and
feelings of other people in general and so to cultivate our love
of man.
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